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Abstract 
 
This thesis has two main objectives. The first is to challenge the prevailing 
orthodoxy that holds the Australia-US alliance is a “special relationship” driven by 
mutual security interests and shared values. Traditional security anxieties and 
common cultural influences continue to drive the relationship. However, this thesis 
argues that support for the current alliance at the elite level primarily derives from 
the desire to sustain western control over regional and international affairs and 
extend Australia’s influence abroad. 
 
The second objective is to provide the first comprehensive critical analysis of the 
role of the AALD in preserving alliance orthodoxy in Australia. Based in part on 
interviews with current and former participants, and informed by the literature on 
lobby groups, informal diplomacy and public diplomacy, this thesis identifies three 
main ways the AALD influences elite opinion. First, it carefully frames discussion and 
debate about the value of the alliance to Australia. Second, it facilitates the 
socialisation of Australian elites into alliance orthodoxy. Finally, it serves as a 
“gatekeeper” of the status quo and a litmus test on the alliance loyalty of potential 
future leaders. 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Understanding Australia’s Alliance-Reliance Mentality 
 
The Australia-US alliance1 is somewhat unusual when compared to other bilateral 
security relationships. Typically, alliances exist to confront an external threat or 
contain or balance one or more rival powers.2 In contrast, the Australia-US alliance 
did not dissolve when the major threats offered as justification for its creation – 
Japanese militarism and Soviet/Chinese communist aggression – were no longer 
officially a concern. Australia’s enthusiastic embrace of the alliance continued into 
the post-Cold War era despite the security pay-offs becoming increasingly unclear 
and the costs remaining high.3 
 
The conventional threat-centric explanations for the existence of the alliance are 
problematic. Japan, the Soviet Union and the PRC did not represent a credible direct 
threat to Australia during the Cold War. Other potential regional threats, such as 
Indonesia, lacked both the intent and the capability to launch a serious attack on 
mainland Australia. Although presented as a direct threat in public, communism 
was privately understood as a threat to western interests as a whole and not to 
Australia directly. Today, strategic concerns with respect to China’s rise are 
primarily about the potential threat Beijing poses to US primacy in Asia rather than 
any specific threat to Australia.4 
 
                                                     
1 “The Australia-US alliance”, “the US alliance” and simply “the alliance” are used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis. 
2 On the traditional role of alliances in international relations and the shifting nature of the Australia-
US alliance and other western security partnerships, see William Tow, “Alliances and Alignments in 
the Twenty-First Century” in Brendan Taylor (ed), Australia as an Asia Pacific Regional Power: 
Friendship in Flux?, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 14-16. For a classic neo-realist understanding of 
the role of alliances in international relations, see Stephen M. Walt, Why Alliances Endure or 
Collapse, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 39, no. 1, 1997, pp. 156-179. 
3 On the peculiar nature of the US alliance system in Asia and the limits of traditional alliance theory 
for understanding its persistence, see Mark Beeson, Can Asia’s Alliances Still Keep the Peace?, Global 
Asia, vol. 9, no. 3, 2014; Mark Beeson, Invasion by Invitation: The Role of Alliances in the Asia-Pacific, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3, 2015, pp. 100-107. 
4 Jae Jeok Park and Hyun Chung Yoo, The Resilience of the US Australia Alliance: Does a (Potential) 
China Threat Provide a Rationale for the Alliance?, The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, vol. 27, 
no. 4, December 2015, pp. 417-434. 
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Nevertheless, conventional wisdom maintains that the alliance is indispensable as a 
deterrent against attack and, more importantly, for maintaining Australia’s self-
reliant defence capability against all levels of potential threat. Indirectly, the 
alliance is seen to underpin Australia’s favourable regional security environment via 
its contribution to the American-led system of bilateral alliances in Asia. According 
to Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper, American primacy is indispensable for 
ensuring a peaceful, prosperous and stabile Asia-Pacific and a “rules-based global 
order”.5 Additionally, the majority of Australian “strategic elites” today view US 
hegemony as preferable to any other system of regional security.6 
 
The apparent central importance of the alliance to Australia is reinforced by the 
“special relationship” narrative which holds that the alliance is built on a historical 
foundation of mutual security interests and shared values first forged in the joint 
blood sacrifices of WWII. Australia and American officials frequently assert that 
evidence of the special relationship can be found in the enduring joint commitment 
of both countries to promote peace, stability, freedom, democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. 
 
Chapter One of this thesis debunks the special relationship myth and demonstrates 
that the overriding guiding principle of the alliance is the maintenance of American 
hegemony and the favourable strategic and economic order it presides over. The 
commitment by Canberra and Washington to uphold the “rules-based global order” 
conveniently ignores the fact that the US largely sets the rules, ensuring the 
benefits of the international system primarily accrue to itself and that of its allies.7 
The preservation and extension of the American-led order has often come at the 
                                                     
5 Commonwealth of Australia, 2016 Defence White Paper, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2016, 
p. 121. 
6 In a survey of 26 Australian “strategic elites”, over sixty per cent favoured “continued US leadership 
even if relative US power declines” over any other alternative regional order, including Chinese 
primacy, a US-China condominium, an uneasy balance of power among major regional powers, and a 
new community of nations based on strengthened multilateral institutions and cooperation. Michael 
J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, Power and Order in Asia: A Survey of Regional Expectations, Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, 17 July 2014, p. 8, <http://csis.org/
publication/power-and-order-asia>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
7 Michael Beckley, China's Century? Why America's Edge will Endure, International Security, vol. 36, 
no. 3, 2011, pp. 48-50. 
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expense of regional peace and stability, as well as the apparent shared 
commitments to freedom, human rights and the other so-called “foundational 
values” of the alliance. 
 
Australia has a long tradition of relying on a powerful ally for its security despite the 
absence of any direct threats. For obvious historical and cultural reasons, Australia 
held fast to strategic dependence on Britain from the time of European colonisation 
through to WWII. Australians harboured a keen sense of vulnerably to the prospect 
of attack and yet, in the words of the Colonial Defence Committee in London in the 
late-nineteenth century, “there is no British territory so little liable to aggression as 
that of Australia”.8 There was no credible German threat to Australia during WWI 
and, although confronted by Japanese imperialism during WWII, there was no 
planned Japanese invasion of Australia.9 
 
Critics of the alliance have typically focused on Australia’s traditional security 
anxieties and other ideological and psychological predispositions to explain the 
contradiction between the remoteness of actual threats to Australia and the 
inability of elites in Canberra to kick the habit of dependency on “great and 
powerful friends”. Following from Australia’s dependence on Britain, this line of 
reasoning was initially employed as a means to explain Australia’s enthusiastic but 
misguided support for failed US military interventions during the Cold War – notably 
in Vietnam – and reiterated by supporters and critical observers since to explain the 
endurance of the alliance in the post-Cold War era.10 
 
The notion of Australian dependence, and even subservience, to the US was 
injected with new life during the particularly intimate relations that developed 
during the years of the John Howard and George W. Bush administrations, and, in 
                                                     
8 Tom O’Lincoln, The Neighbour From Hell: Two Centuries of Australian Imperialism, Melbourne: 
Interventions, 2014, pp. 18-20, quote p. 19. 
9 Greg Lockhart, “We’re So Alone” Two Versions of the Void in Australian Military History, Australian 
Historical Studies, vol. 33, no. 120, 2002, pp. 390-391. 
10 For a recent critical review of the theme of Australian dependence and subservience to the US, see 
Lloyd Cox and Brendon O’Connor, Australia, the US, and the Vietnam and Iraq Wars: “Hound Dog not 
Lapdog”, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 47, No. 2, 2012, pp. 173-187. 
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particular, in the years following Australia’s participation in America’s bungled 
invasion of Iraq.11 Most recently, former Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s resurrection 
of the importance of the “Anglosphere” in international affairs prompted critics to 
question whether, in constructivist terms, “ideational factors and historical path 
dependency” are the most likely explanations for Australia’s enthusiastic embrace 
of the alliance.12 
 
The origins and nature of Australia’s enduring fear of invasion are well documented 
and explored in detail in Chapter Two. In sum, they derive from two main historical 
sources. The first is Australia’s relative powerlessness and geographic isolation from 
“natural” strategic partners in Europe and North America. Combined with deep and 
abiding cultural connections to the Anglosphere, Australia’s perception of its 
strategic vulnerability led to dependence on Britain, and later the US, as a means to 
ensure its security. 
 
Popular theories of racial hierarchy that pervaded nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century Australia constitutes the second source of Australia’s security anxieties. 
Blinded by sentiments of white superiority and irrational fears of Asia, Australia 
maintained a strict immigration policy and held fast to alliances with the great 
Anglo-Saxon powers in order to ensure the survival of white Australia. The 
experience of Japanese imperialism during WWII solidified long-standing fears 
about the prospect of an Asian invasion, while the advent of the Cold War merged 
old fears about Asia with new fears about “international communism”. 
 
While undoubtedly playing a significant role, irrational fears and cultural 
attachments alone do not provide an adequate explanation for the endurance of 
Australia’s alliance with the US. The notion that policy makers have consistently 
                                                     
11 Alison Broinowski, Allied and Addicted, Melbourne: Scribe, 2007; Alison Broinowski, Howard’s 
War, Melbourne: Scribe, 2003; Anthony Burke, Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Joseph Camilleri, The Howard Years: Cultural 
Ambivalence and Political Dogma, Borderlands E-Journal, Special Issue: Cultural Ambivalence, 
Cultural Politics: National Mythologies of Australia, Asia and the Past, vol. 3, no. 3, 2004; Robert 
Garran, True Believer: John Howard, George Bush and the American Alliance, Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, 2004; Erik Paul, Little America: Australia, the 51st State, London: Pluto Press, 2006. 
12 Beeson, Invasion by Invitation, p. 314. 
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overlooked Australia’s unthreatening strategic environment for over sixty years in 
their alliance management calculations warrants scrutiny. As one discerning scholar 
points out: 
 
When policies such as the ANZUS alliance have been pursued for so 
long (and at times at great cost) they cannot be considered as simply 
the result of mistaken perceptions of the world or personal failings of 
political will. They point to structural determinants of policy not 
enunciated in liberal or postmodern approaches.13 
 
Reliance on irrational security anxieties as an explanation for the alliance raises 
further questions; for example, why have Australian military contributions to 
American wars consistently been small in size and mostly symbolic? Far from 
reflecting deeply embedded paranoia, Australia’s alliance management politics 
indicates a shrewd calculation of the perceived national interest.14 
 
Australia and the British Imperial Order in Asia 
 
While acknowledging the influence of security anxieties in Australian strategic 
culture, Chapter Two of this thesis also highlights the existence of an equally 
influential “imperialist spirit” that is connected to, but nevertheless distinct from, 
the traditional fear of invasion. Australians harboured fervently expansionist 
ambitions in the Southwest Pacific during the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries – albeit a kind of sub-imperialism within the British Empire – founded on a 
mix of strategic, economic and nationalist motivations. 
 
This imperialist spirit continued into the post-WWII period under the guise of 
Australia’s “special responsibilities” as a “metropolitan power” and a custodian of 
                                                     
13 Sam Pietsch, Australia’s Military Intervention in East Timor, 1999, PhD Thesis, The Australian 
National University, Canberra, February 2009, pp. 17-18. 
14 For an insightful discussion on the problematic nature of the insurance rational as an explanation 
for Australia’s alliance with the US, see David McLean, Australia in the Cold War: A Historiographical 
Review, The International History Review, vol. 23, no. 2, 2001, pp. 299-321. 
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the British Empire in the Asia-Pacific. It manifested prominently in Australia’s ruling 
conservative parties in the 1950s and 1960s that were firmly opposed to self-
determination for the peoples of Asia.15 Today, Australia’s neo-imperial mindset can 
be seen in its self-identification as a leading “middle power” holding obligations on 
behalf of the western-security community. 
 
Chapter Two also highlights the politico-economic dimension to Australia’s alliance-
reliance mentality. It argues that Australia’s security anxieties cannot be separated 
from the fact that Australia’s prosperity relied on the continuation of the British 
imperial project both at home and abroad. Although technically a part of the 
colonised world, Australia was able to break into the ranks of industrialised nations 
largely as a result of its privileged position within the British Empire and the global 
system of exploitation that sustained it. 
 
One of the implications of Australia’s vested strategic and economic interests in the 
British Empire was the unqualified support for British imperialism to the furthest 
reaches of the globe; Australia upholding a special responsibility for bolstering 
Britain’s imperial position in the Middle East. Defending the Empire consisted of 
helping to thwart attempts by rival imperial powers to acquire British colonial 
possessions and quash popular indigenous movements seeking freedom and 
democracy from colonialism.16 The “loss” of any imperial possessions, it was 
reasoned – either by conquest or revolt – “would mean the denial of a source of 
British power which could be marshalled to defend Australia either directly or on a 
distant perimeter”.17 
 
                                                     
15 Christopher Waters, After Decolonisation: Australia and the Emergence of the Non-aligned 
Movement in Asia, 1954-55, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 12, no. 2, 2001, p. 156. 
16 For an insightful account of how Australian forces were used in the service of British imperialism to 
crush a popular uprising in Egypt in 1919, and the atrocities committed by Australian soldiers in both 
Egypt and Syria during WWI, see Suzanne Brugger, Australians and Egypt, 1914-1919, Carlton, VIC: 
Melbourne University Press, 1980. 
17 D. S. Meakin, Australian Attitudes to Indian Independence, The Australian Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 1, 
March 1968, p. 83. 
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In the context of Australia’s geostrategic position as a “status quo” power, risk-
averse to changes “which could degrade its position of comfort and privilege”,18 far-
fetched security justifications appear more like rationalisations for the continuing 
dominance of its great power ally than the result of cultural attachments or 
mistaken security perceptions. This remained the case even after WWII when 
Australia emerged as more or less a sovereign and independent nation. Australia’s 
central policy objective in the two decades after 1945 was to restore the British 
Empire and the wider European-imperial order in the Far East after it was disrupted 
by Japanese imperialism. 
 
Australia’s major security commitments in the 1950s and 1960s were to the British-
coordinated ANZAM area of strategic interest and the US-led SEATO. Ostensibly, 
these defence arrangements were primarily driven by the threat of communist 
aggression. However, it has since been recognised that the perceived threat was 
mostly illusory. A number of critics have thus pointed to Australia’s “strategic 
dependence” on both Britain and the US – underpinned by traditional security 
anxieties and cultural attachments to the Anglosphere – as an explanation for 
wrong-headed policies such as involvement in the Vietnam War.19 
 
Chapter Three of this thesis proposes that there is a more plausible explanation for 
the unwillingness of Australian policy makers to accept the fallacy of “international 
communism” despite clear evidence to the contrary. Their failure to recognise 
communist movements in Southeast Asia as indigenous, nationalist and mostly 
benign to Australian security was a necessary illusion to justify the objective of 
reasserting western control over Asia. The US alliance assumed exceptional 
importance in this context because Canberra’s regional objective of restoring British 
prestige in the Far East was not possible without America’s support. Coincidentally, 
this objective aligned with Washington’s own interim plans and long-term vision of 
a US-led capitalist world order. 
                                                     
18 Martin Griffiths and Michael Wesley, Taking Asia Seriously, Australian Journal of Political Science, 
vol. 45, no. 1, 2010, p. 20. 
19 For a critical review of the literature on the theme of strategic dependence during the Cold War, 
see McLean, Australia in the Cold War. 
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Australia’s so-called strategic dependence on the US during the 1950s and 1960s 
was therefore not the result of subservience, but rather calculated decision making, 
driven less by genuine security concerns than deeper imperial motives. The 
Australia-US alliance and the strategic doctrine of “forward defence” – particularly 
as it pertained to Vietnam – was a political rather than a defence strategy; one 
whose aim was to lock the US into the region as a means of restoring the western- 
imperial order after the Japanese interregnum.20 
 
US Hegemony and Australia’s “Middle Power” Ambitions 
 
While firmly committed to the restoration and preservation of the British Empire in 
Southeast Asia in the two decades after WWII, it was also evident to Australian 
policy makers that British power in the Far East was in rapid decline. Concomitantly, 
Australia willingly integrated into America’s neo-imperial regional order that  
replaced the old colonial powers; henceforth developing an interest in the 
preservation and extension of American global capitalism. While in the past, 
Australia’s strategic outlook was shaped primarily by Empire interests, by the mid-
1960s, it was clear to those inside the US State Department that Australia had 
increasingly come to view “the world in much the same terms as does the US. She 
seeks the same general objectives and would fashion her role in Asia as a 
microcosm of the American role around the world”.21 
 
This new strategic outlook was not the result of simply replacing strategic 
dependence on Britain with that of the US. Rather, it came about because of a 
general alignment of interests, particularly with respect to preserving western 
dominance in Asia and extending Australia’s regional influence. Although Australia 
relied on its “great and powerful friends” to ensure its security in the 1950s and 
                                                     
20 This argument has largely been drawn from the work of Greg Lockhart, The Minefield: An 
Australian Tragedy in Vietnam, Crows Nest, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2007. 
21 Tracy H. Wilder and Robert F. Packard, Australia in Mid-Passage: A Study of Her Role in the Indian 
Ocean-Southeast Asia Area, Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State, 11 April 1966, p. 7, 
<http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/711-Tracy-H.-Wilder-and-Robert-F.-Packard.pdf>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
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1960s – no matter how distant the threat – thereafter, Australia began to take 
greater responsibility for its own direct security and wider regional interests as a 
strategically independent power. However, it remained dependent on the US to 
preserve the “stability” of the wider regional and global order. 
 
Beginning in the 1970s, and in accordance with Australia’s newfound independence, 
the primary purpose of the US alliance underwent a gradual transformation from 
guaranteeing Australia’s security to bolstering its military and intelligence 
capabilities for defending the nation independently, despite the persistence of 
Australia’s non-threatening security environment. However, the new DOA and “self-
reliance” doctrines, as they were called, quickly evolved from a focus on defending 
the continent and its immediate surrounds to promoting Australia’s wider interests 
abroad as a significant regional power. 
 
It is in this context that Chapter Four argues that the current US alliance can be 
more readily understood in terms of bolstering Australia’s capacity for regional 
influence and control than defending the Australian continent. Although allying with 
the global hegemon undoubtedly provides some security benefits, in the face of a 
persistently benign security environment and Australia’s enduring “middle power” 
ambitions, the alliance has far greater relevance as a means for force-projection. 
Significantly, official accounts and realist arguments in favour of the alliance 
frequently emphasise its utility in enhancing Australia’s status an “Asia-Pacific 
power”.22 
 
Liberal and constructivist critics of the alliance have continued to insist that 
traditional security anxieties and cultural attachments are the primary drivers of 
Australia’s dependence on the US.23 According to critical approaches to 
international security studies, Australia’s strategic dependence on the US is 
presumably not surprising because “states have historically been anxious about 
                                                     
22 Paul Dibb, “Australia-United States” in Brendan Taylor (ed), Australia as an Asia Pacific Regional 
Power, pp. 33-49. 
23 For a useful summary of liberal, constructivist and post-modernist critiques of the alliance in this 
manner, see Pietsch, Australia’s Military Intervention in East Timor, pp. 14-17. 
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security – so much so that they have encoded it into their fundamental structure of 
being”.24 
 
However, in the case of the Australia-US alliance, the primary consideration is not 
defence and security but credibility and influence. Although couched in doctrinaire 
notions of “security” and “stability”, realist accounts which focus on structural 
factors, rather than the personal or psychological, offer greater clarity about the 
fundamental driving influences of the alliance than critics who stress the 
importance of the traditional “fear of security”.25 Furthermore, one could argue 
that it is not the desire for security that lies at the core of the modern nation-state 
system but rather the drive on the part of political elites to amass and project 
power, and to enjoy all of the benefits that coercion evidently confers.26 
 
Australia’s connection to a “great and powerful friend” was long ago understood to 
provide it with a larger voice in international diplomacy. Writing on the concept of 
the Anglosphere in 1929, former Prime Minister Billy Hughes observed that: 
  
The Dominions as part of the Empire are listened to by foreign 
nations with interest, for the influence of a great world power lends 
weight to their lightest word . . . In themselves, although potentially 
great nations . . . they do not count for much; as part of an Empire 
that has behind it great riches and organised force, the world pays 
them the tribute it always gives to wealth and power.27 
 
In the past, Australians certainly believed that participation in faraway British wars 
could be used as a means to gain leverage over London in the event Australia’s 
                                                     
24 Burke, Fear of Security, p. 1. 
25 Burke, Fear of Security. 
26 Historical accounts of the emergence of the nation-state system in Europe certainly lend support 
to this argument. See Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1992, Cambridge: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1992; Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
27 Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian American Relations Between 
1900 and 1975, St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1987, p. 38. 
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interests in the Pacific were threatened.28 Today, the Australia-US alliance is 
understood to “enhance Australia’s standing in the region in a way that would not 
otherwise be possible”.29 
 
There is interplay between Australia’s traditional security anxieties, cultural 
connections to the Anglosphere and desire to extend its influence abroad. They 
constitute mutually reinforcing factors that serve to drive Australia’s alliance with 
the US. Nevertheless, the remoteness of threats to Australia’s security, and its 
relatively large defence expenditures and ever-strengthening alliance with the US, 
can be more readily reconciled in terms of the unsentimental realism of power 
politics. In short, the alliance primarily serves the objective of bolstering Australia’s 
status as a “middle power” that can favourably shape its regional strategic 
environment and assume a larger role in international diplomacy.30 
 
The AALD and the Management of Elite Opinion 
 
The central argument proposed in Part One of this thesis is that structural rather 
than personal or psychological factors provide the greatest clarity in explaining the 
endurance of the alliance. However, its existence is not solely determined by this 
fact. Australia’s fundamental geostrategic position as a status-quo power within a 
US-led capitalist world order does not guarantee the alliance’s persistence.31  
 
                                                     
28 O’Lincoln, The Neighbour From Hell, pp. 15-18. 
29 Park and Yoo, The Resilience of the US-Australia, p. 425. 
30 Significantly, this point has also been argued with respect to Singapore, the only other country in 
the immediate region apart from Australia whose armed forces are externally oriented. According to 
Lee, given that any immediate threat to Singapore’s sovereignty is “far-fetched”, its formidable 
defence capability and its cultivation of defence relationships with great powers is best understood 
as a means to augment its non-military instruments of power – particularly diplomatic and economic 
– thereby increasing its regional and international influence. Yi-Jin Lee, Singapore’s Defence Policy: 
Essential or Excessive, Master’s Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, June 2010. 
31 This contrasts with the view of at least one Marxist account which argues that Australia will 
continue to support the status quo in international affairs unless there is a collapse of the current 
capitalist world order or profound internal social transformation takes place. Pietsch, Australia’s 
Military Intervention in East Timor, p. 24. 
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Despite the high degree of elite and public support for the alliance, concerns about 
its strength, and even its existence into the future, has resulted in efforts to see it 
further institutionalised by various interests.  While their importance is often 
exaggerated, private initiatives launched over recent decades with the objective of 
managing elite and public opinion in Australia have played more than an incidental 
role in helping to preserve orthodox thinking about the alliance and insulate it from 
potential challenges. Critically evaluating what is arguably the most prominent and 
successful of these – the AALD – constitutes the second part of this thesis, detailed 
in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
 
As the cornerstone of Australia’s defence and foreign policies, the Australia-US 
alliance assumes exceptional importance in both public and elite circles. A strong 
belief in the alliance is held by key foreign policy elites in both major parties in 
Australia, senior figures in the bureaucracy and influential non-government 
organisations.32 At the popular level, the alliance has consistently enjoyed high 
levels of support. So deep is public commitment, it is argued, that no government 
that wishes to be elected “would challenge the centrality of the US alliance to 
Australia’s defence and foreign policies”.33 Strong public opinion, electoral politics 
and elite preferences combine to underpin what one scholar has described as the 
“Canberra consensus”: the belief “that a very strong military relationship with the 
USA is necessary for Australia’s well-being”.34  
 
More than a security pact, the alliance has penetrated Australia’s diplomatic, 
military, social, political, economic and cultural spheres. Accordingly, writes 
Australian historian Peter Edwards, the alliance is “far more than just another 
bilateral relationship . . . it has become a political institution in its own right, 
                                                     
32 Nick Bisley, An Ally For All The Years To Come: Why Australia Is Not A Conflicted US Ally, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 4, 2013, pp. 410-412. 
33 James Cotton and John Ravenhill, “Middle Power Dreaming: Australian Foreign Policy During the 
Rudd-Gillard Governments” in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), Middle Power Dreaming: 
Australia and the World Affairs 2006-2010, South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 1. 
34 Bisley, An Ally For All The Years To Come, p. 410. 
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comparable with a political party or the monarchy”.35 One consequence of the 
institutionalisation of the alliance is the unquestioning commitment of Australian 
political leaders to pursue an ever-closer relationship with the US. Even strong 
supporters of the alliance argue that it has perhaps risen to the level of an 
“ideology” or “an article of faith” in Australian politics.36 
 
Although there is broad support for the alliance, there is much room for 
interpretation of national surveys that also appear to indicate the majority of 
Australians would like a more independent foreign policy from the US.37 Recent 
foreign policy decisions either made in accordance with Australia’s alliance 
obligations, or undertaken in order to strengthen the alliance, have been deeply 
unpopular. The recent Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and the 2005 Australia-US Free 
Trade Agreement, are cases in point. 
 
Moreover, a gap has long existed between the Australian public and officialdom 
when envisaging the role and purpose of the alliance. As the noted Australian 
strategic and defence studies expert, Desmond Ball, has pointed out, “there are 
significant differences between the positions articulated in official policy statements 
and public opinion” about the role of the alliance in Australia.38 Ball highlights that 
in elite circles: 
 
Since the 1980s, the important aspects of the alliance have been the 
preferential access to US defence technology, which has been 
important in maintaining the high-technology focus of Australian 
                                                     
35 Peter Edwards, Permanent Friends? Historical Reflections on the Australian-American Alliance, 
Lowy Institute Paper 8, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 13 December 2005, p. 2, 
<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/permanent-friends-historical-reflections-australian-
american-alliance>, accessed 5 April 2015. 
36 Sam Roggeveen, Tony Abbott and the US Alliance, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, 21 August 2013, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/08/21/Tony-Abbott-and-the-
US-alliance.aspx>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
37 Brendan O’Connor and Srdjan Vucetic, Another Mars-Venus Divide? Why Australia Said “Yes” and 
Canada Said “Non” to Involvement in the 2003 Iraq War, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
vol. 64, no. 5, November 2010, p. 538. 
38 Desmond Ball, The Strategic Essence, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 2, 
2001, p. 245. 
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defence strategy; the intelligence cooperation and exchange 
arrangements; and the access to the most senior strategic councils in 
Washington.39 
 
“On the other hand”, Ball continues, “the media and the general public tend to view 
the importance of the alliance very much in traditional terms – that is, whether or 
not it provides a US security guarantee in the event of attack on Australia”.40 
 
The difference in official and popular interpretations of the alliance can be traced to 
its origins.41 Australians were understandably anxious about the possibility of attack 
by a resurgent Japan in the aftermath of WWII. However, in negotiations with 
Washington regarding a Pacific defence pact, the primary objective of the then 
Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, was not to gain assurance of US 
support to defend Australia. Australian policy makers understood that there were 
no foreseeable or credible direct threats to their country. Spender’s central 
objective was to gain access and influence over high-level strategic planning in 
Washington. The ANZUS Pact served the political purpose of appeasing unfounded 
public fears of an invasion, making it possible for the Australian government to 
justify the deployment of forces in the Middle East in line with Anglo-American war 
plans.42 
 
Among the general public, a deep understanding of the alliance and the full 
implications for Australian defence and foreign policies remains absent. According 
to a 2007 national survey, of the 61 per cent of Australians who had read or heard 
of the ANZUS Treaty, 63 per cent did not know the US was a member.43 Many 
                                                     
39 Ball, p. 246. 
40 Ball, p. 245. 
41 The following account of these differences is largely based on a reading of Philip Dorling, The 
Origins of the ANZUS Treaty: A Reconsideration, South Australia: Flinders Politics Monographs, 
Flinders University, 1989. 
42 A cynic might retort that not much has changed in this respect in the intervening six or so decades. 
43 The United States Studies Centre (USSC), Australian Attitudes Towards the United States: Foreign 
Policy, Security, Economics and Trade, presentation by Professor Murray Goot, 3 October 2007, p. 
17, <http://ussc.edu.au/ussc/assets/media/docs/publications/0708_nationalopinionsurvey_part1.
pdf>, accessed 1 April 2016. 
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Australians are ignorant of the fact that the Treaty does not constitute a guarantee 
the US will come to Australia’s aid in the event of an attack, but merely stipulates an 
obligation for each state to “consult” and act “in accordance with its constitutional 
processes”.44 While a majority of Australians are in favour of US forces and bases in 
Australia, few believe Australia should offer support to any US military action in Asia 
were a conflict to develop, for example, between China and Japan, despite the fact 
that America’s presence is likely to implicate Australia in any future US-Sino war.45 
 
Although elites typically express a high degree of confidence about the strength of 
the Australia-US alliance, it is also recognised that the relationship requires careful 
management and nurturing to ensure its continued success. In the past, there have 
been concerns about the possible weakening of both public and elite opinion 
toward the US, with the suggestion that “measures should be taken with the aim of 
obviating or minimising threats to the continued health of the alliance”.46 When a 
national opinion poll revealed that a majority of Australians held some 
unfavourable opinions of the US during the administration of George W. Bush, a 
new research institute was established at the University of Sydney – The United 
States Studies Centre – with the explicit objective of supporting and promoting 
Australia’s relationship with the United States.47 
 
                                                     
44 1951 Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS), reproduced 
at Australian Politics, ANZUS Treaty, <http://australianpolitics.com/topics/foreign-policy/anzus-
treaty-text>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
45 Vince Scappatura, The US “Pivot” to Asia, the China Spectre and the Australian-American Alliance, 
The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 12, issue 36, no. 3, 9 September 2014, <http://apjjf.org/2014/12/36/
Vince-Scappatura/4178/article.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. According to one recent survey, 71 per 
cent of Australians are opposed to supporting the US and Japan in any potential conflict with China 
in the East China Sea. Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), East China Sea: What Australians 
Think, 19 January 2015, <http://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/east-china-sea-what-
australians-think>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
46 Edwards, Permanent Friends?, pp. 53-61, quote p. 57. Significantly, Edwards cites the AALD as a 
positive example in redressing this problem, albeit solely focused on elite opinion. 
47 Tim Anderson, Hegemony, Big Money and Academic Independence, Australian Universities’ 
Review, vol. 53, no. 2, 2010, pp. 11-17; Robert Manne, Threats to University Independence: The Case 
of the Humanities, The Journal for the Public University, vol. 4, 2007, pp. 15-20. 
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More recently, there have been concerns raised about a potentially worrying trend 
in public opinion polls regarding the depth of the public commitment to ANZUS.48 
To head off this possibility, Brendan Taylor argues: 
 
[Alliance] managers might be wise to introduce a series of new 
education programs (conceivably in schools and universities) to 
ensure that the public remains well informed as to the benefits (as 
well as the costs and risks) associated with the ANZUS alliance.49 
 
While the Australia-US relationship “is arguably in its best ever shape”, with “every 
prospect that it will continue to both broaden and deepen into the foreseeable 
future”, it is always necessary to “guard against complacency”.50 
 
The growth of private institutions dedicated to strengthening Australia’s 
relationship with the US over the past two decades has been duly noted. Arguably, 
the most prominent and successful of these institutions – with specific focus on 
managing elite opinion – has been the AALD.51 Writing in 2011, prominent political 
commentator, Paul Kelly, pointed out that “through the decade, Australia’s 
institutional bonds with the US surged with . . . stronger private networks typified 
by the [United States] Studies Centre, the Australian American Leadership Dialogue 
and the Lowy Institute [for International Policy]”.52 
 
Similarly, political and international editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, Peter 
Hartcher, observes that the Australia-US relationship is buttressed by three 
structures: 
                                                     
48 Simon Jackman, et. al., The Asian Research Network: Survey on America’s Role in the Asia-Pacific, 
United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, June 2016, pp. 34-35, <http://ussc.edu.au/
publications/The-Asian-Research-Network-Survey-on-Americas-role-in-the-Asia-Pacific>, accessed 8 
June 2016; Brendan Taylor, Unbreakable Alliance? ANZUS in the Asian Century, Asian Politics and 
Policy, vol. 8, no. 1, 2016, pp. 80-81. 
49 Taylor, p. 83. 
50 Taylor, pp. 75, 82. 
51 According to Bisley, the AALD and the United States Studies Centre are “the two most prominent . 
. . non-governmental efforts to reinforce the centrality of the alliance for Australian foreign policy”. 
Bisley, An Ally For All The Years To Come, p. 412. 
52 Paul Kelly, US Bull Wants to Help in the China Shop, The Australian, 8 June 2011. 
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The economic structure is the [Australia-US free] trade agreement. 
The military-industrial structure is the big defence procurement 
investments and . . . the personal contact structure is the Australian 
American Leadership Dialogue . . . which over 10 years has created a 
new infrastructure of personal relationships between leading figures 
in the two countries.53 
 
The AALD is widely lauded as “arguably the most valuable private-sector foreign 
policy initiative ever undertaken in Australia”,54 “a central institution in the US-
Australia relationship”55 and “the most important of all non-government 
organisations dedicated to the strengthening of the Australia-US alliance in all its 
manifestations; civil, political and commercial”.56 Paradoxically, the AALD is also 
largely unknown beyond a small group of interested participants and observers. 
Supporters of the AALD concede that it is a “vital but largely invisible part of the 
alliance infrastructure”57 and a “semi-secret of the alliance”.58 
 
While there has been much debate surrounding the success of the AALD in 
influencing policy outcomes, there has been no detailed critical analysis of AALD’s 
agenda to preserve and strengthen the Australia-US alliance. The only academic 
inquiry into the AALD to date is limited to evaluating its success as an exercise in 
informal diplomacy, failing to question the self-declared objective of the AALD to 
reinforce and recreate policy orthodoxies.59 One of the objectives of this thesis is to 
                                                     
53 Peter Hartcher, Dunny Escape to Done Deal, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 November 2004, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/11/18/1100748140918.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
54 Stephen Loosley, Support Grows For Free Trade, Sunday Telegraph, 19 August 2001. 
55 Greg Sheridan, Financial Shadow On Alliances, The Australian, 25 September 2008. 
56 Glenn Milne, Rudd’s Relevance Deprivation Syndrome, The Drum, ABC, 29 September 2010, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/35454.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
57 Peter Hartcher, In With The New, And No Hard Feelings, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 January 2008, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/in-with-the-new-and-no-hard-feelings/2008/01/25/
1201157663391.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
58 Greg Sheridan, The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance Under Bush and 
Howard, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2007, p. 311. 
59 Elena Douglas and Diane Stone, The Informal Diplomacy of the Australian American Leadership 
Dialogue, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 1, 2015. 
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help to redress a gap in the study of Australian-American relations by critically 
evaluating the AALD’s role in managing Australia’s alliance with the US. 
Anyone wishing to subject the AALD to critical analysis is immediately faced with a 
number of constraints. Only a select few are invited to attend AALD discussions 
which are also governed by a strict non-disclosure convention. This prevents any 
comments from being publicly repeated without the express permission of the 
participant. The AALD also produces little by way of official publications. A request 
by the author to the board of the AALD to distribute a questionnaire to participants 
was rejected, as was permission for the author to attend an AALD event.60 
 
Instead of citing AALD discussions directly, some one hundred and twenty interview 
requests were emailed to current and former participants of the AALD. Of the sixty-
five who responded, forty accepted the invitation to be interviewed. The founder of 
the AALD, Phillip Scanlan, initially agreed to respond to a series of written questions 
via email. However, answers to the questions were not forthcoming, despite 
repeated follow-up requests.61 
 
In-depth face-to-face and phone interviews were conducted by the author in 2011 
and 2012. Interviewees were asked to respond to a series of questions relating to 
the AALD’s origins, objectives, organisational structure and management, selection 
process, personal and institutional value, influence on Australia-US relations, flaws, 
challenges, success, reputation, relevance and long-term viability. Interviewees 
were also asked about the nature and degree of their involvement with AALD, their 
opinion on the diversity of views and the general nature of discussion and debate, 
and the impact of the AALD on their opinion of the alliance. 
 
                                                     
60 Both requests were made in June 2011 to the then chairman of the Australian board of the AALD, 
Mehrdad Baghai.  
61 In May 2011, Scanlan, who was the then Australian Consul-General in New York, agreed via his 
assistant to respond to the author’s questions. However, answers to the questions were not 
forthcoming, despite a series of follow-up calls and emails to the Consulate-General in August, 
September 2011, and March, April, May 2012. 
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Interviewees represent a wide range of participants with varying degrees of 
experience and involvement with the AALD, including founding members, current 
and former board members, Liberal and Labor Party MPs, public servants, 
prominent academics, key journalists and senior representatives from business. 
Together with material publicly available about the AALD, these sources provide the 
basis for the argument that follows.62 
 
The main contention of this thesis is that the AALD exists to sustain the prevailing 
orthodoxy, detailed in Chapter One, that views the Australia-US alliance as a 
“special relationship” driven by mutual security interests and shared values. The 
AALD emerged within the context of elite fears about the strength of the alliance 
going into the future and sought to insulate it from potential challenges. The AALD 
fulfils its central objective to preserve the status quo in three main ways. First, it 
carefully frames discussion and debate about the value of the alliance to Australia. 
Second, it facilitates the socialisation of Australian elites into the alliance orthodoxy. 
Finally, it serves as a “gatekeeper” of the status quo and a litmus test on the alliance 
loyalty of potential future leaders.63 
 
Thesis Objectives, Structure and Contribution 
 
This thesis has two main objectives; addressed respectively in Parts One and Two. 
The first is to challenge the alliance orthodoxy, or “special relationship” narrative, 
that prevails in official and elite academic circles. The second is to critically evaluate 
the role of the AALD in sustaining the alliance orthodoxy at the elite level in 
Australia. The focus of this thesis with respect to the AALD is on the Australian 
context, given the asymmetrical nature of the relationship, and the facts that the 
initiative for its establishment came from Australia and its agenda reflects an 
Australian context and ambition. 
 
                                                     
62 This includes an analysis of over 1500 news items published about, or with reference to, the AALD 
as of December 2015, sourced from Dow Jones Factiva and the Australian Financial Review. 
63 For an earlier version of this argument see Vince Scappatura, The Role of the AALD in Preserving 
the Australia-US Alliance, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 49, no. 4, 2014, pp. 596-610. 
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In Part One, two conventionally held beliefs about the alliance are identified and 
critiqued. The first, addressed in Chapter One, is that the strength of the alliance 
derives from shared values forged by a joint commitment to liberal ideals such as 
freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; and relatedly, that a 
common interest in both Canberra and Washington is the maintenance of peace 
and stability in the Asia-Pacific. The second orthodoxy, addressed in Chapters Three 
and Four, is that the central purpose of the alliance is to ensure Australian security, 
both in terms of protecting Australia against attack and in maintaining a safe 
regional security environment. To contextualise the origins of these orthodoxies, 
Chapter Two provides the historical development of Australia’s strategic culture 
that has informed Canberra’s traditional alliance-reliance mentality. 
 
Part One argues that the fundamental purpose of the alliance has been to preserve 
a regional and global strategic and economic order favourable to both American 
and Australian interests and, relatedly, to fulfil an ambition on the part of elites in 
Canberra to exercise an independent regional influence as a leading “middle 
power”. Chapters Three and Four specifically illustrate the evolution of Australia’s 
“strategic dependence” on the US in the 1950s and 1960s – undertaken with the 
objective of restoring western influence in Asia – through to Australia’s emergence 
as a strategically independent “middle power” fully integrated into the US-led 
capitalist world order from the 1970s onwards. 
 
Part Two of the thesis investigates how the orthodoxies of the alliance detailed in 
Part One are reinforced at the elite level by the AALD. Chapter Five provides the 
historical background, operation and objectives of the AALD. It reveals that, 
motivated by the fear that the alliance was at risk in the hands of the next 
generation of leaders who were not steeped in the “special relationship” narrative, 
the AALD set out to strengthen the personal foundations of the alliance at the elite 
level in order to preserve the status quo. Chapter Five also identifies the 
significance of the AALD as an elite institution backed by large corporate interests, 
and led by Phillip Scanlan, a committed alliance loyalist and neoliberal ideologue.  
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Chapter Six provides a conceptual framework for critically evaluating the AALD. The 
AALD is purportedly an exercise in “track two” diplomacy that brings officials and 
non-officials together from both countries to discuss matters of mutual interest and 
facilitate mutual understanding. In fact, the AALD functions more like a pro-
American lobby group that serves to preserve the alliance orthodoxy in the minds of 
Australian elites. Drawing on the literature of informal diplomacy, Chapter Six 
demonstrates how the AALD departs from other major T2 initiatives as it seeks to 
preserve rather than challenge official policy perspectives and eschews critical 
discussion and debate. 
 
Chapter Seven investigates the socialisation function of the AALD and its role in 
alliance management. Drawing on the literature of public diplomacy, and 
specifically US foreign leader exchange programs, this chapter demonstrates how 
the AALD socialises elites by providing a number of important material and 
psychological inducements to remain committed to the status quo. Chapter Seven 
also explains the AALD’s “gatekeeping” function to prevent adverse changes to 
orthodox government policymaking on the alliance by acting as a litmus test for 
measuring the alliance loyalty of future leaders. 
 
This thesis makes a number of important intellectual contributions. First, it provides 
a new critique of the conventional understanding of the Australia-US alliance 
beyond the typical realist, liberal and constructivist approaches. Second, it helps to 
fill a gap in the existing literature on informal diplomacy by critically evaluating the 
role of the AALD as a smaller, bilateral T2 dialogue otherwise neglected in 
scholarship. Third, it provides insight into the ways in which both informal and 
public diplomacy combine to manage elite opinion. Finally, it constitutes the first 
major academic study of the AALD since its establishment more than two decades 
ago. The scrutiny this thesis applies to the AALD is particularly important given the 
almost total absence of critical attention it has received by the media and in 
scholarship. 
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PART I: THE AUSTRALIA-US ALLIANCE 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Myth and Reality in Australia’s “Special Relationship” with the US 
 
Challenging the Myth of the “Special Relationship” 
 
Australia and the US enjoy a remarkably firm and enduring relationship. For more 
than sixty years, Australia has remained a stalwart ally and a stable element in 
Washington’s system of bilateral relationships in Asia, serving to boost US 
diplomatic, strategic and economic engagement in the region.1 Conversely, the 
alliance is widely understood to constitute the cornerstone of Australia’s entire 
foreign and strategic policy since the 1950s.2 All current indicators suggest the 
bilateral relationship will continue to grow in strength, particularly as Australia’s 
geopolitical value to the US increases amidst the rise of the “Indo-Pacific”.3 
 
                                                     
1 On America’s “hub-and-spokes” system of alliances in Asia, see Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: Origins of 
the US Alliance System in Asia, International Security, vol. 34, no. 3, 2010, pp. 158-196. For a 
summary of the diplomatic, strategic and economic benefits of the alliance to the United States, see 
John Baker and Douglas H. Paal, “The US-Australia Alliance” in Robert D. Blackwell and Paul Dibb 
(eds), America's Asian Alliances, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 90-3. 
2 Michael Wesley, There Goes the Neighbourhood: Australia and the Rise of Asia, Sydney: New South, 
2011, pp. 143-144. 
3 Michael J. Green, et. al., Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025, Capabilities, Presence and Partnerships: An 
Independent Review of US Defence Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, January 2016, pp. 66-73, <http://csis.org/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacific
Rebalance2025_Web_0.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2016; Michael J. Green, et. al., The ANZUS Alliance in 
An Ascending Asia, Centre of Gravity Series, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre ANU and the 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, July 2015, <http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/publications/
anzus-alliance-ascending-asia>, accessed 5 April 2016; Jim Thomas, Zack Cooper and Iskander 
Rehman, Gateway to the Indo-Pacific: Australian Defence Strategy and the Future of the Australia-US 
Alliance, Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, November 2013, <http://csbaonline.org/
publications/2013/11/gateway-to-the-indo-pacific-australian-defense-strategy-and-the-future-of-
the-australia-u-s-alliance-2/>, accessed 5 April 2016; Bates Gill and Tom Switzer, The New Special 
Relationship, Foreign Affairs, 19 February 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/australia/
2015-02-19/new-special-relationship>, accessed 5 April 2015. 
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The unusual strength, persistence and intimacy of the alliance are commonly taken 
to denote a “special relationship” between both countries.4 Although common 
interests and shared values are ordinarily taken to form the basis of the 
relationship, emphasis is often placed on the latter. Officialdom in both countries 
assert that it is the existence of “shared values” and a “natural friendship between 
our peoples” that forms “the foundation” of the relationship.5 The deep level of 
cooperation and the intimacy of leader-to-leader interactions are taken as evidence 
of a special affinity between both nations.6 
 
Former Prime Minister John Howard did more than any other Australian leader 
before or since to promote the notion of a special relationship. According to officials 
in Canberra who were present during his time in office, Howard successfully 
elevated Australia’s alliance with the US to an unprecedented level.7 Speaking in 
2015, Howard reiterated his belief that: 
 
Nothing that I experienced when I was prime minister, and nothing 
that I have experienced since, has altered my view that the things 
that bind nations together more tightly than anything else are shared 
values and shared philosophies. On that basis it is self-evident that 
the relationship between Australia and the United States, based on 
common values, common beliefs, shared experiences in war and 
                                                     
4 Jeffrey D. McCausl, Douglas T. Stuart, William T. Tow and Michael Wesley (eds), The Other Special 
Relationship: The United States and Australia at the Start of the 21st Century, Strategic Studies 
Institute, US Army War College, February 2007. 
5 Australia-United States Ministerial (AUSMIN) Consultations, 2011 Joint Communique, 15 
September 2011, <http://dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/ausmin-joint-
communique-2011.aspx>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
6 Andrew Shearer, Unchartered Waters: The US Alliance and Australia’s New Era of Strategic 
Uncertainty, Lowy Institute Perspectives, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, August 
2011, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/uncharted-waters-us-alliance-and-australias-new-
era-strategic-uncertainty>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
7 As noted at the time, “In official circles in Canberra, the view is firmly held that the Australian-US 
security relationship is probably in the best shape in its history”. While other factors were at play, 
“Australia’s renewed engagement with its Western alliance partner owes much to the position of 
Prime Minister Howard in the domestic political milieu”. Rod Lyon and William T. Tow, The Future of 
the Australia-US Security Relationship, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania, 1 December 2003, pp. 13, 15. 
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peace . . . is as tight as any bilateral relationship anywhere in the 
world can be.8  
 
For Howard and other ardent believers in the special relationship, the implication is 
that the alliance transcends strategic interests that typify other bilateral alliances. 
While the “enduring power” of the alliance “does derive from shared interests and 
mutual benefits”, writes noted foreign policy commentator Greg Sheridan, “at the 
deepest levels it derives from the fact that for all our differences, the values we 
share as nations are so great”.9 
 
Australia and the US evidently share similarities when it comes to political 
institutions, language, culture and values. Australians have long admired the US as a 
leader and sought to emulate many of its political, economic and cultural 
innovations. From as early as the 1830s, a popular theme in political life was the 
notion of Australia as a “future America”.10 A century later, leading Australian 
figures were still proudly assuring Americans, “What we are, you were; and what 
you are, we hope to be”.11 The inclination to look to America for inspiration 
accelerated in the post-WWII period when, like other western nations, Australia 
was subjected to the global phenomenon of “Americanisation”, and its political, 
economic and cultural development was heavily influenced by American models.12 
 
                                                     
8 David Wroe, Former PM John Howard Defends Top Bureaucrat Michael Thawley Over China 
Remarks, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 July 2015, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/former-pm-john-howard-defends-top-bureaucrat-michael-thawley-over-china-remarks-
20150702-gi3puy.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. Despite all the talk about shared values, Howard was 
prepared to criticise American gun culture. Alliance loyalists sometimes distinguish Australian from 
American values on domestic issues, but rarely when it comes to foreign policy. 
9 Greg Sheridan, The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance Under Bush and 
Howard, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006, p. 322. 
10 Philip Bell and Roger Bell, Implicated: The United States in Australia, Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1993, p. 20. 
11 Former Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes, 1938. Quoted in Dennis Phillips, Ambivalent Allies: 
Myth and Reality in the Australian-American Relationship, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1988, 
p. 69. 
12 Bell and Bell, Implicated, pp. 157-200; Joseph Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: The Web of 
Dependence, South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980, pp. 16-19. On the growing influence and control of 
corporate America over Australia’s economy in the post-WWII era, see Greg Crough and Ted 
Wheelwright, Australia: A Client State, Melbourne: Penguin Books, 1982. 
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Notwithstanding the long and intimate ties Australia shares with the US, the 
language of a special relationship papers over what are in fact complex and 
contradictory histories. Australia, unlike the US, did not experience revolution or 
civil war, nor did it sever its strong and influential ties to the British monarchy, 
events that profoundly shaped American attitudes and institutions. Divergent 
historical experiences, in fact, led to significant differences in cultures, values and 
even languages that belie the notion of a “natural” or inevitable friendship.13 
 
The origin of the special relationship is frequently traced back to the “watershed” 
moment in 1908 when the then Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, in an act of defiance 
toward Britain, invited America’s “Great White Fleet” to visit Australia as part of a 
US tour of the Pacific.14 Australians were decidedly frenzied about the prospect of a 
visit by their powerful white cousins, the event itself drawing bigger and more 
enthusiastic crowds than anything in Australian history, including the inauguration 
of the Commonwealth in January 1901.15 
 
Although the event captured the nation, it did not mark the beginning of an 
“enduring bond” between both nations. It is pertinent to recall that while 
Australians were preoccupied with attending to the everyday needs of their guests, 
the Americans used the opportunity to secretly gather intelligence for contingency 
plans to invade Australia and capture its major cities in the event of hostilities 
breaking out between the US and British-allied Japan. This anecdote is an apt 
reflection of the dictum that states in the international system have no permanent 
friends, only permanent interests.16 
                                                     
13 For an in-depth critique of the widely held view that Australia and the US share similar historical 
influences, cultures, values and languages, see Phillips, Ambivalent Allies. 
14 Australian Consulate-General New York, Enduring Bond: 60 Years of ANZUS, 2012 photo exhibition, 
17 April 2012, <http://www.newyork.usa.embassy.gov.au/nycg/EnduringBondEnduringBond.html>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
15 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the 
International Challenge of Racial Equality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 200-
209; David Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939, St Lucia, Queensland: 
University of Queensland Press, 1999, pp, 93-7. 
16 Gary Brown and Laura Rayner, Upside, Downside: ANZUS After Fifty Years, Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade Group, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Current Issues Brief, no. 3, 2001-02, pp. 
1-2. 
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WWII has similarly been mythologised as a defining historical moment in the 
development of the Australia-US alliance. According to the orthodoxy, Australia’s 
special relationship with the US was “forged by our shared sacrifice during the 
Second World War” and “in the defining battles of the past century”.17 Fuelling this 
narrative is the persistent myth that the US helped to prevent a Japanese invasion 
of Australia during WWII. In reality, the conquest of Australia was explicitly ruled 
out by Japan’s military leaders, a fact revealed by US communication intercepts as 
early as April 1942 and accepted at the highest levels of the Australian government 
by mid-1942.18  
 
America’s decision to reinforce Australia’s strategic position and establish General 
MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific command in early 1942 was due not to an inviolable 
commitment to Australia’s defence and freedom but the result of strategic 
necessity; Australia was no more than a suitable base from which to hit Japan.19 The 
myth of a Japanese invasion of Australia deterred by American intervention has 
“been used by conservatives ever since as a legitimising narrative for Australian 
adherence to the US alliance”.20 
 
WWII is frequently depicted as a decisive turning point in Australia’s foreign 
relations, marking the end of strategic dependence on the UK and the beginning of 
a new dependent relationship with the US. Prime Minister John Curtin’s infamous 
speech in 1941, when he declared that “Australia looks to America, free of the 
                                                     
17 AUSMIN Consultations 2011 Joint Communique. 
18 Peter Stanley, “Dramatic Myth and Dull Truth: Invasion by Japan in 1942” in Craig Stockings (ed), 
Zombie Myths of Australian Military History, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2010, pp. 146-147; Anthony 
Burke, Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
pp. 73-75. For a copy of the official Japanese consideration, and subsequent rejection, of an invasion 
of Australia on 7 March 1942, see Commonwealth of Australia, Threats to Australia’s Security: Their 
Nature and Probability, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing House, 1981, Annex C, p. 62. 
19 Peter Edwards, Permanent Friends? Historical Reflections on the Australian-American Alliance, 
Lowy Institute Paper 8, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 13 December 2005, p. 11, 
<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/permanent-friends-historical-reflections-australian-
american-alliance>, accessed 5 April 2015; Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign 
Policy, St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993, p. 24; Bell and Bell, Implicated, p. 92. 
20 Burke, Fear of Security, p. 74. 
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pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom”, is offered as 
evidence of this fact.21 
 
The quote, however, is taken out of context, making “Curtin seem much more anti-
British and pro-American than he had probably intended”.22 While Curtin was 
looking to promote immediate and substantial strategic support from the US during 
a critical phase of the war, his loyalty remained firmly attached to Britain. His 
government did not consider Australia as “anything but an integral part of the 
British empire”.23 
 
Frequently missing from the popular wartime narrative is the fact that Australia and 
the US entertained major disputes over strategic and economic objectives, notably 
Canberra’s opposition to the Anglo-American “Hitler first” strategy and 
Washington’s attempts to challenge Australia’s protectionist trade policies.24 
Australia and New Zealand evinced fervent opposition from Washington when they 
jointly signed the 1944 Australia-New Zealand Agreement, or ANZAC Pact, in an 
attempt to preserve their spheres of influence in the South Pacific and check 
American expansionism.25 Examining these and other divergent interests between 
the US and Australia in detail, Roger Bell, in his major study of the period, came to 
the following conclusion concerning the wartime alliance: 
 
[It] did not constitute a decisive turning-point as has often been 
implied. No special or enduring bilateral political, security or 
economic relationship developed as a result of effective 
                                                     
21 Fraser, for example, fuels the myth that Curtin’s speech was the moment when “Australia 
transferred its dependence to America”. Malcolm Fraser with Cain Roberts, Dangerous Allies, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2014, p. 74. 
22 Edwards, Permanent Friends?, p. 10 
23 Roger J. Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations and the Pacific War, Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1977, p. 47. 
24 Other disagreements included the Anglo-American opposition to Canberra’s decision to relocate 
its last remaining division in the Middle East to Australia for continental defence, and disagreements 
with Washington over the extent of Australian and British participation in the counter-offensive 
against Japan. See Bell, Unequal Allies. 
25 Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian American Relations Between 
1900 and 1975, St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1987, pp. 124-33. 
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collaboration against Japan. Nor was Australia’s wartime alliance 
with the US unusual or unique.26 
 
Australia and the US remained mutually ambivalent about their relationship in the 
immediate post-war period. While keen to see the US commit to upholding regional 
security, Ben Chifley’s Labor government remained concerned about American 
economic imperialism and potential US interference in what was considered 
Australia’s local sphere of influence.27 American hegemony was a major concern for 
Australia, anxious about the capacity of Washington “to exert political and 
economic pressure on virtually every other country in the capitalist world”.28  
 
In the case of the US, Washington was entirely uninterested in formalising the 
wartime alliance with Australia after the common enemy, Japan, was defeated. The 
Australian Labor government attempted, and failed, on numerous occasions to 
entice the US into a Pacific security arrangement. This was despite fierce and 
persistent lobbying on the part of External Affairs Minister, H. V. Evatt, including 
efforts to utilise the American base on Manus Island as a bargaining chip. The US 
was simply not interested in any security pact or any Australian representation in 
US defence planning circles.29 
 
Evatt’s conservative successor, Sir Percy Spender, was more amenable to 
Washington but also faced the same intransigence. It was only the exigencies of the 
Cold War that finally persuaded the US to accede to Australian pressure, resulting in 
the 1951 ANZUS Treaty and delivering success to Spender’s adept negotiating 
                                                     
26 Roger J. Bell, Unequal Allies, pp. 226-227. 
27 Bell, Dependent Ally, 1993, pp. 38-39; Camilleri, Australian-American Relations, pp. 2-6; Joseph M. 
Siracusa, The ANZUS Treaty Revisited, Security Challenges, vol. 1, no. 1, 2005, pp. 89-97. Australia 
was particularly concerned that America’s trade liberalisation agenda would undermine the ability of 
the government to utilise interventionist measures to promote industrialisation. Ann Capling, 
Australia and the Global Trade System: From Havana to Seattle, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, pp. 18, 25, 32-33. 
28 Capling, p. 21. 
29 Gregory Pemberton, All the Way: Australia’s Road to Vietnam, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987, pp. 4-
5. 
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tactics.30 Even so, the US refused to provide a security arrangement on a par with 
NATO or the access to strategic decision making that Australia had sought.31 
 
Australia’s decision to strategically align itself more closely to the US in the 
aftermath of WWII was a reflection of changes in geopolitics, not sentiment. 
Historian Norman Harper noted in 1947 that the effective decline of British 
influence in the Far East indicated to Australia that the UK “will be unable to play a 
permanent and major role in the balance of Pacific power”. The US, on the other 
hand, had emerged as the “greatest military and industrial world power” whose 
desire for overseas markets made it “perfectly clear that America in policy has 
become an expanding imperial state with every intention of playing a major role in 
Far Eastern affairs”.32 
 
Although Australian leaders recognised a shift was taking place in the regional 
balance of power, there was no significant transference of loyalty or change in 
strategic planning. When the ANZUS Treaty came into force on 29 April 1952, 
Australian Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey, declared that the treaty “will 
not in any way weaken or diminish the close ties of kinship and cooperation which 
bind Australia to the other members of the British Commonwealth”. Rather, it was 
his “hope” that the treaty would “add an important and intimate association” with 
the US.33 
 
                                                     
30 Siracusa, The ANZUS Treaty Revisited. More recent scholarship reveals that Washington was in fact 
more amenable to a Pacific alliance system from 1949-50 than previously assumed, albeit not due to 
sentiments of American “goodwill” toward Australia; it was derived from a reassessment of the 
benefits a Pacific security system would provide to Washington’s Cold War strategy in Asia. David 
McLean, Anzus Origins: A Reassessment, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 24, no. 94, 1990, pp. 64-
82. 
31 Wayne Reynolds, Loyal to the End: The Fourth British Empire, Australia and the Bomb, 1943–57, 
Australian Historical Studies, vol. 33, no. 119, 2002, pp. 42-44. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly 
opposed an equal partnership with Australia with respect to global, or even Pacific, military planning 
and made sure that any language in the draft treaties of ANZUS that alluded to this was removed. 
Pemberton, All the Way, pp. 27-31. 
32 N.D. Harper, Australian Policy Towards Japan, Australian Outlook, vol. 1, no. 4, 1947, p. 16. 
33 Statement by Richard Casey, 29 April 1952, in Roger Holdich, Vivianne Johnson and Pamela Andre 
(eds), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: The ANZUS Treaty 1951, Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 2001, p. 227. 
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Regional defence planning in the first two decades of the post-war era proceeded to 
be primarily coordinated with the British and other Commonwealth nations.34 
Australia fought twice in Southeast Asia, not under ANZUS, but in support of its 
Commonwealth partners during the Malayan “Emergency” (1948-1960) and the 
Indonesian-Malaysian “Konfrontasi” (1963-1966). When the interests of its two 
great power allies conflicted during the 1956 Suez crisis, Australia firmly sided with 
the UK against the US (and virtually the rest of the world), clearly demonstrating the 
conservative Menzies government’s continuing loyalty to British imperial 
interests.35 
 
It was London’s decision to withdraw “east of Suez” in 1967, foreshadowed many 
years earlier, that marked a significant shift in Australia’s prior reliance on the UK as 
the basis of its regional defence planning.36 Simultaneously, Australia entered a 
peak period of dependence on the US, Canberra having made a major commitment 
to America’s war in Vietnam – a war in which Britain did not participate. The period 
from 1945 to the mid-1960s was a transition phase where Australia saw value in 
supporting for as long as possible the declining British Empire as well as the reigning 
American one.37 
 
Australian and American forces have fought together in every significant conflict 
since WWI. Officially, this reflects the enduring strength of the alliance as well as 
                                                     
34 Peter Edwards, seminar on the ANZUS Alliance presented to the Defence Sub-Committee of the 
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Canberra, 11 August 1997, pp. 10-
18. 
35 Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country, South Melbourne: MacMillan, 1979, pp. 370-83. 
36 Derek McDougall, Australia and the British Military Withdrawal from East of the Suez, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 51, no. 2, 1997, pp. 183-194.  
37 The steps by which Australia came to rely primarily on Washington for its security are glossed by 
McLean. “Between 1957 and 1963 Australia standardised its military equipment with the US, 
adopted American military organisational practices, entered into close cooperation with America in 
the exchange of information and in other defence-related areas, and agreed to the establishment of 
the North West Cape naval communications station on terms which surrendered all Australian rights 
to a say in the operation of the base. The dispatch of Australian troops to support US military 
involvement in Vietnam – a war in which Britain did not participate – highlighted the extent of the 
transformation of Australia’s strategic relations since the formation of ANZUS”. David McLean, From 
British Colony to American Satellite? Australia and the USA during the Cold War, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, vol. 52, no. 1, 2006, p. 66. 
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the common values and shared interests between both countries.38 A more realistic 
interpretation is that Australia, as the substantially weaker power, has felt obligated 
to fight alongside the US in order to maintain Washington’s allegiance.39 In either 
case, it is a clear rebuke of the special relationship that on those rare occasions 
when Australian and American strategic interests have failed to converge, 
Australia’s long record of loyalty to the US has counted for very little. 
 
A particularly instructive example occurred in the early 1960s when, after twenty 
years of being a loyal and dependable ally, Australia was unable to sway the US to 
oppose Indonesia’s claims over West New Guinea. Australia faced the prospect of 
becoming entangled in a war with Jakarta without the support of a major ally. 
Placating Sukarno in order to prevent the “loss” of Indonesia to communism 
ultimately proved of far greater importance to the US than Australia’s security 
concerns. It was a “sobering” lesson for Canberra, Pemberton writes, that “in the 
most dangerous international crisis Australia had faced since the [Second World] 
War, the US alliance was of little value as an instrument of Australian diplomacy 
because of the conflict in Australian-US interests”.40 
 
A more recent incident occurred when US President Bill Clinton rebuffed Australia’s 
request for American troops to support the 1999 intervention into East Timor. The 
Clinton administration’s reasoning was that Indonesia, a populous and mineral-rich 
nation, was of far greater strategic importance than the tiny, impoverished territory 
of East Timor.41 After intense lobbying by both Australia and Portugal, along with 
significant pressure emanating from Congress, Washington belatedly decided to act 
                                                     
38 Commonwealth of Australia, 2016 Defence White Paper, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2016, 
p. 124; US Department of State, US Relations with Australia, Fact Sheet, Bureau of East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, 25 February 2016, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2698.htm>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
39 As two prominent strategic experts recently put it, “Australian decision-makers have seen 
involvement in conflict as a premium that needs to be paid for the security guarantee and other 
benefits Australia accrues from its relationship with the US”. Nick Bisley and Brendan Taylor, Conflict 
in the East China Sea: Would ANZUS Apply? Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), Ultimo, NSW, 
2014, p.25. 
40 Pemberton, All The Way, p. 101. 
41 Noam Chomsky, Hypocrisy of the West: East Timor, Horror and Amnesia, Le Monde Diplomatique, 
October 1999, October 1999, <http://mondediplo.com/1999/10/02chomsky/>, accessed 5 April 
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and provide the political, logistical and intelligence support necessary to make the 
Australian-led intervention a success.42 Prime Minister John Howard was 
nonetheless taken aback and intensely disappointed at America’s refusal to provide 
“boots on the ground”, believing it was a “violation of the alliance’s spirit” after so 
many decades of “unbroken military support for the United States”.43 
 
The gravest and most revealing variance in Australia’s relationship with the US 
occurred in the early to mid-1970s, when the progressive Whitlam government 
attempted to shake off Australia’s client status after two decades of unadulterated 
conservative support for the alliance. The Whitlam government’s public criticism of 
US foreign policy in Indochina, dissent over the operation of US intelligence facilities 
and Whitlam’s personally contentious relationship with Australian and American 
intelligence communities raised grave concerns in Washington.44 Whitlam was in 
fact mostly posturing and never intended to seriously threaten the permanence of 
American bases or the foundations of the ANZUS alliance, although that was not 
always clear to American intelligence officials. 45 
 
Whitlam’s agenda to pursue a more independent foreign policy within the alliance 
was perhaps most notably reflected in his government’s attempts at “resources 
diplomacy”.46 The objective was to increase Australia’s returns on mineral exports 
and help Australian corporations “go multinational”, transforming Australia into a 
regional sub-metropolitan power. While the goal was to avoid satellite status, 
                                                     
42 Clinton Fernandes, Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the independence of East Timor, 
Carlton North, Victoria: Scribe Publications, 2004, pp. 97-99. 
43 Paul Kelly, The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia, Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2009, p. 508. 
44 The concerns were perhaps so great that Washington sought to have Whitlam removed. Although 
there is no conclusive evidence, there are many unanswered questions about the CIA’s involvement 
in the dismissal of Whitlam on 11 November 1975. Certainly, the CIA was intricately tied to the 
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Gap in North Australia. Brian Toohey and William Pinwill, Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret 
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46 Robert Catley and Bruce McFarlance, From Tweedledum to Tweedledee: The New Labor 
Government in Australia. A Critique of its Social Model, Sydney: Australia and New Zealand Book 
Company, 1974; Jim Hyde, Australia: The Asia Connection, Malmsbury, Victoria: Kibble Books, 1978. 
CHAPTER ONE 
33 
 
resources diplomacy was crucially dependent upon the continuation of American 
power in the region. Whitlam thus sought to create a more balanced Australia-US 
relationship while maintaining Australia’s increasingly important role as a 
beneficiary and protector of America’s regional security and economic order.47 
 
Although Whitlam never advocated abandoning the alliance, only to make it work 
better in Australia’s interests, this proved almost too much to bear for Washington 
which was accustomed “to the client-patron relationship that earlier Liberal-
Country Party governments had maintained”.48 It was a revealing moment in the 
history of the so-called special relationship that the US responded to Australia’s 
most significant attempt to inject greater balance into the relationship by actively 
considering to abandon the alliance altogether.49 
 
There has been a considerable level of bipartisanship with respect to the alliance 
since the end of the Whitlam administration in the mid-1970s, and particularly since 
the advent of the notoriously pro-American Prime Minister Bob Hawke. Paul 
Keating’s project for greater engagement with Asia during the 1990s ostensibly 
indicated a shift to redefine Australian identity away from the West and more 
toward Asia. In reality, his push merely reflected a desire to take advantage of 
regional economic opportunities while remaining strategically tied to the US.50 
 
The persistence of strong bipartisanship on the question of the alliance, and a belief 
in the notion of a special relationship, has fostered an exaggerated sense of self-
                                                     
47 Nowhere was this more apparent than with respect to Indonesia where the Whitlam government 
moved immediately to strengthen Suharto’s New Order regime to the benefit of western strategic 
and economic interests; expanding economic and military aid, assisting in the rapid expansion of 
trade and investment, forging strong diplomatic relations and praising Suharto’s achievements while 
whitewashing his crimes. See Burke, Fear of Security, pp. 128-131, 134-136. 
48 These were the words Brent Scowcroft used when he advised US President Gerald Ford on the 
newly elected Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser. James Curran, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and 
Nixon at War, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2015, p. 306. 
49 Curran, Unholy Fury. 
50 See David MacDonald and Brendon O'Connor, Australia and New Zealand - America’s Antipodean 
Anglosphere Allies?, Australian Political Studies Association (APSA), 20 August 2010, pp. 10-13, 27, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664698>, accessed 5 April 2016; Mark 
Beeson, “Australia and Asia: The Years of Living Aimlessly” in Daljit Singh and Anthony Smith (eds), 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2001, Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, pp. 44-55. 
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importance among Australian political leaders who are often overcome by their 
connection to, and admiration for, American power.51 After having accompanied 
numerous Australian prime ministers to the US as a senior Australian diplomat, 
Richard Woolcott reflects that many risked “suffering the delusion that Australia is 
more important to the United States than is really the case”.52 
 
The added danger is that Australian political and bureaucratic elites, after having 
internalised the narrative of the special relationship, assume the national interests 
of both countries have always converged and will continue to do so in the future.53 
When asked by a Senate Committee in August 1999 how future conflicts of interest 
between Australia and the United States might be resolved, former defence official 
Paul Dibb stated: 
 
I find it hard to imagine situations, given the ANZUS alliance, given 
our shared values and interests and given the closeness that we 
have, where there would be dramatic differences in the national 
interest.54 
 
The inability or unwillingness to understand that America’s interests as a global 
power do not always align with those of Australia may have significant 
repercussions in the future as Canberra finds itself increasingly pulled in opposite 
directions by its most important strategic relationship with the US and its primary 
trading partner, China. As discussed below, Canberra’s current trajectory is 
                                                     
51 MacDonald and O’Connor, Australia and New Zealand; James Ingram, A Time for Change - The 
Alliance and Australian Foreign Policy, address to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 9 
June 2011, <http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/media_library/a-time-for-change-the-us-
alliance-and-australian-foreign-policy-by-james-ingram-ao-faiia/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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entangling Australia in Washington’s plans for preserving its leadership status in 
Asia, a strategy that could drive a wedge between Canberra and Beijing, and 
potentially drag Australia into a US-Sino war.55 
 
Preserving American Hegemony at All Costs 
 
One of the most prevalent misconceptions embodied in the special relationship 
narrative is the notion that Australia and the US are bound together by their joint 
commitment to promote liberal values abroad. One of the central objectives of the 
alliance, it is officially stated, is to “advance and support human rights, democracy, 
the rule of law and fundamental freedoms around the world”.56 While Australian 
foreign policy is generally less self-consciously idealistic than in the US, it is still 
conventional to adopt America’s depiction of itself as an exceptional nation, driven 
by an enlightened foreign policy and a special historical sense of mission to spread 
freedom and democracy globally.57 
 
Relatedly, it has been “an article of faith” in both Australian and American scholarly 
and policy circles that the US is a “benign hegemon”, responsible for maintaining 
international peace and stability, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, since the end of 
WWII.58 The typical formulation among leading Australian defence experts is that 
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“for the past sixty years, the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific have been 
underwritten by the benign hegemony of the US” which has “allowed countries in 
the region to prosper and grow at a prodigious rate”.59 Moreover, it is insisted, 
“What keeps the US engaged in the region today is its peculiar sense of mission to 
lead the free world, a sense borne of the notion of exceptionalism”.60 
 
In reality, US foreign policy has not been fundamentally different to that of the 
imperial powers that preceded it, perhaps especially so in the Asia-Pacific. In the 
decades prior to the outbreak of WWII, the US had emerged, like Japan, as an 
expansionist Pacific imperial power.61 Although rejecting the trappings of formal 
empire, by the end of WWII, Washington had assumed effective control in the 
Philippines, Japan, South Korea and the entire Pacific Ocean. While rhetorically 
supporting the process of decolonisation, Washington’s objective was to dismantle 
the exclusive trading blocs of the European imperial powers that obstructed its 
plans for an integrated global economic order that facilitated American corporate 
interests. In any case, the US eventually moved to assist European colonial powers 
in their attempts to regain their former colonial possessions as it became clear this 
was necessary to ensure the rapid reconstruction of Europe.62 
 
America’s support for reinstating European colonialism dovetailed with Australia’s 
own vision for the post-war regional order. Like the US, Australia spoke of liberating 
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Asia during WWII.63 In reality, Canberra was only interested in liberating Asia from 
Japanese imperialism, which in many respects, was no different to that of Western 
colonialism.64 As a proud member of the British Empire, Australia was a strong 
supporter of British imperialism and the European-imperial order more generally, as 
well as being a colonial power in its own right with no intention of relinquishing 
control of its territorial possessions.65 With respect to Dutch rule in Indonesia, 
Minister for External Affairs, H. V. Evatt, stated frankly in October 1943 that “We 
visualise the restoration of the former sovereignty”.66 
 
Australian support for European colonialism was most forcefully expressed in the 
conservative Liberal-Country Coalition led by Robert Menzies. From opposition 
during the mid-to-late 1940s, Menzies had supported the European imperial powers 
in their struggles to quash Asian independence movements – the British in 
Southeast Asia, the French in Indochina and the Dutch in the East Indies – and he 
continued to endorse the virtues of empire throughout the 1950s and 1960s.67 
Australia’s primary military commitments in Malaya and Vietnam, initiated by the 
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64 Selden writes, “In both lofty rhetoric of empire and the brutality of the conquest and subjugation 
of Asian peoples . . . Japan shared much in common with Western colonial powers”. In fact, Japan’s 
imperial order in Asia had a more positive impact on economic development than that of American 
or European colonialism. Mark Selden, East Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: 
Political Economy and Geopolitics, 16th to 21st Centuries, The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 7, issue 9, no. 
4, 25 February 2009, <http://apjjf.org/-Mark-Selden/3061/article.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
65 Australia’s major colony being Papua/New Guinea. 
66 O’Lincoln, Australia’s Pacific War, p. 53. Accordingly, when WWII ended, Australian troops 
provided assistance for the restoration of Dutch control in Indonesia. Later, Australia played a more 
constructive role in supporting the Indonesian liberation struggle. However, this was largely because 
it saw independence as an inevitable outcome that it could better shape in a direction conducive to 
its interests. O’Lincoln, pp. 48-49, 52-53. 
67 David Goldsworthy, Australian External Policy and the End of Britain’s Empire, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, vol. 51, no. 1, 2005, pp. 17-29; Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of 
Britain’s Empire, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002; Christopher Waters, After 
Decolonisation: Australia and the Emergence of the Non-aligned Movement in Asia, 1954-55, 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 12, no. 2, 2001, p. 156. In the early 1950s, long before Australia 
became militarily involved in America’s war in Vietnam, Australia provided “military and air supplies 
for use by French forces in Indochina”, the only country other than the US who had done so. Military, 
Air and Civil Aid from Australia for Indo-China, The Canberra Times, 12 March 1953, p. 1. 
CHAPTER ONE 
38 
 
Menzies government, contributed to the broader efforts of British and American 
power to crush the anti-colonial movements that were then sweeping across Asia.68 
 
American and Australian opposition to independence movements in the decades 
following WWII contradicts the popular rhetoric today that generations of 
Americans and Australians died in Asia to defend freedom and democracy.69 Equally 
striking is the claim that American military engagement in the Asia-Pacific has been 
responsible for underpinning regional peace and stability. The US, after all, was the 
principle protagonist in Asia’s two bloodiest conflicts in North Korea and Vietnam, 
wars that were prosecuted with a litany of human rights abuses and war crimes.70 
Since WWII, US air power in Asia alone has been responsible for millions of deaths 
and the vast destruction of civilian infrastructure in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.71  
 
Throughout the Cold War, the US used the pretext of maintaining stability to 
support and enhance the repressive capacities of authoritarian regimes that 
maintained pro-Western loyalties and interests. A direct line can be drawn between 
US military assistance and the extreme repression that emerged in much of the 
third world during the Cold War. As Andrew McCoy observes: 
 
Much of the abuse synonymous with the era of authoritarian rule in 
Asia and Latin America seems to have originated with the United 
States. While dictatorships in those regions would no doubt have 
tortured on their own, US training programs provided sophisticated 
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techniques, up-to-date equipment, and moral legitimacy for the 
practice, producing a clear correlation between US Cold War policy 
and the extreme state violence of the authoritarian age.72 
 
Under the guise of defeating communism, Washington propped up countless 
“national security states” throughout the third world, particularly in Asia and 
Central and South America, overthrowing democratically elected governments and 
undermining progressively-based mass social movements.73 Where the US did 
support democratic reform, it was in the form of a “polyarchy” rather than genuine 
democracy, ensuring decision making was confined to a small group of elites who 
preserved US strategic and economic interests.74  
 
With few exceptions, Australia enthusiastically defended the actions of the US 
during the Cold War, apologising for American-allied dictators that were pro-
western and stable including the Shah in Iran, Marcos in the Philippines, Suharto in 
Indonesia and a string of dictators in South Vietnam and South Korea.75 The 
portrayal of Marcos in official circles as “the last hope for democracy” just months 
before martial law was declared in September 1972 was typical of Canberra’s 
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approach to western-allied dictators generally.76 Three years and 50,000 political 
prisoners later, the Australian foreign affairs department continued to downplay 
the repression of the Marcos regime, arguing that “‘martial law’ in the Philippines is 
of a different, milder variety from its European archetype”, and that there was no 
serious political opposition to the government.77 
 
Australia did more than just provide diplomatic cover to odious regimes. Along with 
directly participating in America’s two major wars in Asia,78 Canberra provided 
direct economic and military assistance for Southeast Asian military regimes such as 
those in South Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, much of it under 
the guise of the Colombo Plan. Ostensibly a humanitarian program, the Colombo 
Plan was ultimately employed by Canberra as a psychological warfare campaign to 
prevent revolutionary political change in Asia and extend western influence in the 
region. It included ASIO training military regimes throughout Asia in police and 
security methods, and intelligence officers in counter-subversion techniques.79 
 
ASIS also cooperated closely with its Anglo-American counterparts in several parts 
of the third world during the Cold War, particularly Southeast and Northeast Asia, 
engaging in covert operations to support numerous pro-western regimes and 
undermine their political opponents. ASIS aided the CIA’s covert operations in 
Indonesia in support of Sukarno’s political opponents in the late 1950s and 1960s, 
maintained a close working relationship with the secret police in the Philippines 
when that country was under martial law in the 1970s, and participated, to an 
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unknown extent, in the CIA’s efforts to overthrow Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 
Cambodia in 1970 and Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973.80 
 
More recently, America’s “war on terror”, with enthusiastic Australian participation, 
has been widely recognised as a catastrophic strategic failure and a human rights 
disaster, resulting in mass civilian casualties, the widespread use of torture and the 
destabilisation of the wider Middle East and North African regions. America’s long 
history of intervention in both Afghanistan and Iraq has been a major factor in 
generating the political, economic and social chaos that plagues these countries 
today.81 
 
The rapid rise and success of international jihadi terrorism can be explained, to a 
significant degree, by the actions of the US and its allies, particularly with respect to 
the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq.82 Australia’s participation in the war on 
terror, although small in military terms, nonetheless helped to undermine the rule 
of law as well as implicate leading Australian political and military leaders in 
potential war crimes.83 
 
The hypocrisy of the US-led “war on terror” is obscured in mainstream international 
relations accounts that employ a narrow definition of terrorism that excludes the 
actions of states. During the Cold War, the term “ terrorism” was rarely applied to 
the atrocities committed by America’s extreme right-wing satellites in Central and 
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South America.84 Today, America’s global drone-strike assassination program, 
crucially supported by US intelligence and communications bases on Australian soil, 
is a classic example of the modern use of state terror.85 If state terrorism was not 
excluded from the international relations literature, the US would be recognised as 
one of the most consistent perpetrators and supporters of terrorism since WWII.86 
 
Like terrorism, the term “stability” confers a narrow meaning that often obscures 
America’s destabilising role in the world. In is conventional in realist international 
relations and strategic studies accounts of Asia-Pacific regional affairs to equate 
stability and the “balance of power” with the prevailing distribution of power or the 
status quo; an interpretation that conveniently translates into support for US 
hegemony.87 While there have been no major wars in Asia for some time, there is a 
contradiction that appears to be lost on most Australian strategic commentators 
who regularly assert that US domination simultaneously provides “balance” to the 
region.88  
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Unconstrained US power has had numerous destabilising effects in the Asia-Pacific, 
not least of which is the way it has continued to undermine regional integration. 
Observers have long noted that accommodation between some or all of the great 
powers of Asia would undermine the western alliance system.89 Mark Beeson points 
out that American strategic involvement in the region “is expressly designed to 
keep East Asia divided and its security orientation firmly oriented toward 
Washington”.90 Quoting an international relations expert, Michael Mastanduno, 
Beeson argues that keeping the region divided has been a key element of America’s 
overall grand strategy: 
 
since the United States does not want to encourage a balancing 
coalition against its dominant position, it is not clear that it has a 
strategic interest in the full resolution of differences between, say, 
Japan and China or Russia and China. Some level of tension among 
these states reinforces their individual need for a special relationship 
with the United States.91 
 
While US hegemony has arguably contributed to the absence of a great power war 
in Asia since the late 1970s,92 Washington also maintains a vested interest in the 
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various regional disputes that keeps Japan, South Korea and other US allies 
dependent on America. As Gavan McCormack writes: 
 
If relations between Japan and North Korea, or even between North 
and South Korea, were ever normalised, the tension would drain 
from them and the comprehensive incorporation of Japan within the 
American hegemonic project would become correspondingly more 
difficult to justify. In other words, if peace broke out in East Asia, the 
justification for the sprawling US military base presence in South 
Korea and Japan would disappear.93 
 
The bilateral hub-and-spokes system of alliances the US established in Asia after 
WWII was designed to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon that might 
threaten US security and ensure regional compliance and continued American 
leadership. Washington’s objective was to “exert maximum control over [its] 
smaller ally’s actions” and “amplify US control and minimise any collusion among its 
alliance partners”.94 The hub-and-spokes system served America’s dual geopolitical 
objectives in the region of preventing the emergence of a “peer competitor” and an 
indigenous regional grouping that might exclude the US.95  
 
Believers in the benevolence of American “leadership” in Asia are quick to attribute 
credit to the US for the phenomenal economic growth in the region in the post-
WWII era, largely on account of the strategic stability and economic liberalisation 
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policies sustained by American primacy.96 In actuality, American-style globalisation 
and insecurity evince “a disturbing positive correlation in East Asia”.97 
 
East Asia’s economic growth during the “miracle years” – occurring variously from 
the 1950s to the 1990s – was achieved by development models that were otherwise 
vehemently opposed by the US.98 It was not happenstance that while East Asia 
continued to boom under various forms of the “infant industry” development 
model that defied the orthodox economic theories advocated by Washington, 
America’s poster-child neoliberal economies in Latin America crashed spectacularly 
during the “lost decade” of the 1980s.99 
 
As with America’s Marshall Plan for Europe in the aftermath of WWII, Washington’s 
tolerance for the alternative development models adopted by its Asian allies was 
driven by the long-term objective of thwarting indigenous communist and left-
socialist political forces that threatened America’s global economic dominance.100 
Access to the massive domestic American market, provision of foreign aid and 
corporate penetration were used by Washington across the third world as a means 
to moderate radical nationalism in a strategy of “developmental containment”.101 
 
In return for America’s apparent economic largesse, third-world elites were 
required to pledge political obedience to Washington’s Cold War strategic 
objectives. Unsurprisingly, the rapid national economic growth of the peripheral 
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capitalist states of East and Southeast Asia was accompanied by pronounced 
political repression – a kind of “repressive developmentalism” – justified under the 
guise of maintaining stability and in accordance with traditional “Asian values”.102 
 
When the geopolitical value of America’s Asian allies lapsed at the end of the Cold 
War, they came under increasing pressure from the US to adopt the prevailing 
economic orthodoxy or “Washington consensus”. Australia was at the forefront of 
promoting the neoliberal model of development in the region that proved so 
beneficial for Australian and western business interests and local Asian elites but 
severely damaging to the poor, the environment, and political and economic 
stability in the region. The rapid trade and capital market liberalisation policies that 
were the hallmark of the neoliberal project – pushed through multilateral economic 
forums such as the Australian-initiated APEC – led to instability and economic 
collapse, epitomised by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and exacerbated by the 
economic prescriptions imposed by the US-controlled IMF in its aftermath.103 
 
Turning to current times, it has become patently clear, even within mainstream 
political and scholarly circles, that US primacy may not be the anchor of regional 
stability it once claimed to be.104 The rapid rise of China and its increasing ability 
and willingness to challenge Washington’s insistence on dictating the “rules” of the 
regional order undermines the fundamental premise of orthodox accounts of 
regional stability that claim US primacy is critical for suppressing conflict between 
the great powers. 
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America’s refusal to cede any strategic space to the PRC amidst its growing national 
power is steadily increasing the risk of a major destabilising regional conflict. While 
the US insists its military posture toward Beijing is geared solely toward upholding 
common goods such as freedom of navigation, its overriding objective is to preserve 
its hegemony, especially the capacity to project military power as close inshore to 
China as possible.105 
 
America’s grand strategy with respect to the PRC has always been to prevent its 
emergence as a “powerful, autonomous, self-determining nation asserting its right 
to formulate the rules along with other great powers”.106 During the Cold War, 
Washington’s strategy was to contain and isolate China until the rest of Asia was 
sufficiently brought under US influence. Recognition and normalisation of relations 
occurred only after the threat of regional national liberation movements were 
defeated, requiring China to adapt to the new Asia that had painfully emerged after 
the end of the Vietnam War.107 US foreign policy has since oscillated between 
“constructive engagement” and containment, but with the same objective of 
ensuring China remains incorporated into the “norms” and “rules” of the US-led 
international strategic and economic order.108 
 
While Australia continues to insist that regional stability is of the utmost 
importance, it is simultaneously positioning itself as a central part of America’s 
strategy to contain the rise of China,109 risking a major confrontation that could 
                                                     
105 The Pentagon’s current strategic doctrine, dubbed “AirSea Battle” (renamed JAM-GC in January 
2015) is specifically designed to undermine China’s emerging A2/AD capabilities that are required for 
preventing an attack via China’s air and maritime approaches. Vince Scappatura, The US “Pivot” to 
Asia, the China Spectre and the Australian-American Alliance, The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 12, issue 
36, no. 3, 9 September 2014, <http://apjjf.org/2014/12/36/Vince-Scappatura/4178/article.html>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
106 James Peck, Ideal Illusions: How the US Government Co-opted Human Rights, New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2010, p. 139. 
107 Peck, Washington’s China. 
108 Peck, Ideal Illusions, pp. 133-139.  
109 US strategy toward China is perhaps more accurately described as “dissuasion” rather than 
containment. The goal is not to slow the rate of growth of China’s military power but match it, and 
thereby preserve America’s military advantage. Together with strengthening its web of defence 
relationships in Asia, the US aims to shape Beijing’s choices and discourage it from challenging US 
primacy. Nina Silove, The Pivot before the Pivot: US Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia, 
International Security, vol. 40, no. 4, Spring 2016, pp. 45-88. 
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cross the nuclear threshold and drag Australia into a US-Sino war.110 The prospect of 
China providing a potential countervailing force to balance the preponderant power 
of the US is interpreted by Canberra as a threat that must be contained.111 
 
Subsequently, over the past five years, Canberra has intensified Australia’s politico-
military integration into the US alliance and America’s geopolitical strategy for 
maintaining its dominance in the Asia-Pacific, not least through its enthusiastic 
support for Obama’s “Pivot to Asia”.112 The dramatic expansion in size and scope of 
US military bases – or “joint facilities” – in Australia makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, for Canberra to disentangle itself from any future US conflicts.113 
 
Australia and the US undoubtedly share similar interests and values, particularly 
with respect to the contours of the regional and global order. However, as even a 
cursory review of the historical record makes clear, they are not the enlightened 
self-interests or lofty liberal values typically reflected in political rhetoric and within 
dominant international relations and strategic studies accounts. The overriding joint 
principle of the Australia-US alliance has been the maintenance of American 
hegemony and the favourable global strategic and economic order it presides over, 
even as this has frequently undermined the professed commitment to liberal values 
and international peace and security. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Australian Strategic Culture 
 
Race Fears, Dependence and Militarism 
 
Australian history is replete with fears of unrealistic threats. Two noted strategic 
experts write that “It is commonplace to assert in every era that Australia faces 
complex, uncertain and potentially dangerous strategic circumstances”.1 In reality, 
the absence of current and future threats is probably the most striking historic 
feature of Australia’s strategic environment. Although it is rarely stated explicitly, 
the fact of the matter is that “for more than seventy years, the defining feature of 
Australia’s strategic environment has been the absence of a threat against which to 
plan its defence”.2 Contrary to the traditional myth of Australia’s indefensibility, its 
relative geographic isolation makes it “arguably more naturally secure than any 
other part of the planet”.3 
 
One might expect that such a historically benign security environment would result 
in a global outlook marked by national confidence, self-assurance and a fiercely 
independent and peaceful foreign policy. To the contrary, Australia’s defence and 
foreign policy tradition has reflected that of an insecure, dependent and militaristic 
nation. The major features of Australia’s strategic culture – its salient and enduring 
                                                     
1 Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith, Australian Defence: Challenges for the New Government, 
Security Challenges, vol. 9, no. 4, 2013, p. 49. 
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beliefs, values and habits – are an elevated sense of vulnerability and insecurity and 
a resort to militarism and alliances to ensure its security.4 
 
Australia’s strategic culture is both a logical consequence of, and reinforcement for, 
the realist paradigm that has historically dominated the mindset of Australian policy 
makers and strategic thinkers.5 From the perspective of realism, Australia’s pursuit 
of great power allies is understood as the solution to an enduring security dilemma 
derived from its relative powerlessness and geographic isolation from cultural and 
strategic partners in Europe and North America. Fearful of their defencelessness 
against an attack by a large and hostile power – irrespective of how remote that 
threat may be – Australians have traditionally sought alliances with “great and 
powerful friends” to guarantee their security.6 
 
Australia’s enthusiastic support for its Anglo-American allies can be partly explained 
by its historic apprehension of being abandoned in a time of need.7 According to 
orthodox alliance theory, asymmetrical alliances are afflicted by the dual fears of 
abandonment and entrapment: 
 
[If] a state feels highly dependent on its ally, directly or indirectly, if it 
perceives the ally as less dependent, if the alliance commitment is 
vague, and if the ally’s recent behaviour suggests doubtful loyalty, 
                                                     
4 David McCraw, Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture: the Cases of Australia and New Zealand, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 2, 2011, pp. 169-174; Alan Bloomfield and Kim 
Richard Nossal, Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia 
and Canada, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 28, no. 2, August 2007, pp. 286-90; William Cannon, 
How Will Australia’s Strategic Culture Inform its Engagement in the Indo-Pacific region?, Culture 
Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, vol. 11, issue 1, 
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Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996, pp. 258-271. 
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Politics and History, vol. 55, no. 3, 2009, pp. 324-334. 
6 Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian American Relations Between 
1900 and 1975, St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1987; Cannon, Australia’s 
Strategic Culture, p. 12. 
7 Andrew O’Neill, Australia’s Asia White Paper Review and the Dilemmas of Engagement, Security 
Challenges, vol. 8, no. 1, 2012, p. 17. 
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the state will fear abandonment more than entrapment. It will 
therefore tend to reassure the ally of its commitment, support him in 
specific confrontations with the opponent, and avoid conciliating the 
opponent. The reverse conditions will tend to induce opposite 
strategies.8 
 
Australia’s traditional fear of abandonment has been accompanied by an 
enthusiasm for waging war far from its borders and in support of its Anglo-
American allies. As a number of historians have noted, one the ironies of the 
historical fear of invasion is that Australia has remained virtually untouched by 
foreign invaders while successive governments have “displayed a bloodthirsty 
enthusiasm for despatching troops to invade the territory of others, at the behest of 
either Britain or America”.9 
 
Since 1885, Australia’s alliance-reliance mentality has led it to invade “the Sudan, 
South Africa, Somaliland, Egypt, Palestine, Turkey, various European countries, 
several Pacific islands, Korea and Vietnam”.10 Afghanistan, Iraq (thrice) and Syria 
have since been added to that impressive list. Launching wars in support of its great 
and powerful allies is now a mythologised source of Australia’s national identity.11 
 
The roots of Australia’s security anxieties and alliance-reliance mentality can be 
traced to the time of European colonisation when they became deeply embedded 
                                                     
8 Glenn H. Snyder, The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics, World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4, 1984, p. 
475. 
9 Alistair Thompson, Marilyn Lake and Drew Cottle, “Australians at War” in Verity Burgmann and 
Jenny Lee (eds), A Most Suitable Acquisition: A People’s History of Australia since 1788, Melbourne: 
McPhee Gribble Publishers, 1988, p. 189. 
10 Thompson, Lake and Cottle, p. 189. 
11 Judy Hemming and Michael McKinley, Major Wars and Regional Responses in Australia and New 
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New Orleans, LA, 18 February 2015; Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds (eds), The Militarisation of 
Australian History, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2010. Concerns about the militarisation of Australian 
history motivated a number of distinguished historians and other eminent Australians to establish a 
group in 2013 to challenge the popular narrative of war in the development of Australia’s national 
identity. See Honest History: Supporting Balanced and Honest History, <http://www.honesthistory.
net.au>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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in the national psyche.12 For Australia’s early white colonisers, who were relatively 
small in number and far from their cultural homelands in Europe, densely populated 
Asia was perceived and depicted as a dire security threat to the sparsely populated 
continent they came to occupy. 
 
The perceived threats to Australia’s security were mostly illusory and, particularly in 
the case of Asia, entirely racial. The whole of white Australia during the course of 
the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was effectively seized by the blind 
determination to create a nation of the “higher” races, eliciting extreme and 
irrational fears of the “lower” oriental races who it appeared were determined, and 
perhaps destined, to inundate the more advanced white race they outnumbered. 
 
Race fears behind Australia’s alliance-reliance mentality were inseparable from 
prevailing sentiments of British race patriotism. Australians felt part of the British 
whole, and together with the rising power of the US, were hopeful that the 
“Anglosphere” could retain its dominance in world affairs. This sentiment was 
captured by the “Father of Australian Federation”, Sir Henry Parkes, when he 
declared that: 
 
[These] great states that are forming here will hold out their hands to 
the states of America and these two great countries will stretch out 
their hands again to the mother country and will unite one and all in 
one great empire to govern the world.13 
 
It is not an unrelated fact that during the late-nineteenth century, when race-based 
fears of foreign invasion were arguably at their peak, the internal “threat” posed by 
Aborigines was considered an even greater concern, at least in the areas where 
Aboriginal resistance persisted. In 1879, a correspondent to The Queenslander 
                                                     
12 David Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939, St Lucia, Queensland: 
University of Queensland Press, 1999; Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour 
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argued that the community had “not grudged a large outlay on national defence 
with but a very doubtful prospect of foreign attack”, but asked why was the 
government not willing to spend as much for the “repression of the enemy within 
our gates”.14 On another occasion in 1887, a writer to The Queenslander observed: 
 
there are thousands, that can be spent in Defence Forces, to protect 
the inhabitants of this country from the invisible, perhaps imaginary, 
but for certain distant enemies; but we cannot afford to keep an 
efficient body of police to keep in check the enemy we have at our 
door, the enemy of everyday, the one that slowly but surely robs and 
impoverishes us.15  
 
Concerns about threats to Australia from abroad were inextricably linked to the 
frontier wars white colonisers were waging against the Aboriginal population at 
home. Widespread fears in the early-twentieth century of the “empty north” being 
invaded by a populous Asian nation arose from the experience of European 
colonisers who, after having dispossessed the Aborigines, now feared they too 
might be “aboriginalised”.16 In a speech at the laying of the foundation stone for 
Parliament House in Canberra in 1913, the then Attorney General Billy Hughes 
made the link between the two explicit, exhorting that Australia and America were: 
 
[Two] nations that have always had their way, for they killed 
everybody else to get it. I declare to you that in no other way shall 
we be able to come to our own except by preparing to hold that 
which we have now. [Cheers.] We are here as visible signs of a 
continent. We have a great future before us . . . The first historic 
event in the history of the Commonwealth we are engaged in today 
[is being taken] without the slightest trace of that race we have 
banished from the face of the earth. We must not be too proud lest 
                                                     
14 Henry Reynolds, Forgotten War, Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2013, p. 79. 
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we should, too, in time disappear. We must take steps to safeguard 
that foothold we now have. [Cheers.]17 
 
Such race fears constituted a major driving force behind Australia’s defence 
preparations in the lead up to WWI. A force of 100,000 men was envisioned by 
Australian policy makers to defend the continent against an aggressive Japan who, 
it was thought, would launch a racial war against Australia to forcibly allow its 
citizens to freely enter the country and overturn the “white Australia policy”. 
Germany, on the other hand, was a secondary concern, viewed primarily as a threat 
to Great Britain and its colonial possessions. The British skilfully played on the 
irrational fear of Japan as a means to encourage Australians to mobilise for war, all 
the while correctly anticipating that Australians would rush to serve British interests 
anywhere in the world once war came.18  
 
Much of the fear of Japan leading up to WWII was similarly based not on sound 
strategic assessments but an “almost racially-based dogma” that saw Japan as a 
threat to “white Australia”.19 When Japanese militarism did emerge as a genuine 
security threat between 1941 and 1945, it appeared to vindicate Australia’s fears of 
Asia and reinforced its alliance-reliance mentality, even as Britain proved incapable 
of coming to Australia’s aid.20 When Japanese expansion toppled the British 
garrison at Singapore and most Western colonial governments in Asia by 1942, the 
experience became burned into Australia’s strategic memory, influencing defence 
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policy for at least the next three decades, particularly as the advent of the Cold War 
merged old fears about Asia with new fears about “international communism”.21 
 
The Political Economy of Australia’s Alliance-Reliance Mentality 
 
The emergence of Australia’s race-based security anxieties and alliance-reliance 
mentality cannot be separated from the fact that the nation’s prosperity relied on 
the continuation of the British imperial project both at home and abroad.22 
Typically, fear of the “other” was utilised by European empires as a rationalisation 
for imperialism.23 In the case of the British Empire, concerns about race survival and 
belief in popular theories of racial hierarchy provided a form of ideological 
legitimisation for Britain’s awesome power and control over vast swathes of the 
world’s population: 
 
The physical, political and to some extent cultural usurpation of so 
many people demanded justification. Many indigenous people were 
exploited, oppressed and even killed in the process of colonisation, 
and conscientious Britons needed to rationalise this profitable, but 
morally ambiguous conduct.24 
 
Similarly, race fears served to legitimise Australia’s support for the British Empire 
and the colonial project to which it owed significant economic benefits.25  The 
                                                     
21 Greg Lockhart, The Minefield: An Australian Tragedy in Vietnam, Crows Nest, Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 2007, pp. 8-15. 
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abundance of natural resources that were the source of Australia’s wealth and 
economic development were inevitably acquired by displacing and dispossessing 
the indigenous population. The extraction, development and export of those 
natural resources were highly dependent on British investment and the global 
trading system, underpinned to a substantial degree by UK naval power.26 
Australia’s economic prosperity was thus inextricably tied to the fate of the British 
Empire and the continued exploitation of those colonised countries which, under 
significant duress, were made to restructure their economies in ways that 
complemented the industrial needs of the west. 
 
In some ways, Australia’s status as a colony of Britain served as a hindrance to 
economic development, particularly given the national economy was dependent on 
British investors who were reluctant to provide capital for investment in industries 
and technology other than those that satisfied the needs of the British market. 
Eventually, however, on accord of Australia’s status as a white-settler nation, and its 
privileged position within the Empire’s division of labour, the City of London came 
to sanction Australia’s industrial development. 
 
Permitted to develop behind protectionist trade barriers and engage in massive 
state-funded infrastructure projects, Australia managed to break into the ranks of 
the industrialised world. Other colonies of European powers, by contrast, were 
brutally forced into becoming sources of cheap raw materials and foodstuffs, the 
imposition of “free trade” policies effectively “kicking away the ladder” to 
development that Australia and other industrialised states had used to climb to 
prosperity.27 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
and David Meredith, Australia in the International Economy in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990; Ian W. McLean, Why Australia Prospered: The Shifting Sources of 
Economic Growth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. 
26 Membership in the British Empire had perhaps doubled Australian trade by World War I. Mclean, 
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The political economy of Australian foreign policy after WWII continued to lend 
itself to the waning global imperial order, particularly in Southeast Asia, where 
Australia held direct and indirect economic interests.28 The continued subordination 
of the region to the old colonial powers was considered necessary to safeguard the 
economic strength of Europe and the imperial preferential trading system which 
Australia remained heavily dependent on. The paramount importance of Malaya’s 
economy to the Commonwealth, for example, provided the incentive on the part of 
Britain, and arguably Australia, to crush the revolutionary nationalist-communist 
movement that gained strength there in the years after WWII.29 
 
Canberra’s plans for the post-WWII regional economic order aligned, more or less, 
with that of its allies in London and Washington. This was made evident by 
Spender’s Colombo Plan that hinged on the objective of restoring and developing 
Southeast Asia’s capacity for exporting food and raw materials to the UK and 
continental Europe. Southeast Asia was also deemed important as an outlet for 
Australia’s secondary products and for supplying Australia with desperately needed 
dollar earnings. The Colombo Plan could only succeed, however, with massive 
American economic investment and other forms of support. Significantly, this 
dovetailed with Washington’s own agenda for defeating revolutionary movements 
in Asia.30 
 
As British power continued to decline in the two decades after 1945, Australia was 
gradually integrated into America’s neo-imperial order that came to replace the old 
colonial powers in Asia. This shift required both the growing influence of American 
                                                     
28 For a summary of Australia’s direct economic interests in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia 
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interests were far less important to Australia’s prosperity than existing trade and investment links 
with the UK and Europe. 
29 Malaya’s rubber and tin mining industries were the biggest dollar earners in the Commonwealth. 
Malaya was thus described by a British Lord in 1952 as the “greatest material prize in South-East 
Asia”. Mark Curtis, Web of Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the World, London: Vintage Press, 2003, p. 
335. 
30 Gregory Pemberton, All the Way: Australia’s Road to Vietnam, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987, pp. 1-
3, 13-15. 
CHAPTER TWO 
58 
 
corporations over the Australian economy31 and a regional division of labour that 
saw Australia play an important second-tier role in the subordination of Southeast 
Asia to joint American-Japanese economic domination.32 
 
In a process largely completed by the mid-1960s, Australian trade policy was 
reoriented away from dependence on Britain and Western Europe to economic 
integration with the Asia-Pacific region and within the broader framework of the 
US-led multilateral global trading system.33 Australia’s traditional defence of the 
British Empire was thus superseded by its support for America’s “informal empire”, 
with its unique capacity to maintain and extend a global strategic and economic 
order favourable to western-capitalist interests.34 
 
Australia’s “Imperialist Spirit” and “Middle Power” Ambitions 
 
A closer look at Australia’s early colonial history reveals what can only be described 
as an “imperialist spirit”, linked to, but distinct from, traditional security anxieties. 
To the degree that the colonies, and later, a federated Australia, had a foreign 
policy toward surrounding Pacific neighbours during the nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries, it was mostly coloured by varying levels of enthusiasm for 
imperialist expansion. Australia’s “Monroe Doctrine” of preventing nearby 
territories falling into the hands of rival European imperial powers often 
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underpinned the drive for colonial conquest.35 However, security concerns did not 
always dominate. Australia’s desire for expansion was driven in no small part by the 
interests of Australian capital and the substantial economic benefits derived from 
dominating trade and investment in the region.36 
 
From as early as the 1820s, when the desire for imperialist expansion into the 
Southwest Pacific first emerged in the colonies, there was little or no concern that 
claims to surrounding Pacific territories from foreign imperial powers might 
threaten Australia’s security. For over a half century, the desire for expansion was 
primarily justified by the objective to secure commercial and Christian missionary 
interests.37 From the 1880s onwards, fears of expansionist European powers were 
presented as the primary, although not only, justification for colonial conquest. 
Queensland’s attempt to annex East New Guinea in 1883 was one notable 
exception, largely motivated by the desire to preserve it as a labour recruiting 
ground for Queensland’s sugar industry.38 
 
After federation, nationalist pride in the nascent power of the new nation injected 
great fervour into Australia’s ambition for its own colonial project in the Southwest 
Pacific. The liberal Adelaide Advertiser reflected the imperialist hopes of a unified 
Australia when it declared that, in contrast to the 1880s, now “we have the 
machinery for bringing the concentrated opinion of Australia to bear upon matters 
affecting our continental interests”. The “numberless islands” that surround 
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Acquisition; Stuart Rosewarne, Australia’s Changing Role in the South Pacific: Global Restructuring 
and the Assertion of Metropolitan State Authority, Journal of Australian Political Economy, no. 40, 
December 1997, pp. 80-116. Note that the following discussion is largely based on a reading of Roger 
C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist Era 1820-1920, Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1980. 
37 East New Guinea, due to its closeness to Australia, was an exception. Still, when moves to annex it 
first emerged in the 1870s, defence and economic benefits were considered equally important. 
38 In order to justify his actions and present it as fait accompli, Queensland Premier Thomas 
McIlwraith fabricated a threat of imminent German annexation. Britain, however, disallowed the 
annexation. Thompson, Australian Imperialism, pp. 51-65. 
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Australia’s waters, “whatever allegiance they may now own – we still regard as . . . 
preordained, at however remote a date, to be our heritage”.39  
 
Informed by the imperial sentiment of the day that linked nationhood to imperial 
status, and combined with a belief in racial superiority, hegemony in the Southwest 
Pacific was viewed as part of Australia’s destiny as a white power.40 This pro-
imperial spirit was most notably expressed with respect to Australia’s sustained 
desire to annex the New Hebrides. There were no conceivable security threats to 
justify Australia’s pursuit of annexation. Rather, Australia’s imperial quest was a 
matter of “national honour” and prestige.41 
 
Australia’s imperialist spirit was on full display in the lead up to WWI when secret 
preparations were undertaken for an expeditionary force of 20,000 men to engage 
in colonial conquest in the Pacific and for wider use in service of the British Empire. 
The plans for offensive action were stunningly broad. A long list was proposed to 
seize the colonies of Germany, Holland, Portugal and France in the East Indian 
Archipelago and the Pacific. “There were few places within four thousand miles of 
Australia”, notes one Australian historian, “for which a case for conquest could not 
be made”.42 
 
Although race fears featured significantly in Australia’s desire for expansion, the 
outbreak of WWI also presented an opportunity for Australia to extend its political 
sovereignty in the Pacific. The successful takeover of New Guinea from the Germans 
was advocated by The Age with the following justification on 12 August 1914:  
 
                                                     
39 Thompson, p. 158. 
40 Significantly, even intervention in regional public health was envisioned as a means to fulfil 
Australian dreams of hegemony in the Pacific Islands. Alexander Cameron-Smith, Australian 
Imperialism and International Health in the Pacific Islands, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 41, no. 
1, 2010, pp. 57-74. 
41 Since 1903 when Britain offered, and, in 1904, secretly drafted, a convention to establish a joint 
Anglo-French protectorate over the New Hebrides, thereby preserving its demilitarisation, any 
possibility of a threat to Australia was effectively neutralised. Successive Australian leaders, 
however, continued to push for annexation as a matter of national prestige. Thompson, Australian 
Imperialism, pp. 173-203. 
42 Newton, Hell-Bent, p. 47. 
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We have long since realised that we have a Pacific Ocean destiny . . . 
By virtue of the European war an unexpected path has been opened 
to the furtherance of our ambition [to lay down] the foundations of a 
solid Australian sub-empire in the Pacific Ocean.43 
 
For most parliamentarians, the territory of New Guinea was “rightfully” Australian; 
it belonged to Australia “as Tasmania does”.44 At the war’s conclusion, Prime 
Minister Hughes argued at the League of Nations for outright annexation of New 
Guinea. Although security grounds were presented as the primary concern, the 
desire to exploit its natural resources also featured prominently in parliamentary 
debates. When it came to the push for control over Nauru, there was no doubt that 
the desire to exploit its considerable phosphate deposits was of prime concern.45  
 
Australia’s expansionist stance continued into WWII. At the 1944 ANZAC 
Conference, Australian Minister for External Affairs, H. V. Evatt, looked to secure 
Australian control over wide areas of the Pacific, including sovereignty over the 
Solomon Islands, the New Hebrides and Fiji.46 Washington reacted to the Australia-
New Zealand Agreement (ANZAC Pact) by claiming Australia was attempting to 
establish a “Monroe Doctrine” and a “co-prosperity sphere” covering most of the 
Pacific islands south of the equator; a policy dubbed “ANZAC imperialism”.47 That 
policy would, Harper notes, “of course be a revival of Australian Pacific ambitions 
more than half a century earlier”.48 
 
After WWII, Australian elites continued to envision their country as an “outpost”, 
“bastion” and “custodian” of the British Empire in the Asia-Pacific. However, they 
now viewed themselves on an equal footing with London and to have a new and 
more independent role in the world. Evatt, Spender, Casey and other prominent 
                                                     
43 Tom O’Lincoln, Australia’s Pacific War: Challenging a National Myth, Australia: Interventions 
Publishers, 2011, p. 22. 
44 Patricia O’Brien, Remaking Australia's Colonial Culture?: White Australia and its Papuan Frontier 
1901-1940, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 40, no. 1, 2009, p. 97. 
45 Thompson, Australian Imperialism, pp. 211-12. 
46 O’Lincoln, Australia’s Pacific War, p. 59. 
47 Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend, p. 127. 
48 Harper, p. 127. 
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post-WWII planners argued that Australia was a Commonwealth nation as well as a 
“middle power” and “metropolitan power” with special rights and responsibilities in 
the region.49 
 
From the end of WWII, the Australian Labor government pushed to take leadership 
of Empire interests in the region and expand Australia’s military and political role 
south of the equator. Crucially, a reassertion of British imperialism was recognised 
as necessary for Australia to achieve its regional leadership goals.50 According to 
Bell, this was the central objective of Australian’s foreign policy during this time. He 
observes that: 
 
Increased Dominion diplomatic and military independence, 
combined with active support for a reassertion of British power and 
influence in the Far East under Australian leadership, was the 
principal feature of Australian policy during 1944-6.51 
 
Post-WWII conservatives carried the flame of Australia’s imperialist spirit into the 
1950s and 1960s. The Liberal-Country Coalition, led by Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies, seriously considered the expansion of Australia’s empire in the South 
Pacific throughout the 1950s, while successive conservative governments “stood 
against the tide” of rapid decolonisation that was occurring in European colonies 
during the 1960s.52 Menzies and his colleagues were strong supporters of the 
continuation of British prestige and wider European imperialism in the Far East, 
viewing all of the European powers, with the exception of Russia, “to be worthy of 
support, since all, in their varying ways, could be seen as bearers of European 
influence in the non-Western parts of the globe”.53 
                                                     
49 Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialised Identity in International Relations, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011, pp. 56-58. 
50 Roger J. Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations and the Pacific War, Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1977, pp. 161-164. 
51 Bell, p. 171. 
52 Christopher Waters, “Against the Tide”: Australian Government Attitudes to Decolonisation in the 
South Pacific, 1962-1972, The Journal of Pacific History, vol. 48, no. 2, 2013. 
53 David Goldsworthy, Australian External Policy and the End of Britain’s Empire, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, vol. 51, no. 1, 2005, p. 18. Accordingly, Menzies endorsed the attempts by the 
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Australia’s self-identification as a “middle power” has continued to be a central 
theme in Australian foreign policy discourse up to the present.54 Although typically 
associated with the liberal internationalism of Labor leaders such as H. V. Evatt, 
Gareth Evans and Kevin Rudd, Australia’s middle power activism is consistent with 
classical realist interpretations that emphasise the pursuit of self-interest via the 
exercise of power and influence.55 In fact, the dominant stream in Australian middle 
power imagining is grounded in empire and imperialism, not liberal 
internationalism. Moreover, the middle power concept should be understood, at 
least in part, as a continuation of Australia’s imperialist spirit first forged in the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.56  
 
Australia’s middle power ambitions have always been undertaken within the ambit 
of it great power alliances. As demonstrated in the chapters that follow, the primary 
role of the US alliance in Australian defence and foreign policies evolved with 
Australia’s increasing independence, growing strategic ambitions and changes in the 
regional distribution of power. Although initially conceived of in security terms, the 
alliance played its most important role as an expression of Australia’s interests in 
restoring and preserving the western-imperial order in Asia. As the old colonial 
order receded, and Australia’s strategic independence grew, the alliance took on 
greater relevance for bolstering Australia’s status as a leading middle power within 
the US-led global strategic and economic order. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
British, French and Dutch to crush independence movements in Southeast Asia, from the late 1940s 
onwards, which challenged European domination.  
54 As Ungerer writes, Australia’s self-identification as a middle power is “one of the most enduring 
themes in Australian foreign policy discourse for over sixty years”. Carl Ungerer, The “Middle Power” 
Concept in Australian Foreign Policy, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 53, no. 4, 2007, p. 
551. 
55 Ungerer, p. 540. 
56 Allan Patience, The Two Streams of Australia’s Middle Power Imaginings and their Sources, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 60, no. 3, 2014, pp. 449-465. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Australia-US Alliance and Defending the Imperial Order in Asia  
 
Threat Perceptions in the 1950s and 1960s 
 
The formal defence treaty signed by Australia, New Zealand and the US in 1951 
(ANZUS) was carefully worded, on the insistence of the Americans, to avoid any 
binding obligations to come to one another’s aid.1 Australian leaders at the time 
publicly presented ANZUS as a defence treaty identical to that of NATO.2 Unlike 
NATO, however, the treaty does not consider “an armed attack against one . . . shall 
be considered an attack against them all”. Rather, ANZUS merely stipulates that in 
the event of an attack each country will “act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional processes”.3 Australia nonetheless took the 
alliance to be a security blanket so long as certain obligations were fulfilled, 
particularly support for US foreign military interventions and the hosting of US 
bases on Australian soil.4 
 
Apart from guaranteeing protection in the event of an attack, Australian policy 
makers saw the alliance as crucial for forestalling the emergence of threats to 
Australia in its immediate strategic environment. In the context of the early period 
of the Cold War during the 1950s and 1960s, the primary concern was Soviet and/or 
                                                     
1 Gregory Pemberton, All the Way: Australia’s Road to Vietnam, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987, pp. 
25-26. The US has typically crafted its alliances to contain loopholes or vague commitments in order 
to avoid becoming entangled in a war that it does not perceive to be in its interests. See Michael 
Beckley, The Myth of Entangling Alliance: Reassessing the Security Risks of US Defence Pacts, 
International Security, vol. 39, no. 4, 2015, pp. 18-19. 
2 Foreign Minister Richard Casey, for example, remarked to the Australian parliament in July 1951 
that, like NATO, the “intension” of the ANZUS Treaty “is that an attack on one should be regarded as 
an attack on all”. Gary Brown, Breaking the American Alliance: An Independent National Security 
Policy for Australia, Canberra: Australian National University, 1989, p. 62. 
3 1951 Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS), article IV. 
Reproduced at Australian Politics, ANZUS Treaty, <http://australianpolitics.com/topics/foreign-
policy/anzus-treaty-text>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
4 In practice, given the reality of Australia’s strategic environment, the ANZUS Treaty was of little 
value to Australia in providing protection against a direct attack. As Sissons wrote in 1952, “It seems 
certain, almost beyond reasonable doubt, that circumstances under which Australia may invoke 
American assistance under the Pact will not arise”. D.C.S. Sissons, The Pacific Pact, Australian 
Outlook, vol. 6, no. 1, 1952, p. 21. 
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Chinese communist infiltration into Southeast Asia from which an attack on 
Australia might have been mounted. Consequently, the alliance played a central 
role in Australia’s strategic doctrine of “forward defence”. A memorandum 
concerning Australian security submitted by the Defence Committee in January 
1962, stated:  
 
[Protection against communist expansion] can be best achieved by a 
forward defence strategy which involves the containment of enemy 
forces as far from our immediate environs as possible. The adoption 
of this forward defence strategy extends our strategic interests to 
Southeast Asia as the centre and closest part of the Allied defence 
line extending from Pakistan to Japan, and as the area most 
immediately threatened. While Southeast Asia is held, defence in 
depth is provided for Australia.5 
 
As the memorandum suggests, the doctrine dictated sending Australian forces, in 
cooperation with its allies, to confront communism as far forward of Australia as 
possible in order to maintain “defence in depth”. By continuing to support 
America’s involvement in the region, it was reasoned, the US would be more likely 
to retain a significant military presence in Southeast Asia and come to Australia’s 
aid in a time of need.6 
 
Although the threat of communist aggression took centre stage during the Cold 
War, the process of decolonisation and the rise of independent Asian nationalism 
were of greater concern to Australian policy makers. Secretary of the Department 
of External Affairs, Sir Alan Watt, revealed in March 1951 that “Australia wanted an 
American security guarantee for three reasons: against a rearmed Japan, against 
communist imperialism in Asia, and against Asian expansionism generally”. It was 
                                                     
5 Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of 
Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992, p. 247. 
6 Graeme Cheeseman, From Forward Defence to Self-Reliance: Changes and Continuities in 
Australian Defence Policy 1965-90, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 26, no. 3, 1991, p. 430. 
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the third reason Watt believed to be “the strongest” although this “could not . . . be 
made public”.7 
 
Australian policy makers acknowledged on a number of occasions that not all Asian 
nationalist movements were communist. Richard Casey, for example, conceded this 
very point at a lecture at Michigan State University in the late 1950s. However, “he 
warned, making it quite clear he was referring to Indonesia, non-Communist 
extreme anti-Western nationalist forces in Asia could pose as great a danger as 
Communism”.8 Casey’s concerns reflected Australia’s official strategic assessments 
which, by the late 1950s, began to “recognise decolonisation and the establishment 
of new, independent countries in Asia as a separate strategic concern from the Cold 
War . . . and then replace the latter as the main focus of Australia’s defence 
policy”.9 
 
Although allying itself to the greatest power in world history undoubtedly provided 
a level of protection to Australia that was otherwise unavailable, the actual defence 
benefits the alliance provided against realistic threat scenarios were minimal. The 
dual threats of potential Japanese militarism and Soviet/Chinese communism that 
led to the establishment of the ANZUS Treaty and formed the primary defence 
justification for the alliance in the 1950s and 1960s were far less significant than 
was, and continues to be, typically presented. When the term “threat” was used in 
official Australian strategic assessments, “it often meant the contribution to allied 
action in support of wider interests, rather than a direct possibility of harm to 
Australia itself”.10 
 
                                                     
7 These comments were made during private discussions with New Zealand on the ANZUS Treaty. 
See Roger Holdich, Vivianne Johnson and Pamela Andre (eds), Documents on Australian Foreign 
Policy: The ANZUS Treaty 1951, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001, fn 3, p. 130. Minister 
for External Affairs, Richard Casey, also made the point in his private notes that ANZUS “protects us 
against Com Russia, Asian aggression, Indonesia (Dutch) – as well as Japan”. David McLean, Anzus 
Origins: A Reassessment, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 24, no. 94, 1990, pp. 78-79. Emphasis in 
original. 
8 Pemberton, All the Way, p. 79. 
9 Stephan Fruhling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, Canberra: Defence Publishing 
Service, Department of Defence, 2009, p. 44. 
10 Fruhling, fn 4, p. 2. 
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The retention of American forces and bases in Japan virtually eliminated any 
potential threat from that country.11 Although Australia’s Minister for External 
Affairs, and self-declared “father” of the ANZUS Treaty, Sir Percy Spender, required 
some convincing, he and most members of Cabinet eventually came to accept that 
a Japanese threat to Australian security was remote.12 In line with US thinking, the 
Australian government increasingly came to view Japan as a bulwark against 
communist aggression and, as early as November 1946, “fell into line with the 
prevailing geopolitical position that Japan should be treated as a loyal ally within 
the changing strategic balance, rather than too harshly as defeated enemy”.13 
 
In the case of communism, from as early as 1947, high-level strategic planning 
assessments concluded that there was no direct threat to Australia from the Soviet 
Union and, from 1949, added that communist control over the Chinese mainland, 
and any further extension of communist influence in Asia “would not materially 
affect Australia’s comparatively secure strategic position in the short to medium 
term”.14 
 
The outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in 1950 did not fundamentally change 
these assessments.15 After the attack on South Korea by the DPRK, Menzies 
reiterated that “International Communism” did not possess great naval power and 
that “the principal purpose of an Australian Army is not to repel a land invasion, but 
to cooperate with other democratic forces in those theatres of war where the fate 
of mankind may be fought out”.16 
                                                     
11 As Wood writes, “the overwhelming US presence in Japan, the exceptional powers exercised by 
McArthur as SCAP [Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers], the American trusteeship of 
Japanese territories and the presence of US forces in the Asia-Pacific region confirmed the 
inadequacy of the proposition that Japan could constitute a threat to Australia”. James Wood, 
“Australian Aims During the Occupation of Japan 1945-1952: From Occupier to Protector” in 
Christine De Matos and Robin Gerster (eds), Occupying the “Other”: Australia and Military 
Occupations From Japan to Iraq, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, 2009, p. 
38. 
12 McLean, Anzus Origins, p. 77; Philip Dorling, The Origins of the ANZUS Treaty: A Reconsideration, 
South Australia: Flinders Politics Monographs, Flinders University, 1989, pp. 76, 80, 104. 
13 Wood, “Australian Aims During the Occupation of Japan”, p. 38. 
14 Dorling, The Origins of the ANZUS Treaty, pp. 26-27, 32-33, quote p. 33. 
15 Dorling, pp. 44-68.  
16 Dorling, p. 64. 
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The ANZUS Treaty was not understood by Spender primarily as a defence pact to 
protect Australia in the event of a direct attack but rather as a means to secure 
Australian access and influence over American global strategic planning. In October 
1950, American diplomat, George Perkins, wrote in a memorandum to US Secretary 
of State, Dean Acheson, that, while Spender’s initial concern was to gain assurance 
that the US would defend Australia, it was “no longer important in Spender’s or 
other Australian eyes”. Although Spender “is still interested in the Pacific Pact, what 
he really wants is closer participation in all stages of high-level Washington planning 
which might later involve the disposition of Australian forces or material”, likely in 
the Middle East, to assist the UK in the event of global war.17 Spender later 
addressed the House of Representatives expressing the same concerns and 
desires.18 
 
As Australia became increasingly concerned with instability in Southeast Asia, the 
ANZAM area of strategic interest came to serve as the basis of Australia’s defence 
policy throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Ostensibly, the purpose of ANZAM was to 
provide for the common defence of Australia, New Zealand and Malaya against the 
threat from Soviet or Chinese communism. However, as Australian military 
historian, Greg Lockhart, points out, the ANZAM concept “was based on the 
absence of an external threat to those places”. Both high-level Australian and British 
assessments confirmed there was “no possible land threat to the mainland of 
Australia” and “the external threat to Malaya from Chinese armies operating over 
long and difficult lines of communications is not likely to be very great”.19 
 
Even in the case of Indonesia, with whom relations were significantly strained over 
the question of Dutch New Guinea and the establishment of the Malaysian 
Federation, the official assessment from 1950 onwards was that there was “no 
immediate threat of external aggression”. Indonesia was identified as posing a 
                                                     
17 Dorling, p. 82. 
18 Dorling, pp. 85-87. 
19 Greg Lockhart, The Minefield: An Australian Tragedy in Vietnam, Crows Nest, Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 2007, p. 9. Emphasis in original. 
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potential direct threat to Australia in a slightly revised assessment in October 1964, 
however, its capacity to attack Australia was still acknowledged to be negligible.20 
 
Despite frequent public pronouncements by Australian conservative governments 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s of the need for a great power alliance to protect 
Australia against communist aggression from the North, official but classified 
strategic assessments – although deficient and exaggerated – continued to present 
the likelihood of high-level threats to Australia as remote.21 Evidence that 
Australia’s secure position was understood by policy makers at the time can be 
deduced from defence outlays and ADF manpower statistics which were not high 
and thus not indicative of a nation that was seriously concerned with a high-level 
threat.22 
 
In sum, while Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s is 
commonly portrayed as a response to genuinely perceived military threats from 
Asia, and the ANZUS Treaty the “bolt on the back door” to those threats, in reality, 
“low defence budgets confirmed what the electorate and the Australian Chiefs of 
Staff well knew: that Japan was pacifist, China did not have a navy, Indonesia was 
also too poor to invade, and there was never any sign of a Viet Cong Pacific 
armada”.23 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
20 Lockhart, p. 12. Significantly, at a popular level, less than ten per cent of Australians considered 
Indonesia to be a possible threat in the 1960s and early 1970s despite it having one of the largest 
communist parties in the world until 1965. Simon Philpott, Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the 
Australian National Imagination, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 3, 2001, p. 
379. 
21 Brown, Breaking the American Alliance, pp. 24-25. 
22 Brown, pp. 18-19; David McLean, Australia in the Cold War: A Historiographical Review, The 
International History Review, vol. 23, no. 2, 2001, pp. 318-319. 
23 Greg Lockhart, “We’re So Alone” Two Versions of the Void in Australian Military History, Australian 
Historical Studies, vol. 33, no. 120, 2002, p. 392. 
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Strategic Dependence 
 
During WWII, Australia unmistakably surrendered its sovereignty to the US, partly 
out of strategic necessity, but also to an extent that was probably unnecessary.24 
After the war, Australia emerged as more or less an independent nation, although it 
retained substantial political, economic and cultural links to the British Empire. 
Under the direction of Minister of External Affairs, H. V. Evatt, Australia assumed an 
unprecedented degree of independence from the major powers, evidenced by 
Evatt’s advocacy on behalf of smaller nations at the San Francisco Conference in 
1945, and Australia’s early independent position on the first major dispute in the 
Cold War concerning the Korean peninsula.25 
 
Evatt was fiercely committed to securing an equal partnership with the US that 
entailed full consultation on all matters of common interest. In May 1949, the US 
chargé in Canberra, Andrew B. Foster, expressed his belief that the Labor 
government on the whole was “extremely jealous of the independent position of 
Australia, suspicious of what it regards as American economic imperialism, and 
determined not to be pushed around”.26  
 
The Liberal-Country opposition, on the other hand, was far more predisposed to 
ensuring the interests of the “Anglosphere” were front and centre in Australia’s 
foreign policy. In December 1949, the US State Department warmly welcomed 
Menzies’ electoral victory, advising that while Evatt tended to “subordinate” United 
                                                     
24 Peter Edwards, Curtin, MacArthur and the “Surrender of Sovereignty”: A Historiographical 
Assessment, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 2, 2001, pp. 175-185. 
25 On Evatt’s advocacy at the San Francisco Conference, formally the United Nations Conference on 
International Organisation, see Roger J. Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations and the 
Pacific War, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1977, pp. 183-6. In the case of Korea, Australia 
initially remained firmly opposed to supporting any action that might further divide the country, 
including separate elections in the south, despite intense lobbying from Washington. Australia also 
privately condemned the American occupation in South Korea for entrenching power in the hands of 
extreme rightists, labelling all opponents of Rhee’s regime as “communist”, and suppressing dissent 
through “police state” machinery. By late 1948, however, with the deepening Cold War atmosphere 
and external pressure from western intelligence and security agencies, the ALP shifted its position in 
full support of the US. Gavan McCormack, Cold War Hot War: An Australian Perspective of the 
Korean War, Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1983, pp. 19-21, 40-58. 
26 Joseph M. Siracusa, The ANZUS Treaty Revisited, Security Challenges, vol. 1, no. 1, 2005, p. 95. 
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States-Australian relations to the United Nations, the Menzies administration made 
them “a cardinal point of Australian foreign policy”.27 
 
Menzies readily accepted America’s Cold War perceptions of the communist threat 
at home and abroad. Post-war conservatives in Australia as a whole held 
disparaging views of communists, considering them to be “human vermin”, “the 
scourge of Satan”, a “fifth column” and “un-Australian”.28 Any communist 
association or participation in any peace organisation in Australia was taken to be 
evidence of communist subversion, influence and control.29  
 
Like their US counterparts, Australian conservative leaders took communist 
movements worldwide to be part of a monolithic bloc, headquartered in Moscow 
and Beijing, whose purpose was global domination. For two decades, Eisenhower’s 
1954 “domino theory” laid the basis for both American and Australian security 
policies. Menzies’ rationale for sending military forces into Malaya in 1955, as part 
of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, was in case “of an overt Chinese offensive 
into the region”.30 Ten years later, Menzies provided the following justification for 
sending a combat battalion to Vietnam in April 1965:  
 
The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to 
Australia and all the countries of South and South East Asia. It must 
be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans.31 
 
In reality, communist movements in Southeast Asia were not satellites of the Soviet 
Union or Red China. The communist guerrilla movement in Malaya, which sparked 
                                                     
27 Pemberton, All the Way, p. 7. 
28 Stephen Alomes, Mark Dober and Donna Hellier, “The Social Context of Postwar Conservatism” in 
Ann Curthoys and John Merritt (eds), Australia’s First Cold War 1945-1953, Vol 1, Society, 
Communism and Culture, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1984. 
29 Phillip Deery, Menzies, the Cold War and the 1953 Convention on Peace and War, Australian 
Historical Studies, vol. 34, no. 122, 2003, pp. 248-269. 
30 Christopher Waters, After Decolonisation: Australia and the Emergence of the Non-aligned 
Movement in Asia, 1954-55, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 12, no. 2, 2001, p. 157. 
31 Lockhart, The Minefield, p. 13. 
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the Malayan “Emergency” in 1948, was a revolt against colonial rule arising 
primarily from domestic political, industrial and communal grievances; 
“international communism” had little to do with it.32 In Vietnam, the conflict was 
not a case of the Sino-Soviet controlled communist North instigating war against the 
South, as commonly depicted at the time. After 1954, the conflict “was essentially a 
struggle between a radicalised Vietnamese patriotism, embodied in the Communist 
Party, and the United States and its wholly dependent local allies”.33 
 
While assuming the mantle of communism, the radical social movements that 
swept across Southeast Asia and much of the third world from 1945 to the 1960s 
were first and foremost revolutionary nationalist movements seeking to free their 
countries from European colonisation and American domination. Distinction 
between the two was critical for accurately assessing any potential security threat; 
and yet, “Western colonial powers often described anti-colonial movements as 
‘communist’, whether they were in fact directed by communists or non-
communists”. For western policy makers, including in Australia, it was “almost 
inconceivable” that revolutionary movements could be both communist and 
nationalist: “it was assumed they had to be one or the other”.34 
 
Throughout the period when Canberra’s Vietnam policy was being decided, 
numerous Western observers called attention to the extensive and freely available 
evidence contrary to Australia’s perception of events; and yet, this evidence was 
persistently ignored and no serious attempt was made to ascertain the facts. The 
ignorance was so great that “Canberra could, as late as 1963, convince itself and 
state openly that the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem enjoyed popular support” and that it 
                                                     
32 Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, pp. 26-30. Chin Peng, long-time leader of the 
Malayan Communist Party, including the period of the Emergency, writes, “We were never aided 
financially by the USSR; neither did Moscow ever order us which path to take. Medical aid for our TB 
patients was all we got from China until 1961 when the struggle took another form in line with Mao’s 
reading of world revolution”. Chin Peng, Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History, Singapore, Media 
Master, 2003, pp. 115-116. 
33 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical 
Experience, New York: Pantheon Books, p. 107. 
34 Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, p. 37. 
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was “impossible for the South Vietnamese to support the pro-communist South 
Vietnamese National Liberation Front rather than the Government in Saigon”.35 
 
Despite the unreality of these beliefs, it has long been maintained that the fear of 
Chinese communist “aggression” and domination over Southeast Asia, and the 
apparent direct security threat this posed to Australia, must be assumed to be 
sincere. Thus, Gregory Clarke asks, as early as 1967, how can “the claim to believe in 
such a threat be genuine . . . when it appears to be based on such a distorted 
interpretation of China’s behaviour?”36 The answer, Clarke believed, lay in the 
“ideological and psychological outlook” of Australian policy makers. A fervent belief 
in the inherent evil of Soviet communism and, above all, the traditional fear of the 
threat to Australia as a European outpost on the edge of Asia, sufficiently explained 
the inability of policy makers to accurately interpret the behaviour of communist 
China or even conceive of China as a normal state.37 
 
In a similar vein, Renouf argued over a decade later, in 1979, that ideology and 
deeply embedded irrational fears of invasion best explained the inability of 
Australian policy makers to distinguish between national liberation movements and 
communist aggression which led, for example, to Australia’s strategic blunder in 
Vietnam. “Had Australian governments not been blinded by political ideology and 
misled by fear”, writes Renouf, “they would not have made such a bad error”.38 
Australia’s “baffling irrational consistency” to see the threat of communism 
everywhere was the result of the “traditional fear of invasion to the North”.39 
 
Later critical accounts have broadly followed this line of argument, stressing the fact 
of Australia’s “strategic dependence” on the US as an explanation for Canberra’s 
                                                     
35 Gregory Clark, In Fear of China, Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1967, pp. 173-74, quote p. 174. 
Emphasis in original. 
36 Clark, p. 172. 
37 Clark, pp. 184-191. 
38 Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country, South Melbourne: MacMillan, 1979, p. 275. 
39 Renouf, pp. 276-277. 
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enthusiastic support of America’s Cold War objectives.40 According to one 
interpretation, Australia’s distorted view of the communist threat was to a large 
extent the result of Canberra’s uncritical embrace of the American alliance and a 
wholehearted adoption of Washington’s characterisation of regional events.41  
 
Others have argued that although Australia was strategically dependent on the US, 
Canberra’s threat assessments were more or less the result of an independent 
reading of the regional security environment, and those assessments, as 
subsequently revealed, had some veracity. While, with the benefit of hindsight, it 
clearly lacked nuance and subtlety, Canberra’s perception of the communist threat 
was understandable given the events of the period.42  
 
In either case, whether the perceived threat was conceived independently or not, 
the actions taken by elites in Canberra, no matter how misguided, are primarily 
understood in terms of advancing Australia’s national security interests. Certainly, 
the desire for security – rooted in deeply embedded themes of fear and 
dependence – played a role in driving Australia’s regional defence policy and its 
strategic dependence on the US during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that the decolonisation movement that swept across Southeast Asia in the 
1950s and 1960s posed little actual threat to the security of Australia and this needs 
to be contextualised in terms of the broader UK and US imperialist agendas of the 
time.  
 
                                                     
40 For a critical review of the literature on the theme of strategic dependence during the Cold War, 
see McLean, Australia in the Cold War. Following on from the work of Gregory Clark and others, 
McLean argues that Australia’s distorted view of the communist threat was the result of “cultural 
predispositions”, stressing the point that Canberra’s polices and perceptions were not formed in 
Washington or London but rather a combination of traditional fears of Asia and Australia’s particular 
regional circumstances. 
41 See, for example, Joseph Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence, South 
Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980; Philip Bell and Roger Bell, Implicated: The United States in Australia, 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
42 See, for example, Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, St. Leonards: 
Allen & Unwin, 1993; Peter Edwards, Permanent Friends? Historical Reflections on the Australian-
American Alliance, Lowy Institute Paper 8, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 13 
December 2005, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/permanent-friends-historical-
reflections-australian-american-alliance>, accessed 5 April 2015. 
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Recognising the fact of Australia’s rather benign security environment is important 
because, as Lockhart points out, “while reality is the historian’s hedge against 
fantasy, beliefs are subject to political manipulation”.43 It would be unwise to 
discount the actual remoteness of threats to Australia’s security and focus solely on 
the beliefs of policy makers as a means to understand their actions. Perceptions, 
even when held with conviction, do not always present the full story. The leaders of 
imperial Japan, after all, viewed their mission to conquer Asia as deriving from a 
similar set of sincere beliefs to bring liberty, stability and prosperity to the region.44  
 
What’s missing from conventional accounts of Australian policies and perceptions 
during the 1950s and 1960s is the fact that revolutionary nationalist movements, 
while posing little threat to Australian security, did pose a real and significant threat 
to the European-imperial order in Asia and, in the long-term, Washington’s vision of 
a US-led capitalist global order. As a status quo power heavily invested in the 
continuation of the British Empire, and increasingly integrated into America’s 
regional political and economic order, Australia had clear interests in the defeat of 
revolutionary nationalism and the preservation of Anglo-American dominance in 
Asia. 
 
Defending the Imperial Order in Asia 
 
Australia’s Cold War perceptions, rooted in the concepts of the “domino theory” 
and “monolithic communism”, were shared throughout the western world to a 
greater or lesser extent. Unlike in Australia, however, there has been extensive 
critical scholarship, particularly with respect to US foreign policy, that challenges 
                                                     
43 Greg Lockhart, Mugged at Oxford: Or, “Little Point in Defending the Periphery”!, Australian 
Historical Studies, vol. 35, no. 123, 2004, p. 151. 
44 As Dower writes, imperial Japan’s rulers and planners “were, in their own eyes, moral and rational 
men. That the nation’s actions, and their own, so often belied their words did not trouble them or 
even register upon them”. John W. Dower, Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq, New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc, 2010, pp. 99-100. Elsewhere, Dower writes that even after 
Japan’s defeat, none of the war crimes trials defendants accepted that they had been engaged in a 
conspiracy to wage wars of aggression. “On the contrary, they believed to the end with all apparent 
sincerity that their policies, however disastrous in outcome, had been motivated by legitimate 
concerns for Japan’s essential rights and interests on the Asian continent”. John Dower, Embracing 
Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II, London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1999, p. 468. 
CHAPTER THREE 
76 
 
the notion that misperceptions led to unwise policies and erroneous doctrines. 
According to this scholarship, rather than misjudging the communist threat, the 
tendency of US planners to see communist aggression everywhere was largely an 
act of self-delusion, necessitated by the challenge that decolonisation and 
revolutionary movements posed to their global strategy – already largely 
formulated before the conclusion of WWII – to expand and restructure the 
international capitalist system under US leadership.45 
 
The US emerged from WWII determined to sustain its position of unprecedented 
global wealth and power in a world devastated by war.46 In order to preserve its 
leadership position, US national security planners sought to eradicate the existing 
system of closed trading blocs and develop in their place a global economy open to 
US capital, just as the UK had sustained an open world trading system during its 
period of ascendancy in the mid-to-late-nineteenth century. 
 
While initially intending to displace the existing system of European imperialism 
with American globalism, the US later helped to reconstruct parts of the colonial 
order as a temporary measure for funding the rapid reconstruction of Europe and 
                                                     
45 William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II, Monroe, US: 
Common Courage Press, 2004, pp. 12, 18-20; Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State, London: Penguin 
Books, 2003 [1973], pp. 34-35, 51-55; Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States 
Foreign Policy 1945 – 1980, New York: Pantheon Books, 1980, pp. 117-118, 130; James Peck, 
Washington’s China: The National Security World, the Cold War, and the Origins of Globalism, 
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006, pp. 1-45, 169, 234; James Peck, Ideal Illusions: 
How the US Government Co-opted Human Rights, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010, pp. 12-36; 
Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American 
Empire, London: Verso, 2012, p. 11; Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History, New York: The 
Modern Library, 2011, pp. 215-216; William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US 
Intervention, and Hegemony, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. For a similar account 
from the perspective of the UK, see Mark Curtis, The Great Deception: Anglo-American Power and 
World Order, London: Pluto Press, 1998; Mark Curtis, Web of Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the World, 
London: Vintage Press, 2003. The following section is largely based on a reading of these texts. 
46 This point is aptly illustrated by frequently quoted memorandum of George Kennan (Head of the 
US State Department Policy Planning Staff): “We have about 50 per cent of the world’s wealth, but 
only 6.3 per cent of its population . . . In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and 
resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will 
permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. 
To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming . . . We should cease to 
talk about vague and – for the Far East – unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living 
standards, and democratisation. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight 
power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.“ George Kennan, 
Review of Current Trends, US Foreign Policy, Policy Planning Staff, PPS No. 23, 28 February 1948. 
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supporting European governments in their efforts to quash third-world 
revolutionary movements that sought an independent path to political and 
economic development. 
 
The military power of the Soviet Union and Communist China posed the only 
serious obstacles to Washington’s plans for the creation of a new world economic 
order. While the Soviet Union checked American penetration into Eastern Europe, it 
was independent nationalism that posed the greatest threat to Washington’s plans 
for reducing the third world to part of its own economic system.47 Much like the 
French Mission Civilisatrice, the US needed a persuasive ideological ethos of 
worldwide significance to provide a context for their actions and justification for 
their means. Anti-communism was the perfect fit because “seeing the dangers of 
Communism everywhere was a way of seeing American global interests 
everywhere”.48  
 
While the conventional wisdom, including in Australia, is that institutionalised 
paranoia and ignorance largely explain the persistence of American officials in 
mistakenly viewing wars for national liberation as part of a Red Chinese or Soviet 
orchestrated conspiracy, this does not account for the consistency of this error 
across time and place. As Chomsky explains:  
 
Why were policy makers always subject to the same form of 
ignorance and irrationality? Why was there such systematic error in 
the delusional systems constructed by post-war ideologists? Mere 
ignorance or foolishness would lead to random error, not to regular 
and systematic distortion: unwavering adherence to the principle 
that whatever the facts may be, the cause of international conflict is 
                                                     
47 That the primary consideration was American dominance and not Soviet containment was made 
clear in the 1950 National Security Council master document on the strategy of containment, NSC-
68, which stated that the “overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to 
foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish . . . a policy which 
we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat”. Panitch and Gindin, The Making of 
Global Capitalism, p. 95. 
48 Peck, Ideal Illusions, p. 23. 
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the behaviour of the Communist powers, and all revolutionary 
movements within the United States system are sponsored by the 
Soviet Union, China or both . . . Ignorance and stupidity can surely 
lead to error, but hardly to such systematic error or such certainty in 
error.49 
 
Chomsky does not suggest that US policy makers did not believe their doctrines. 
What they may have believed, rather, is less relevant for understanding US foreign 
policy than the functionality of those beliefs. He writes: 
 
The fact that policy makers may be caught up in the fantasies they 
spin to disguise imperial intervention, and may sometimes even find 
themselves trapped by them, should not prevent us from asking 
what function these ideological constructions fulfil – why this 
particular system of mystification is consistently expounded in place 
of some alternative. Similarly, one should not be misled by the fact 
that the delusional system presents a faint reflection of reality. It 
must, after all, carry some conviction. But this should not prevent us 
from proceeding to disentangle motive from myth.50 
 
Australian policy makers are said to have “shared the mistakes made by their 
counterparts in Washington”, carrying out the same fundamental error with respect 
to the threat of “international communism” despite clear evidence to the 
contrary.51 However, as is the case with the US, the “baffling irrational consistency” 
of Australian policy makers to view anti-colonial movements everywhere in Asia as 
a security threat raises important questions that are insufficiently accounted for by 
resort to psychological explanations rooted in fear and ignorance. 
 
                                                     
49 Chomsky, For Reasons of State, p. 53. 
50 Chomsky, pp. 54-55. Emphasis in original. 
51 Renouf, The Frightened Country, p. 274. 
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Primarily, if Australia’s persistent eagerness to participate in mistaken and 
foolhardy US foreign wars had been driven by irrational fears, why were Australia’s 
military contributions consistently calculated and measured to ensure the minimal 
amount required to secure American goodwill? If the basis of such mistaken policies 
were genuine and deeply held but erroneous security anxieties, would not 
successive Australian governments have been eager to militarily contribute to a 
degree that matched the dreaded threat? In the case of Vietnam, Renouf points 
out: 
 
There was an inconsistency in Australia’s attitude that was not lost to 
the US. While Australia continually talked of the tremendous 
historical, world-wide significance of Vietnam, her governments 
never acted as if they believed their own statements. If they did 
believe this, why was it so difficult to get anything from them for 
South Vietnam except words and money? This inconsistency was 
obvious to [senior US presidential advisor] Clark Clifford when he 
visited Canberra in 1967. Talking with the Government he realised 
that the forward defence strategy meant that it was principally the 
US which should defend Australia in Asia, not Australia herself.52 
 
The reluctance on the part of Canberra to commit to a military effort that matched 
its rhetoric during the Vietnam War is not an isolated occurrence. When it comes to 
Australian support for US military interventions abroad, “Australia’s alliance habit is 
towards big rhetoric while sending a small force . . . minimising the military and 
political burden”.53 The “US alliance management equation” of announcing firm 
loyalty to Washington while making as small a military contribution as possible is 
                                                     
52 Renouf, The Frightened Country, p. 278. Emphasis in original. Also see James Curran, Unholy Fury: 
Whitlam and Nixon at War, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2015, pp. 60-64. 
53 Graeme Dobell, The Alliance Echoes and Portents of Australia’s Longest War, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 6, no. 4, 2014, p. 391. 
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one “that Canberra has followed with remarkable consistency through five wars 
since World War II – Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan”.54 
 
Contrary to earlier theories of dependence which stressed Australia’s subordination 
to US interests, later scholarship confirms that Australia was not, and is not, so 
much a follower of the US as an enthusiastic partner; and policy makers in Canberra 
often more hawkish in their advocacy for defeating communism, or other equally 
dubious threats, than their American counterparts.55 Australian governments have 
not displayed helpless dependence and irrationality so much as shrewdness in 
paying the minimum premium required to “lock the US into the region” against the 
possibility of a future threat.56 
 
The nature of that threat throughout the 1950s and 1960s, however, could not have 
been in the form of a direct attack. High-level strategic assessments stated at the 
time that Australia was not under serious threat of external aggression in the 
foreseeable future, communist or otherwise. The “threat” of national independence 
on the other hand, was an accurately identified and genuinely held concern because 
those liberation movements compromised British colonial interests in Asia, to which 
Australia was still aligned. 
 
In the context of the actual threat that nationalist liberation movements posed to 
colonialism, Australia’s otherwise “baffling irrational consistency” in mistaking 
communism everywhere in Asia as a security threat to Australia is more readily 
explainable as a rationalisation for propping up the imperial order in Asia. As 
Lockhart explains: 
 
                                                     
54 Dobal, p. 392. For similar arguments along these lines, see Lloyd Cox and Brendon O’Connor, 
Australia, the US, and the Vietnam and Iraq Wars: “Hound Dog not Lapdog”, Australian Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 47, No. 2, 2012; Albert Palazzo, The Making of Strategy and the Junior Coalition 
Partner: Australia and the 2003 Iraq War, Infinity Journal, vol. 2, no. 4, 2012, pp. 26-30. 
55 Cox and O’Connor; Pemberton, All the Way; Michael Sexton, War for the Asking: Australia’s 
Vietnam Secret, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1981. 
56 Edwards, Permanent Friends? 
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By building on an apparition of earlier Japanese expansion, Menzies 
had constructed the threat to the imperial position in Malaya as an 
imagined Chinese invasion. Arguably, this move better enabled him 
to manage politically and psychologically what he really feared: the 
threat that the local forces of radical Asian nationalism did pose to 
the British Empire in Asia after the Japanese interregnum.57 
 
The suppression of radical Asian nationalism and the preservation of the British 
Empire could only succeed with the full support of Washington which shared both 
of these objectives, albeit for slightly different reasons. Australia’s strategic 
dependence on the US and its enthusiastic support for American intervention in 
Southeast Asia, including the small and mostly symbolic force sent to Vietnam, can 
thus be explained as a political strategy to lock the US into the region as a means to 
preserve western dominance in Asia. 
 
While Canberra’s security perceptions were built on deep-seated race fears of Asia, 
the desire to see the European-imperial order maintained cannot be reduced to 
these fears alone. As noted in Chapter Two, traditional invasion anxieties are just 
one part of Australia’s strategic culture that underpinned the support for 
imperialism. The fact remains that Australia held a deeply embedded imperialist 
spirit, along with vested interests, in the continuation of British power in the Far 
East, and in the emerging American neo-imperial order in Asia. These were linked 
to, but nevertheless distinct from, any perceived security concerns. 
 
Understood from this perspective, Australia’s strategic dependence on the US in the 
1950s and 1960s was not the result of uncritical deference to US foreign policy 
objectives or a flawed assessment of Australia’s own independent security interests. 
While deep-seated security anxieties manifestly fuelled Australia’s alliance-reliance 
mentality, strategic dependence was a decision less informed by genuine security 
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CHAPTER THREE 
82 
 
concerns than the enduring desire to see Asia subordinated to western strategic 
and economic interests.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Australia-US Alliance: from Strategic Dependence to 
Independent “Middle Power” 
 
Threat Perceptions from the 1970s 
 
By the early 1970s, a major shift in Australia’s strategic environment and defence 
relationships had already taken place. The old colonial system in Southeast Asia, 
which Australia fought hard to preserve in the 1950s and 1960s, collapsed far 
earlier than expected. Divergent influences remained, where even as the “threat” of 
communist and radical nationalist movements was, for the most part, successfully 
thwarted, British interests were largely preserved for some time thereafter. The US 
largely replaced the old colonial system in Asia with its own form of neo-
imperialism, reorienting the political and economic life of the region according to its 
global agenda of an integrated world trading system open to American corporate 
interests. 
 
While the UK was displaced by the US as Australia’s primary strategic and economic 
partner, the foreshadowed departure of America’s military presence from 
Indochina created the catalyst for Australia to take greater responsibility for its own 
security. Beginning in the early to mid-1970s, forward defence gradually receded as 
the basis of Australia’s defence policy in favour of the DOA and “self-reliance” 
doctrines, although these concepts were not entirely new1 and continued to remain 
“conceptually and operationally inchoate” until the mid-to-late 1980s.2 
                                                     
1 The notion that Australia needed to develop an independent force to defend itself first arose in the 
early 1960s as policy makers began to acknowledge that Australia’s security interests would not 
always coincide with that of the US, particularly over Indonesia. However, it was not until the 1970s 
that the idea of operations independent from allies transformed from a credible contingency to 
deliberate policy. Stephan Fruhling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, Canberra: 
Defence Publishing Service, Department of Defence, 2009, p. 44. 
2 Desmond Ball, The Strategic Essence, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 2, 2001, 
p. 235. While the Whitlam government entered office with the determination to implement a more 
self-reliant approach to defence, the overall structure of Australia’s defence forces and defence 
equipment acquisition programs continued to reflect earlier decisions and priorities to project 
Australian military strength beyond the continental boundaries in order to support the security of its 
neighbours in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Graeme Cheeseman, From Forward Defence 
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Together, DOA and self-reliance shifted the focus of Australia’s defence strategy 
from expeditionary combat to the protection of the homeland, placing primary 
importance on the ability of the armed forces to independently defend the northern 
air and maritime approaches to Australia from which an attack would most likely be 
mounted.3 The change in strategic doctrine reflected an official acknowledgment in 
Australia that it could not, and should not, rely on the US to guarantee its security.4 
Australia henceforth emerged as a more strategically independent nation. 
 
The catalyst for the shift from strategic dependence to self-reliance was the 
announcement of President Richard Nixon’s “Guam doctrine”, requiring allies like 
Australia to take on more of the “burden sharing” for regional security.5 While the 
Cold War continued to dominate Australian threat perceptions, the détente 
between the superpowers, the discrediting of the “domino theory” and monolithic 
communism in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, and the resumption of 
diplomatic ties with the PRC severely undermined the perceived threat of 
communist aggression in Southeast Asia. 
 
As assurances of American military aid were downgraded, and in the light of 
Australia’s changing strategic environment, greater attention was placed on the 
                                                                                                                                                      
to Self-Reliance: Changes and Continuities in Australian Defence Policy 1965-90, Australian Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 26, no. 3, 1991, p. 433. 
3 Peter Edwards, Permanent Friends? Historical Reflections on the Australian-American Alliance, Lowy 
Institute Paper 8, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 13 December 2005, pp. 32-4, 
<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/permanent-friends-historical-reflections-australian-
american-alliance>, accessed 5 April 2015; Stephan Fruhling, Australian Defence Policy and the 
Concept of Self-Reliance, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 5, 2014, pp. 533-34. 
4 The shift in attitude was reflected in official Australian defence papers which downgraded the 
alliance from a “guarantee” (1956) and the “assured foundation of Australia’s security” (1972) to 
“substantial grounds for confidence” (1976) and later just “confidence” (1987) that the US would 
come to Australia’s aid. Gary Brown and Laura Rayner, Upside, Downside: ANZUS After Fifty Years, 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Current Issues 
Brief, no. 3, 2001-02, p. 17; Gary Brown, Breaking the American Alliance: An Independent National 
Security Policy for Australia, Canberra: Australian National University, 1989, pp. 62-65. 
5 The Guam doctrine was merely a tactical change on the part of Washington. The US fully intended 
to remain dominant in the region, only now its allies – backed by American aid and technology – 
would have to assume a greater proportion of the costs in both lives and treasure. See Virginia 
Brodine and Mark Selden (eds), Open Secret: The Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine in Asia. Why We Are Never 
Leaving, New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 
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benefits the US alliance provided Australia in terms of access to advanced defence 
technology, intelligence cooperation, defence science and military training.6 While 
in the past, the primary justification for the alliance was viewed in terms of a 
guarantee of protection against attack and its contribution to the global strategic 
balance, by the mid-1980s this had changed. As Desmond Ball observes: 
 
[The] importance of the US alliance derived from entirely different 
grounds – that only the United States could provide Australia with 
the intelligence, defence technology and professional military 
expertise which would enable Australia to independently handle 
regional threats.7 
 
Specifically, these benefits were deemed critical for ensuring Australia could defend 
itself against more likely, but low-level, threat scenarios, while remaining prepared 
to meet the potential challenge of a serious, albeit remote, high-level attack.8 In the 
latter scenario, advanced strategic intelligence capabilities required to determine 
foreign military strength and hostile intent were deemed crucial for ensuring an 
adequate lead time for force expansion.9 The qualitative lead in military and 
intelligence capabilities – or regional “edge” – derived from the alliance has 
continued to be understood for the last forty years as a solution to mitigate both 
the disparity in Australia’s landmass and maritime patrol zones and the relative 
small size and capacity of its defence forces.10 
 
Although the benefits derived from the alliance undoubtedly bolstered Australia’s 
self-reliant defence posture, their actual value can only be properly evaluated in the 
                                                     
6 As Edwards notes, greater attention to these benefits “had been gaining support in political and 
official circles for some years, but from the late 1970s they would be deployed more frequently in 
public debate”. Edwards, Permanent Friends?, p. 34. 
7 Ball, The Strategic Essence, p. 236. 
8 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister for Defence, Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, March 1986, pp. 46, 53-55. 
9 Richard Brabin-Smith, Force Expansion and Warning Time, Security Challenges, vol. 8, no. 2, 2012, 
pp. 33-47. 
10 John Hardy, Statements of Intent: The Politicisation of Australia’s Strategic Edge in the era of 
Defence Self-Reliance, Australian Political Studies Association (APSA) Annual Conference, Melbourne, 
30 September – 3 October 2013, pp. 1-42.  
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context of Australia’s continuing non-threatening strategic environment. While fear 
and threat inflation frequently dominated political rhetoric during the 1970s and 
1980s, official strategic assessments confirmed the low probability of contingencies 
that might arise concerning the defence of Australia.11 
 
The potential value of the alliance in providing for Australia’s defence was carefully 
appraised by Paul Dibb in his 1986 report, Review of Australia’s Defence 
Capabilities.12 Dibb pointed out that the deterrence capacity of the alliance in the 
“remote” and “improbable” case of a high-level threat emerging, while still 
valuable, was not particularly relevant given strategic realities. Apart from its 
“obligations” under the ANZUS Treaty, the dramatic change in regional 
circumstances that would likely precipitate such a threat emerging would impinge 
on core US interests – specifically America’s “own supremacy in the region” –  that 
would automatically elicit a countervailing American response.13 
 
In the “very improbable” case of sustained conventional global war between the 
superpowers, Dibb deemed the chance of a direct Soviet threat as “limited” given 
the remoteness of Australia. In any case, during global war, “both the United States 
and its European allies would give first priority to their own military needs. We 
could not assume that they would give any priority to our military requirements”.14 
 
Given that a general war between the superpowers would in all likelihood quickly 
escalate into an all-out nuclear exchange, special importance was placed on the 
need to maintain an effective nuclear deterrence strategy. However, contrary to 
Dibb’s assertion in his 1986 report, the early warning and verification capacities of 
                                                     
11 Commonwealth of Australia, Threats to Australia’s Security: Their Nature and Probability, Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing House, 
1981. On the mismatch between political rhetoric and official strategic assessments, especially 
during the Fraser and Hawke governments, see Brian Toohey and Marian Wilkinson, The Book of 
Leaks: Exposes in Defence of the Public’s Right to Know, North Ryde: Angus and Robertson, 1987. 
12 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities. 
13 Dibb, pp. 1, 7, 175.  
14 Dibb, pp. 31-32. 
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the Australia-US “joint-facilities” did not necessarily serve to protect Australia 
against the threat of nuclear war.15 
 
In many ways, the “joint-facilities” served to undermine the strategic nuclear 
balance between the superpowers as well as make Australia a high-level Soviet 
nuclear target.16 Technical developments and changes in the global nuclear order 
since the end of the Cold War have further undermined the apparent contribution 
of these facilities to global nuclear stability.17 
 
The most significant contribution of the alliance to Australia’s direct security 
identified by Dibb were the “practical benefits” that augmented the ADF’s defence 
capabilities. These were deemed important particularly against more credible, but 
less serious, threat contingencies, such as small-scale harassments and raids 
through to substantial conventional military action, albeit well below the level of 
invasion.18 
 
These benefits were specifically identified and quantified as access to US 
intelligence resources, which contributed to the “potential effectiveness” of the 
ADF in combat; logistical support that provided Australia with “some assurance” of 
military supplies during conflict; and “considerable” access to advanced US military 
                                                     
15 Dibb, p. 31. 
16 Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia, Sydney: Hale & 
Iremonger, 1980, especially pp. 121-138. For a more recent review of these issues, see Richard 
Tanter, The “Joint Facilities” Revisited – Desmond Ball, Democratic Debate on Security, and the 
Human Interest, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, Special Report, 11 December 2012, 
<http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-joint-facilities-revisited-desmond-ball-
democratic-debate-on-security-and-the-human-interest/>, accessed 5 April 2016; Richard Tanter, 
Possibilities and Effects of a Nuclear Attack on Pine Gap, Australian Defence Facilities Pine Gap, 
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 30 October 2013, <http://nautilus.org/briefing-
books/australian-defence-facilities/possibilities-and-effects-of-a-nuclear-missile-attack-on-pine-
gap/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
17 Richard Tanter, “Just in Case”: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defence of Australia, Pacific 
Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies, vol. XXVI, no. 1, April 2011, pp. 113-136; Richard Tanter, 
The US Military Presence in Australia: Asymmetrical Alliance Cooperation and its Alternatives, The 
Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 11, issue 45, no. 1, 11 November 2013, 
<http://apjjf.org/2013/11/45/Richard-Tanter/4025/article.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
18 While small-scale harassments and raids were deemed within the current military capabilities of 
regional powers, more substantial conventional military action such as lodging and maintaining 
substantial forces in Australia would require a significant and detectable military build-up over many 
years. Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 5, 53-55. 
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technology that contributed to Australia’s efforts at maintaining a clear 
technological advantage over potential regional adversaries.19 
 
It is important to note that the Dibb report emphasised the fact that no conflict at 
any level of threat was considered likely in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the 
more credible low-level threat scenarios for which the alliance was deemed of most 
benefit were still conditioned on a then unforeseeable and substantial deterioration 
in strategic circumstances. All of the threat assessments “simply represented 
judgements of what might be possible, given potential military capacities, should 
conflict arise”.20  
 
The end of the Cold War virtually eliminated the threat of communism and global 
nuclear war that provided the primary justification for the alliance since the 1950s. 
Ceased to be bound together by a common threat, the importance of the alliance as 
an anchor for regional stability subsequently took on greater prominence in the 
post-Cold War era.21 In Northeast Asia, there was the apparent prospect of regional 
tensions erupting into outright conflict in the absence of the “balancing” effect of 
America’s dominating military presence.22 
 
Closer to home, in Southeast Asia, Australian defence planners, it was argued, were 
confronted by a “bewildering array of momentous change”, “profound uncertainty” 
and “extraordinary volatility”, particularly as a result of developments such as the 
Asian Financial Crisis, the collapse of President Suharto’s regime in Indonesia and 
                                                     
19 Dibb, p. 46. Although Dibb rather cautiously valued the practical benefits of the alliance in his 1986 
report, subsequent government policy statements and speeches were less equivocal, asserting that 
self-reliance was only achievable with the benefits the alliance provided. See Graeme Cheeseman 
and Michael McKinley, Moments Lost: Promise, Disappointment and Contradictions in the 
Australian-United States Defence Relationship, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 
2, 1992, p. 208. More recently, Dibb has argued that Australia’s self-reliant defence posture is 
“immeasurably strengthened” as a result of the practical benefits the alliance provides. Paul Dibb, 
US-Australia Alliance Relations: An Australian View, Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, National Defence University, no. 216, August 2005, p. 1. 
20 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p. 54. 
21 John Baker and Douglas H. Paal, “The US-Australia Alliance” in Robert D. Blackwell and Paul Dibb 
(eds), America's Asian Alliances, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 89-90. 
22 The typical formulation in the post-Cold War era has been that US military presence caps Japanese 
militarism, balances Chinese power and deters North Korea. 
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the independence of East Timor. This “rapid strategic change” had consequently 
“brought into relief the complacent attitude towards the US alliance and the [sic] 
defence spending”.23 
 
Despite these apparent dramatic changes in Australia’s regional environment, the 
transition into the post-Cold War era did not bring about a major shift in Australia’s 
strategic outlook. Rather, as had been the case since the 1970s, Australia continued 
to live in a “non-specific threat environment”.24 Concerns that emerged in the late 
1990s and 2000s about the so-called “arc of instability” to Australia’s north 
reflected an unwarranted “securitisation” of the region.25 How such instability 
might translate into an actual high-level threat to Australia remained unexplained in 
realistic terms.26 No Southeast Asian nation then, or since, has possessed the 
requisite military capability or hostile intent to threaten Australia in the foreseeable 
future.27 
 
In the 2000s, fear of regional instability merged with fears of the threat of 
terrorism, the latter skilfully utilised by the conservative Howard government to 
justify Australia’s participation in America’s “war on terror”.28 The extraordinary rise 
and military success of ISIS in recent years has refocused the political debate on the 
threat of international terrorism and Australian involvement in the Middle East. In 
reality, the threat of terrorism to Australia since the terrorist attacks against the US 
                                                     
23 Desmond Ball, Australian Defence Planning: Problems and Prospects, Pacifica Review, vol. 12, no. 
3, 2000, pp. 281, 290. 
24 Robert Ayson, “Australasian Security” in Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball (eds), Strategy and 
Security in the Asia-Pacific, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2006, p. 242. 
25 Joanne Wallis, The South Pacific: “Arc of Instability” or “Arc of Opportunity?”, Global Change Peace 
& Security: Formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, vol. 27, no. 1, 2015, pp. 39-
53. 
26 Alan Dupont, Transformation or Stagnation? Rethinking Australia’s Defence, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 57, no. 1, 2003, pp. 55-76. 
27 Dupont. For a careful appraisal of Indonesia’s military capabilities today, see Benjamin Schreer, 
Moving Beyond Ambitions? Indonesia's Military Modernisation, Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
(ASPI), Canberra, November 2013, <https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/moving-beyond-
ambitions-indonesias-military-modernisation>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
28 Anthony Burke, Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, pp. 207-233. 
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on 11 September 2001 has remained marginal, its prominence more a reflection of 
domestic politics than genuine security concerns.29 
 
The enduring absence of identifiable threats in Australian defence planning was 
summed up by Desmond Ball at the turn of the twenty-first century. Threats to 
Australia’s national security, he pointed out, had for many decades played no role in 
the maintenance of the US alliance. In Ball’s words: 
 
[Since] the 1970s, when “forward defence” was replaced by the 
policy of “defence of Australia”, official assessments have reiterated 
that Australia faces no foreseeable threats, and threat scenarios have 
played no part in the development of Australia’s defence capabilities. 
The vitality of the alliance has been “threat insensitive”.30 
 
The general thrust of Ball’s assessment remains true today. Admittedly, the rise of 
China and the transformation of major power relations in the Asia Pacific have 
emerged as Australia’s central strategic considerations for the foreseeable future. In 
all likelihood, the “unipolar” era of American dominance is a state of affairs that will 
continue well into the twenty-first century.31 Nevertheless, the potential 
destabilising effects of China’s rise, and the need to hedge against it, has taken on 
primary importance in Australian defence planning.32 
 
                                                     
29 Christopher Michaelsen, The Triviality of Terrorism, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 
66, no. 4. 2012, pp. 431-449; Scott Burchill, Radical Islam and the West: The Moral Panic Behind 
the Threat, The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/radical-islam-and-the-west-the-moral-
panic-behind-the-threat-43113>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
30 Ball, The Strategic Essence, p. 245. 
31 Michael Beckley, The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited, PhD 
Thesis, Colombia University, New York, 2012. 
32 This has been the case since the release of the 2009 Defence White Paper. As a number of 
strategic commentators argued at the time, the rise of China and the transformation of major power 
relations in the Asia-Pacific have been accepted by Canberra “as a fact requiring an Australian 
response in the form of an unprecedented military build-up over 20 years”. John Langmore, Calum 
Logan and Stewart Firth, The 2009 Australian Defence White Paper: Analysis and Alternatives, Austral 
Policy Forum 10-01A, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 15 September 2010, pp. 10-
11, <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/langmore-logan-firth.pdf>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
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Whatever the long-term consequences of the changing power relations in Asia may 
be, Australia faces the least strategic challenge from the rise of China of any 
regional power. China lacks the requisite military capability and hostile intent to 
present a realistic threat scenario to Australia now or in the foreseeable future.33 
Australia’s latest Defence White Paper, while stressing the uncertainty inherent in 
the wider strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific, nevertheless reiterates that 
“there is no more than a remote prospect of a military attack by another country on 
Australian territory in the foreseeable future”.34 The fear of an invasion by China, or 
any other state for that matter, remains “close to fantasy”.35 
 
Australia’s growing economic dependence on China may pose greater problems, but 
here too, concerns are exaggerated.36 While China’s rise has resurfaced long-
standing but erroneous fears about Australia’s apparent economic vulnerability to 
the disruption of international trade,37 in reality, it is extremely unlikely China 
would attempt to shut down the free flow of trade in the South China Sea, an act 
that would irreparably damage Beijing’s interests.38 As has been the case since 
                                                     
33 Paul Dibb and John Lee, Why China Will Not Become the Dominant Power in Asia, Security 
Challenges, vol. 10, no. 3, 2014, pp. 1-21; Robert S. Ross, The US Pivot to Asia and Implications for 
Australia, Centre of Gravity Series, ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, March 2013, 
<http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/publications/us-pivot-asia-and-implications-australia>, accessed 5 April 
2016; James Ingram, A Time for Change - The Alliance and Australian Foreign Policy, address to the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, 9 June 2011, <http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/
media_library/a-time-for-change-the-us-alliance-and-australian-foreign-policy-by-james-ingram-ao-
faiia/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
34 Commonwealth of Australia, 2016 Defence White Paper, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2016, 
p. 15. 
35 Langmore, et.al, The 2009 Australian Defence White Paper, p. 9. 
36 While China is Australia’s largest two-way trading partner in goods and services, the economic 
relationship is rather one-dimensional. Exports to China consist mostly of commodities and imports 
of cheaply manufactured consumer goods. This fact, together with the dynamic nature of the 
international commodities market, means that China’s capacity to punish Australia economically is, 
in practice, “almost non-existent”. Nick Bisley, An Ally For All The Years To Come: Why Australia Is 
Not A Conflicted US Ally, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 4, 2013, p. 414. 
37 Commonwealth of Australia, Guarding Against Uncertainty: Australian Attitudes to Defence, 
Report on Community Consultations, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2015, p. 17, <http://www.
defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/docs/GuardingUncertainty.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2016. For an 
explanation of why Australia’s economy is not especially vulnerable to disruption through the 
interdiction of overseas trade see Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 2, 39. Also see 
Commonwealth of Australia, The Defence of Australia 1987, Canberra: Department of Defence, 1987, 
p. 28. 
38 Ralf Emmers, “The US Rebalancing Strategy: Impact on the South China Sea” in Leszek Buszynski 
and Christopher Roberts (eds), The South China Sea and Australia’s Regional Security Environment, 
National Security College Occasional Paper, no. 5, September 2013, pp. 41-42. 
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WWII, the fundamental strategic reality is that Australia remains a relatively secure 
country now and for the foreseeable future. 
 
Self-Reliance and Australia’s Expansionist Defence Policy 
 
With the threat of radical nationalism in Southeast Asia effectively “inoculated” by 
the Vietnam War,39 Australia was empowered to take greater responsibility for its 
own security as a more strategically independent nation, even as it remained 
dependent on the US to maintain overall “stability” in East Asia. The decision to 
focus on Australia’s direct security needs, reflected in the 1986 Dibb report, 
immediately provoked criticism from American officials, the Australian military and 
conservative commentators. These critics charged that the report proposed a 
defence posture that was too isolationist and failed to take into consideration 
Australia’s responsibilities for maintaining regional security in accordance with the 
US alliance.40 
 
While Dibb did prioritise the defence of the continent, Australia’s “direct” and 
“primary” spheres of military interest were deemed to be ten per cent and twenty 
per cent of the earth’s surface respectively – hardly isolationist – and expeditionary 
combat in support of Australia’s allies was to continue, albeit with a reduced 
focus.41 In any case, if there were any hint of a “fortress Australia” mentality in 
defence thinking, it was well and truly abandoned by the Department of Defence’s 
November 1989 report, Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s. That report 
unambiguously declared Australia’s defence strategy “goes beyond the defence of 
                                                     
39 As Edwards writes, “It remains the case that the strongest argument to be raised in favour of the 
commitment by the United States and its allies is that it delayed the communist victory in South 
Vietnam by ten years, from 1965 to 1975, thereby giving several potential Southeast Asian 
‘dominoes’, such as Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, time to strengthen themselves economically, 
politically and socially”. Edwards, Permanent Friends?, p. 21. 
40 Significantly, the criticism impelled a change in the 1987 White Paper which made a point of 
stressing Australia’s regional responsibilities and alliance obligations. Frank P. Donnini, ANZUS in 
Revision: Changing Defence Features of Australia and New Zealand in the Mid-1980s, Alabama: Air 
University Press, February 1991, pp. 68-74. 
41 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp. 3-4, 37, 50-51. Also see, Commonwealth of 
Australia, The Defence of Australia 1987, pp. 2-3. 
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the nation against direct attack to include the promotion of our security 
interests”.42 
 
The planning document summarised how Australia’s strategic policy evolved from 
dependence on allies to defending the homeland independently and finally “to a 
positive acceptance of both self-reliance and our need to help shape our regional 
strategic environment, in which we are a substantial power”.43 Under the heading 
“Promoting Our Strategic Interests”, the document argued that Australia “should 
see itself as a substantial regional power exerting considerable influence on the 
rate, direction and outcomes of strategic change”. Among the reasons cited was 
“the fact that we are a substantial regional military power” and “our alliance with 
the US”.44 
 
Australia’s new strategic doctrine of prioritising the defence of the continent and its 
immediate surrounds thus faded almost as soon as it was announced, overcome by 
Australia’s deeply embedded expeditionary mindset and desire to establish its own 
“Pax-Australiana”.45 As a number of critical scholars argued throughout the 1990s, 
the post-Dibb defence strategy reflected a “new Australian militarism” that 
conceived of Australia’s substantial regional military power as a diplomatic 
instrument to further the nation’s interests abroad and enhance Australia’s 
international status.46 In the words of former Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, the 
more self-reliant defence posture that had emerged since the 1980s “liberated” 
Australia so that it could pursue a much broader security agenda in line with the 
nation’s “middle power” status.47  
                                                     
42 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Canberra: Department of 
Defence, 27 November 1989, p. 2. 
43 Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s, p. 3. 
44 Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s, pp. 42-43. 
45 Cheeseman and McKinley, p. 203. 
46 Grame Cheeseman and St John Kettle (eds), The New Australian Militarism: Undermining Our 
Future Security, Sydney: Pluto Press, 1990; Gary Smith and St John Kettle (eds), Threats Without 
Enemies: Rethinking Australia’s Security, Sydney: Pluto Press, 1992; Graeme Cheeseman and Robert 
Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After 
the Cold War, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996. 
47 Graeme Cheeseman, “Back to ‘Forward Defence’ and the Australian National Style” in Graeme 
Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger, p. 269. 
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As in previous decades, the post-Cold War era saw Australia continue to support 
America’s efforts at maintaining its global hegemony and contribute to major US 
military interventions around the world. However, the difficulty in balancing these 
two objectives – to advance Australia’s ability to shape its own regional strategic 
environment and support its ally globally – proved to be significantly contentious. 
This became particularly evident during the conservative administration of Prime 
Minister John Howard, especially after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, 
which had the effect of rallying Australian political opinion in support of the US-led 
“war on terror”. 
 
Although the Howard government continued to place importance on the notion of 
Australia as a “middle power” – or, in the preferred terminology, a “pivotal”, 
“considerable” and “significant” power – it advocated moving beyond regionalism 
to advancing Australia’s interests on the global stage in concert with its major ally.48 
The decision by the Howard government to focus the ADF on distant operations in 
support of the US, as well as regional operations in Southeast Asia and the South 
Pacific, was characterised by critics of the alliance “as clear a statement as any could 
be that Australia had officially returned to a policy of forward defence”.49 
 
Concerned that Australia’s priorities under the Howard government had tilted too 
far in favour of expeditionary combat missions in support of allies, noted strategic 
commentators urged Australia to concentrate on developing Australia’s capacity to 
defend the continent and project credible force into the region, with the focus on 
the latter.50 Professor Hugh White, for example, argued Australia should “build and 
                                                     
48 Alexander Downer, Should Australia Think Big or Small in Foreign Policy, speech to the Centre for 
Independent Studies: The Policymakers Forum, 10 July 2006. 
49 Joseph Camilleri, A Leap Into the Past - In the Name of the “National Interest”, Australian Journal 
of International Affairs, vol. 57, no. 3, 2003, p. 447. 
50 Paul Dibb, “Australia-United States” in Brendan Taylor (ed), Australia as an Asia Pacific Regional 
Power: Friendship in Flux, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 38-9; Paul Dibb, “The Self-Reliant Defence of 
Australia: The History of an Idea” in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds), History as Policy: 
Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy, Canberra: Australian National 
University E Press, 2007, p. 22; Hugh White, Beyond the Defence of Australia: Finding a New Balance 
in Australian Strategic Policy, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2006, 
<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/beyond-defence-australia>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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sustain military capabilities that will give it strategic weight as a regional power”, 
capable of independently protecting its interests as far offshore as possible.51 
 
Similarly, former US ambassador, Michael Thawley, argued Australia should not be 
content to become “progressively more of a strategic price-taker as others around 
us grow”, but instead work toward becoming more of a “strategic price-setter”. 
Thawley advocated that Australia increase “the size of our defence force and 
develop more significant force projection capabilities” so that it could aim to “shift 
the balance in any potential conflict in our region”.52 
 
The advent of Kevin Rudd’s Labor government brought new hopes for realising 
these ambitious goals. The 2009 Defence White Paper proposed the acquisition of 
major force projection capabilities well out of proportion to Australia’s security 
needs, including doubling the size of the submarine fleet to twelve, acquiring three 
Air Warfare Destroyers, a new class of eight frigates, one hundred fifth-generation 
combat aircraft and around 1,100 armoured combat vehicles.53 
 
The intention was to acquire the necessary military capabilities for making a 
significant contribution to the “balance of power” in the region; an objective that 
was recognised as an evolution, not a revolution, in Australian strategic thinking.54 
Controversially, the Rudd government appeared to be preparing the ADF to support 
the US in a major regional war, China being the obvious target.55  
 
                                                     
51 White, pp. ix-x, 56. 
52 Michael Thawley, More Power to Australia, address to the Sir Robert Menzies Lecture Trust, 
Melbourne, Parliament House, 4 November 2005. 
53 Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence 
White Paper 2009, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009. 
54 As Ayson put it in a review of the 2009 White Paper, “Residing deep within the Australian strategic 
consciousness . . . is a desire that it be a dominant influence in its own part of the wider Asian 
strategic balance”. Robert Ayson, Australia’s Defence Policy: Medium Power, Even Bigger 
Ambitions?, The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, vol. 22, no. 2, 2010, p.192. 
55 An allegedly secret chapter in the 2009 white paper detailed plans to fight China by using the 
Australian Navy’s submarines to help blockade key trade routes, raising the prospect of China firing 
missiles at targets in Australia in retaliation. Brendan Nicholson, Secret “War” With China 
Uncovered, The Australian, 2 June 2012, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-
affairs/policy/secret-war-with-china-uncovered/story-fn59nm2j-1226381002984>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
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By the end of Rudd’s term in office, Australia had undergone a significant expansion 
in military power. Over the two decades to the year 2010, successive defence 
funding increases saw Australia achieve the tenth largest military spending in the 
world, all the while continuing to outspend all of its Southeast Asian neighbours by 
a considerable margin.56 Construction had begun on two new Landing Helicopter 
Docks, first envisioned by the Howard government in 2000, capable of deploying 
over 2,000 troops and associated weapons, vehicles and aircraft. Altogether, in the 
words of White, the ADF had acquired key air and naval assets that reinforced 
Australia’s status as “the most significant air and naval power in the region south of 
China and east of India”.57 
 
The notion of Australia as an influential actor requiring high-end military capabilities 
to bolster its regional influence continued to be advocated by Rudd’s successor, 
Julia Gillard. In 2013, the Gillard government published Australia’s first National 
Security Strategy, declaring that one of Australia’s central objectives or “ends” was 
“to influence and shape our regional and global environment to be conducive to 
advancing Australia’s interests and values”.58 In particular, “strengthening our 
position as an influential regional actor” was deemed “a focus of our foreign 
policy”.59 The maintenance of “credible high-end capabilities” was considered 
necessary to “act decisively when required”, deter potential threats, and 
“strengthen our regional influence”. 60  
 
The Gillard government released a new Defence White Paper in 2013, reaffirming 
the intention to deliver the “core capabilities” identified in Rudd’s 2009 white 
paper.61 However, plans for a large military build-up in the short term were 
                                                     
56 Mark Thompson, The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2012-2013, Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute (ASPI), Canberra, May 2012, p. 167, <https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-cost-
of-defence-aspi-defence-budget-brief-2012-2013>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
57 Quoted in Michael Wesley, There Goes the Neighbourhood: Australia and the Rise of Asia, Sydney: 
New South, 2011, p. 26. 
58 Commonwealth of Australia, Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security, 
Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2013, p. 4. 
59 Strong and Secure, p. 23. 
60 Strong and Secure, p. 17. 
61 Commonwealth of Australia, Defence White Paper 2013, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2013, 
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effectively deferred due to “fiscal realities” and subsequent cuts to defence 
spending – a decision that evoked hysterical commentary in Australia and from key 
officials in Washington – despite the fact that the US had also planned future 
defence cuts.62 Nevertheless, Australia managed to maintain its rank as the 10th 
largest defence spender in the world in 2013, and continued its significant lead in 
defence spending in Southeast Asia.63 
 
Although the 2013 Defence White Paper toned down the alarmist rhetoric toward 
Beijing, the identification of China as a potential threat continued as a major 
theme.64 The decision taken by the subsequent conservative Abbott government to 
purchase a large number of fifth-generation fighter jets,65 and the intention to 
spend up to $40 billion on twelve new submarines, added real impetus to the 
objective of preparing Australia for a future war with China. 
 
As defence experts have noted, the only significant strategic function for purchasing 
the submarines is their “symbolic political contribution to maintaining alliance 
credit through a niche role in US naval operations against China”.66 Similarly, the 
unique capability of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter “to conduct deep strike missions 
                                                     
62 Geoffrey Barker, Time For A Balanced Debate on Defence, Australian Financial Review, 21 June 
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against a sophisticated integrated air defence system on Day 1 of a conflict” only 
has relevance in a US-led war against China.67 
 
Meanwhile, strategic elites advocated Australia boost its “hard” and “soft” power, 
including “a more capable military”, so as to “protect the full breadth of our 
interests”.68 For example, Rory Medcalf argued in 2015 that current realities: 
 
[Compel] us to think about security interests in broad terms. The 
expansive version of national security today includes maintaining the 
kind of international, transnational and domestic order that serves 
our interests as a middle power.69 
 
At the very minimum, as a “top 20 nation”, Australia has been urged to “seek the 
capacity to substantially shape the security environment of the South Pacific and 
Southeast Asia” while playing a more limited role in wider East Asia, “where it can 
matter”, such as imposing a “distant blockade” on China in any future US-Sino 
war.70 Others insist that Australia go further, aiming to play a decisive role in East 
Asia and equipping the ADF with the military capabilities to inflict serious damage in 
any potential future conflict with China.71 
 
It fell upon the government of Malcolm Turnbull to act on these hawkish aspirations 
and deliver the significant military build-up first envisioned by Rudd, but never 
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69 Rory Medcalf, Don’t “Contain” China, but Australia Must Push for Rules-Based Security Order, 
Australian Financial Review, 11 September 2015, <http://www.afr.com/opinion/dont-contain-china-
but-australia-must-push-for-rulesbased-security-order-20150910-gjjp0v>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
70 Andrew Carr, “Learning to Act Like a Major Power – Australia as a Top 20 Nation” in Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Are We A Top 20 Nation or a Middle Power? Views on Australia’s 
Position in the World, 18 December 2014, p. 4, <https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/are-we-a-top-
20-nation-or-a-middle-power-views-on-australias-position-in-the-world>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
71 Ross Babbage, Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030, Kokoda Papers, no. 15, February 2011, 
<http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Documents/KP15StrategicEdge.pdf>, accessed 5 
April 2016. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
99 
 
properly funded. Turnbull’s 2016 Defence White Paper boasted that it was the first 
to be “fully costed” in order to “match our strategy and capability plans with 
appropriate resources”, pledging to lift defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP by 
2020-2021, and invest an unprecedented $195 billion into the military over ten 
years.72 
 
The 2016 White Paper put credibility behind previous plans to acquire twelve new 
“regionally superior” submarines and a fleet of new fifth-generation fighter jets to 
conduct offensive strike operations “as far from Australia as possible”.73 Other big 
ticket items reaffirmed in the 2016 White Paper include twelve new major surface 
vessels (three AWDs and nine frigates) that can “project force into the region and 
beyond”.74 
 
The three core priorities identified by the 2016 Defence White Paper are defending 
Australia, securing Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific and ensuring a stable 
Indo-Pacific and a “rules-based global order”.75 In a departure from previous white 
papers, all three are accorded equal weight in the design and development of the 
ADF.76 Peter Jennings, who led the expert panel advising the government’s white 
paper, has written that the most important strategic defence interest identified in 
the white paper is to secure Australia’s wider regional interests, the new design of 
the ADF ensuring Australia can “take the fight into maritime Southeast Asia”.77 
Elsewhere, Jennings observes that the 2016 White Paper: 
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[Can] be seen as the concluding verse to the generation-long saga of 
the Defence of Australia (DOA) strategy. “DOA” is now fully effected 
in a maritime strategy focused on Southeast Asia and the Pacific.78 
 
Since the emergence of the self-reliance and DOA doctrines, there has been a clear 
expansionist evolution in Australia’s defence strategy. An increasingly central 
objective of the ADF has been to project force as a substantial regional power and 
promote Australia’s “national interests”, right up to and including the global level. 
Australia has also gradually stepped back from the concept of self-reliance, 
returning to an earlier assumption that Australia will always be fighting alongside 
the US and that the key role of the ADF is to support its ally’s actions.79 The 
implication of this development for Australia’s relationship with the US, detailed 
below, has transformed the fundamental purpose of the alliance from helping to 
defend Australia to enhancing Australia’s capacity for regional influence and 
control. 
 
The Australia-US Alliance and Australia’s “Middle Power” Ambitions 
 
Notwithstanding Australia’s growing strategic ambitions, the fundamental role of 
the US alliance has ostensibly remained the same since the 1970s, namely, to 
provide regional and global “stability” and ensure Australia has access to the 
defence technology and intelligence benefits deemed crucial for defending the 
nation independently. The latest Defence White Paper reiterates that Australia’s 
security is underpinned by the ANZUS Treaty and America’s regional presence, and 
that the ADF’s persistent technology, intelligence and capability superiority would 
be beyond Australia’s capacity without the US alliance.80  
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However, as illustrated above, the central defence planning concepts of “self-
reliance” and DOA are clearly no longer about ensuring the ADF has the capacity to 
defend the continent without the assistance of major allies. The continued use of 
these terms thus obscures rather than elucidates Australia’s current defence policy 
and the role of the alliance within it.81 In the context of Australia’s enduring benign 
security environment and growing “middle power” ambitions, the alliance assumes 
far greater relevance in terms of bolstering Australia’s capacity for regional 
influence and control. 
 
At the elite level, “being a middle power has been at the heart of how Australian 
politicians have framed and conceived of their nation’s role in international affairs, 
and they have done so with an enthusiasm beyond any other comparable 
country”.82 As noted in Chapter Two, Australia’s self-identification as a middle 
power is a significant and long-standing part Australia’s strategic culture and can be 
traced back to the country’s imperialist imaginings of the nineteenth and early- 
twentieth century. 
 
Although there is no consensus on the definition of a “middle power”, possessing 
sufficient capability to influence regional and global affairs lies at the core of the 
concept. Australia, by and large, fulfils the criteria of a middle power by any of the 
typical measures, including possessing substantial military and economic power, a 
history of diplomatic activism on the regional and global stage and self-
identification.83 Indeed, Australia is understood in the relevant scholarship to 
constitute the ideal or definitive model of a middle power.84  
 
The importance of the Australia-US relationship to Australia’s middle-power status 
is frequently highlighted by strategic elites and ardent alliance supporters, including 
political and defence officials. Although the core of the alliance is defined in security 
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terms, its more tangible value to Australia in said to be its “force multiplier” effect – 
not only militarily but economically and diplomatically – enhancing Australia’s 
“freedom of action” and bolstering its regional status as a “middle power” and an 
“Asia-Pacific power” that can “punch above its weight” in the region and beyond.85 
 
Paul Dibb is perhaps the most cogent exponent of the argument that the alliance is 
of central importance for bolstering Australia’s status as a significant regional 
power. In an edited collection published in 2007, dedicated to the theme of 
“Australia as an Asia-Pacific Regional Power”, Dibb argued that: 
 
Australia’s alliance with the United States in many ways underpins its 
status as an Asia-Pacific power . . . As it is, Australia’s closeness to 
America and its influence in Washington transforms Australia’s 
regional status: it allows Australia to punch above its weight in 
regional and, indeed, international security organisations.86  
 
While Dibb maintains that the “core” of the alliance is the protection of a great and 
powerful friend, the benefits of the relationship ultimately derive from access to the 
corridors of power in Washington, irreplaceable US intelligence, cooperation in 
defence science and technology and advanced US military weapons that together 
bolster “Australia’s strategic influence in regional affairs and its reputation for 
military strength”.87  
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The post-Cold War strategic context of Australia’s middle power status and the US 
alliance are perhaps best articulated in a seminar Dibb presented on the ANZUS 
alliance to the Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade in the late 1990s.88 Dibb warned that the growing 
economic might of ASEAN implied Australia would have to work harder in the future 
to maintain its position as “the leading middle power in Southeast Asia”, remain 
relevant “in terms of the capacity to defend Australia”, “show leadership in the 
region” and “shape the regional strategic environment to our advantage as an 
important middle power”.89  
 
Crucially, Dibb pointed out that threats to Australia in the post-Cold War strategic 
environment are not primarily about the potential for a direct attack, but rather the 
threat to Australia’s position as a middle power. He argues, “greater strategic 
complexity and uncertainty” in the region is not about: 
 
[Defining] a clear and imminent direct military threat . . . it is about 
the balance of power and balance of influence and our survival as an 
independent middle power strongly allied with the United States and 
not subordinate to some external—or externally lodged—Asian great 
power.90 
 
In an argument that has taken on greater relevance today in light of China’s rise, 
Dibb presciently warned that the major concern for Australia in the future is the 
end of the “Vasco da Gama period” – or the end of western dominance in the 
region for the first time in 500 years – as great Asian powers increase their ability to 
shape the regional strategic environment.91 That will not occur, Dibb predicts 
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reassuringly, as long as the US stays engaged so that the “balance of influence” (a 
more honest term than the conventional “balance of power”) remains firmly with 
the West. Dibb sums up his strategic assessment in the following terms: 
 
[There] are no clear military threats to Australia, but, increasingly, as 
a middle power in a shifting balance of power, we will need to shape 
our own regional strategic environment. As the balance of power 
changes, which undoubtedly it will, our survival as an independent 
middle power becomes a first order issue for us. As new powers 
emerge and as Australia’s relative strategic mass declines, then it will 
become more important—not less important—that we retain our 
alliance with the United States in good repair and that we do what 
we can to keep US interests in the region engaged. That may well 
mean doing more with the United States and carrying more of the 
alliance burden, not less.92 
 
The rapid rise of China and its willingness to test US primacy in recent years, 
particularly in the East and South China Seas, has brought the issue of Australia’s 
alliance with the US and the changing balance of regional power relations into sharp 
focus.93 
 
The latest Defence White Paper identifies the relationship between the US and 
China as fundamental to Australia’s future strategic circumstances.94 It places strong 
emphasis on supporting America’s regional military presence and the strategic 
“rebalance” in order to maintain a stable Indo-Pacific and “rules-based global 
order” – a phrase mentioned 48 times. The potential threats to stability identified 
include “major powers trying to promote their interests outside of the established 
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rules”95 – that is, outside of the rules largely crafted by the US to ensure the 
benefits of the international system accrue primarily to itself and its allies.96 
 
Significantly, there is disagreement about whether Australia’s middle power status 
is enhanced or circumscribed by its alliance with the US. For subscribers to the 
“idealist” view, which define middle powers in terms of how they ought to act, the 
US alliance is seen to constrain Australia’s independence and therefore its 
credibility as a middle power, reducing its scope for acting as a “good international 
citizen”. According to this view, Australia’s long-standing commitment to employ 
middle power diplomacy in pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation has been 
compromised by its alliance obligations to host key US bases integral to America’s 
nuclear war fighting capacity, as well as Australia’s unwavering diplomatic support 
of Israel, despite its status as an undeclared nuclear power.97 
 
Similarly, idealists have argued in the past that the middle power “dreams” of both 
the Rudd and Gillard Labor governments were left unrealised because of a lack of 
“credibility” in regional and international forums as a result of aligning too closely 
with the position of the US.98 Although the fulfilment of Australia’s middle power 
ambitions did not require an abandonment of the alliance, “a greater degree of 
independence within an alliance framework” was seen to be a necessary 
condition.99 Most recently, Canberra’s decision to align itself with the US in its 
strategic rivalry with China is considered evidence that the alliance constrains 
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Australian foreign policy in an area where one assumes a middle power could 
exercise greater freedom of action.100  
 
In reality, idealists have placed too much emphasis on the “moral” behaviour of 
middle powers when there is little empirical evidence to support this.101 While 
Australia’s alliance commitments may constrain its scope for acting as “a good 
international citizen”, this has not been Australia’s overriding foreign policy 
consideration or a central element of its middle power ambitions. Despite the 
rhetoric, Australia’s “default” strategic culture has in fact been to further its 
interests irrespective of international law or institutions.102 As one recent review of 
Australia’s response to repressive military regimes in the Asia-Pacific concluded, 
Canberra’s actions have “ultimately arise[n] from calculations of Australian national 
security, strategic interests, alliance maintenance and power potential, but tend to 
be obscured by the universalist rhetoric of promoting democracy and protecting 
human rights”.103 
 
It is no surprise that Australian policy makers have continued to find no 
contradiction between Australia’s middle power ambitions and its alliance 
obligations. To the contrary, “the Australian government has consistently argued 
that the country’s strong alliance relationship with the United States supports its 
capacity to be a globally influential middle power”, viewing its connection to a large 
power “as an unqualified benefit to the nation’s influence”.104 
 
In this context, the value of the alliance in providing advanced US military 
technology and intelligence benefits critical for ensuring Australia’s regional military 
superiority, despite the absence of any threats, makes sense. Combined with 
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patronage from Washington in regional and global diplomatic forums, the alliance 
provides Australia, at least in the eyes of elites in Canberra, with “a military and 
diplomatic heft it could not afford otherwise” or achieve independently.105 
 
Significantly, the bolstering effect of the alliance on Australia’s national power has 
mutual benefits by ensuring Canberra is a more effective or credible ally in 
undertaking its regional “burden sharing” responsibilities on behalf of the US-led 
western security community. This is an explicit requirement of the alliance since the 
US announced the Guam doctrine in 1969, but it has gradually taken on increasing 
importance as Australia’s national power has grown. Australia, wrote Paul Dibb in 
the mid-2000s, “has a significant role to play in securing American interests, as well 
as its own, in the Asia-Pacific region”, largely as a result of its growing “geopolitical 
clout in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific”.106 
 
Conversely, the ability and willingness of Australia to launch successful military 
interventions in the region, particularly in its own “patch” in the South Pacific, is 
understood by Canberra as essential for maintaining and bolstering Australia’s 
“credibility” as a middle power in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. Patronage by the US 
in the regional and global diplomatic arena, critical to Australia’s middle power 
ambitions, is dependent upon Australia meeting its alliance obligations to uphold 
stability in its own region. Recent Australian interventions in the region spanning 
two decades, including in Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Solomon Islands, have 
been undertaken with the primary, although not sole, objective of maintaining 
Australia’s credibility in Washington’s eyes.107 
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Historically, Australia’s primary utility to the US has been viewed in terms of its 
geostrategic position as a “suitable piece of real estate” for hosting US intelligence 
facilities which, in recent years, have undergone the most dramatic expansion in 
size and scope since the end of the Cold War.108 In the mid-1960s, according to a 
declassified study for the US State Department, Australia’s value was judged by its 
potential to become a “credible power” that could exert sufficient regional 
influence and perhaps “eventually be an alternative to the British”.109 Significantly, 
that assessment was not only accurate but prescient. Today, the Washington-based 
strategic community views Australia as a geographic “sweet spot” for basing US 
forces targeted at China and, like the UK in the twentieth century, as a “means to 
preserve US influence and military reach across the Indo-Pacific”.110
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PART II: THE AUSTRALIAN AMERICAN LEADERSHIP DIALOGUE 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Preserving the Status Quo 
 
Origins 
 
A spectacular fireworks display over Sydney Harbour welcomed the long-awaited 
arrival of President George H. W. Bush on New Year’s Eve, 1991. It was 25 years 
since a sitting American president had made a state visit to Australia, the last being 
Lyndon B. Johnson in October 1966 at the height of the Vietnam War. The visit was 
secured by former Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, at a black-tie dinner event in the 
White House on 27 June 1989. The President had responded immediately to the 
request by Hawke whom he considered to be his close and personal friend.1 
 
The official meeting between the two heads of state, however, was not to be. While 
Bush had planned to make the trip in early 1991, he was delayed until the end of 
the year by which time Paul Keating was Prime Minister. The President’s decision to 
continue as planned was somewhat awkward for Keating, whose uncordial 
relationship with Bush was well publicised. In keeping with expectations, Hawke 
received a warm and friendly embrace from Bush upon his arrival, while the 
President’s encounter with Keating was far more formal; the latter noticeably 
nervous and tense.2 
 
The aloofness in the personal relationship between the President and the new 
Prime Minister reflected broader concerns regarding the strength of the Australia-
US relationship. While Keating declared he would be just as committed to the US 
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alliance as Hawke, he also promised more “relative independence”.3 The US had 
kept a close eye on the possibility of a leadership challenge in Australia because of 
this attitude and what it indicated about Keating’s commitment to US foreign policy 
interests. In reality, Keating’s comments were primarily for domestic consumption 
and the left-wing members of the ALP.4 Nonetheless, Keating’s rhetoric and the 
President’s visit resurfaced doubts about the utility of the alliance in a post-Cold 
War world. 
 
Specifically, there was significant concern and speculation in Australia regarding the 
possibility of US disengagement from Asia and a weakening of the “hub-and-
spokes” alliance system in the Asia-Pacific.5 The ALP’s attempts at “self-reliance 
within the alliance” in the late 1980s only heightened these concerns as it implied 
the possibility of greater detachment from the US.6 
 
The Australia-US alliance was considered the cornerstone of Australia’s foreign 
policy, but since the Soviet Union had disappeared, it was feared, so too had “the 
strongest bond holding the US and Australian alliance together, the threat to world 
peace from Soviet Communism”.7 Furthermore, in the post-Cold War era, as 
Stephen Mills asked in the Australian Financial Review of 3 January 1992, what 
“does the Australia-United States relationship mean for both countries, for the Asia-
Pacific region, and for the broader global community?” While the ANZUS Pact was 
sure to remain, “what does it mean and what will it do?”8 
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Responding to this apprehension about the role of the US in the new world order, 
President Bush sought to reassure his Australian friends by declaring that America 
was “going to stay totally involved in this part of the world . . . right up to the very 
end of eternity”.9 Despite these remarks, doubts lingered about the commitment of 
future US presidents, particularly given the personal bonds between leaders in both 
nations were believed to be fading with time. As a veteran of the war in the Pacific, 
President Bush was recognised as “one of the last of the generation of American 
leaders with that kind of connection to Australia”.10 
 
Distinguished business leader Phillip Scanlan, then managing director of Coca-Cola 
Amatil’s global beverages operations, shared these concerns. Scanlan held a 
particular interest in the US and its relationship to Australia, cultivated, in part, by 
the time he had spent as a postgraduate student at the Harvard Kennedy School of 
Government and, more personally, by his American-born wife. Scanlan would later 
assume the prestigious diplomatic post of Australian Consul-General in New York 
from 2009-2012. 
 
Scanlan held a deep-seated fear that he “would wake up one morning and find that 
the US has declared independence from Australia”.11 Coincidentally, Scanlan was 
presented with a unique opportunity to express his concerns at a level where it 
counted. That occurred when Scanlan received an invitation from his old friend, 
Nick Greiner, then premier of NSW, to attend a New Year’s Day cruise on Sydney 
Harbour, held in honour of President Bush’s visit. Greiner had first met Scanlan in 
the late 1970s when the latter was chief of staff to NSW Liberal opposition leader 
Peter Coleman. After Scanlan took up his position at Amatil, the former political 
colleagues remained friends. They were of similar age, held similar attitudes and 
lived near each other at the time.12 
 
                                                     
9 Tony Stephens, Blessings from the King George Show, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 January 1992. 
10 George Bush Comes to Town, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 January 1992. 
11 Phillip Scanlan, Australian American Leadership Dialogue, New Observer, 2 May 2004; Brian 
Toohey, The Dialogue Box, Australian Financial Review, 24 April 2008. 
12 Author interview with Nick Greiner, 6 July 2011. 
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Scanlan hoped that, at best, he might have the opportunity to meet Bush and 
introduce his American-born wife, Julie Scanlan. When the occasion arrived and 
Scanlan and his wife came to take their seats, both were surprised to find 
themselves sitting at the same table with the President.13 Along with a number of 
other Australian and American dignitaries,14 a conversation inevitably arose about 
the state of the relationship between the two countries. President Bush eventually 
turned to Scanlan and asked his thoughts on the matter. 
 
Scanlan obliged, expressing his concerns about the forthcoming difficulties in 
preserving the Australian-American relationship after the shared memories of 
sacrifice in World War II passed and a new generation of leaders arose. Scanlan 
feared that diminishing personal bonds between the leaders of both nations would 
create a distance neither wanted, but may occur as each nation took the other for 
granted.15 
 
The President listened with approval and was encouraged by Scanlan’s idea of 
forming a new group of Australian and American leaders to cultivate fresh ties and 
preserve the centrality of the relationship into the future. Two nights later, Brent 
Scowcroft, the President’s national security advisor, told Scanlan “We’ve spoken to 
people. We’ve checked you out. The President wants you to go ahead”.16 Less than 
eighteen months later, the inaugural AALD took place in Washington in June 1993. 
  
                                                     
13 Note that Greiner did not plan or organise for Scanlan to be seated at the same table with himself 
and the President. Apparently, it was happenstance that someone in Greiner’s office had arranged 
the seating placements in this way. Author interview with Nick Greiner, 6 July 2011. 
14 Others at the table are reported to have included the President’s wife, Barbara Bush, Nick Greiner 
and his wife, Kathryn Greiner, US Secretary of State, James Baker, and US National Security Advisor, 
Brent Scowcroft. 
15 Daniel Flitton, Man of Many Words, The Age, 11 August 2007, <http://www.theage.com.au/news/
in-depth/man-of-many-words/2007/08/10/1186530610605.html>, accessed 5 April. 
16 Paul Kelly, The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia, Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Publishing, 2010, p. 163. According to Gerard Henderson, Scanlan had been “speaking 
about these matters to some people privately” for one or two years before his encounter with 
President Bush. The visit by Bush “gave him the opportunity to do something about it”. Author 
interview with Gerard Henderson, 7 March 2012. 
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In order to bring the idea of the AALD17 into being, Scanlan took a break from his 
corporate career and tapped into his extensive Australian and American political 
contacts. Scowcroft had agreed to become a chief recruiter on the Republican side 
of American politics, along with Mel Sembler, who was the then US Ambassador to 
Australia. Philip Lader, who went on to become President Bill Clinton’s Deputy Chief 
of Staff and US Ambassador to the UK, was enlisted to recruit Democrats; as was 
Thomas J. Schneider, a close friend of President Clinton and who later came to serve 
on the management board of the AALD. 
 
Anne Wexler, one of Washington’s most influential lobbyists, and her husband, Joe 
Duffey, Director of the USIA from 1993 to 1999, became important Democratic 
members of the AALD soon after its establishment. Wexler in particular is credited 
with being “instrumental” in the establishment and success of the AALD.18 
According to the Sydney Morning Herald, Wexler “brought a range of influential 
Democratic figures” into the AALD, some of whom went on to become “senior 
officials in the Obama Administration”.19 
 
The AALD also attracted strong support from the political establishment in 
Australia. According to the then Labor senator, Nick Bolkus, recently ousted Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke was “fairly intricately involved” in putting the AALD together, a 
key member in organising the Australian side, and fundamental to “the foundations 
of the Dialogue”.20 Prime Minister Keating was also in full support of the AALD while 
his wife, Annita van Iersel, helped to financially support it in her role as General 
Manager of United Airlines Australia. According to Don Russell, Australia’s 
ambassador to the US at the time, the AALD had the backing of the Australian 
embassy, with Russell happy to lend his good name to assist in its establishment.21 
 
                                                     
17 Note that the terms “AALD”, “Leadership Dialogue” and simply “the Dialogue” are often used 
interchangeably by observers to describe the Australian American Leadership Dialogue. 
18 Author interview with Mel Sembler, 21 March 2012. 
19 Pacific Alliance Loses a Powerful Friend, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 August 2009. 
20 Author interview with Nick Bolkus, 6 September 2011. It was Hawke who had personally invited 
Bolkus to be one of the twenty or so Australian delegates who participated in the inaugural AALD 
event in Washington in 1993. 
21 Author interview with Don Russell, 21 December 2012. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
114 
 
Although the idea for the AALD was Scanlan’s alone, he received considerable 
support for its establishment. Former Australian diplomat, Richard Woolcott, 
assisted Scanlan in the early stages of the AALD’s development.22 So did Scanlan’s 
long-time friend and professional business associate, Stephen Loosley, who helped 
to “put a framework around the idea”.23 Loosley supported the AALD for many 
years, initially as a NSW Labor senator and subsequently as a serving member on 
the Australian board of the AALD from 1999-2010. 
 
Scanlan used his political contacts to attract high-level participation from both 
major political parties in Australia.24 Former Liberal MP, David Kemp, a personal 
friend of Scanlan’s, encouraged ministers of the Coalition shadow ministry to take 
an interest in the AALD after its establishment.25 Nick Greiner also helped to gather 
delegates from the Liberal Party and, although defeated at the 1992 state election, 
went on to attend the AALD for the next ten years as a private citizen.26 Kim 
Beazley, a close personal friend of Scanlan,27 agreed to become the “standard 
bearer” for the ALP and subsequently became a long-standing supporter and AALD 
participant.28 
 
Despite these cumulative efforts, the success of the AALD was the result of the 
personal initiative, sacrifice and determination of its founder, Phillip Scanlan. David 
Kemp’s remarks are representative of many AALD participants interviewed by the 
author when he claims “very few people would either have the motivation or the 
capacity or the linkages” to achieve the high-level commitment and quality of 
discussion that is the distinguishing marker of the AALD’s success.29 Scanlan 
remained chairman of the AALD until April 2009, when he was appointed Australian 
                                                     
22 Author interview with Richard Woolcott, 22 March 2011. 
23 Author interview with Stephen Loosley, 11 January 2012. 
24 According to Sheridan, “Scanlan convinced successive prime ministers Keating and Howard to do 
private sessions exclusively for the visiting Americans”. Greg Sheridan, The Partnership: The Inside 
Story of the US-Australian Alliance Under Bush and Howard, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006, p. 315. 
25 Author interview with David Kemp, 31 August 2011. 
26 Author interview with Nick Greiner, 6 July 2011. 
27 Beazley was best man at Scanlan’s wedding. 
28 Kelly, The March of Patriots, p. 163. 
29 Author interview with David Kemp, 31 August 2011. 
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Consul-General in New York in recognition of his services and commitment to the 
alliance. Although no longer chairman, Scanlan remains on the board of the AALD 
and exerts a powerful influence over its operation and objectives.30 
 
Operation, Objectives and Success 
 
For well over twenty years, the AALD has brought together a select group of high-
level politicians, government officials, business people, journalists, academics and 
other influential leaders from both countries for an annual private forum on 
designated matters of mutual interest. Alternating between Washington and 
various Australian cities each year, the AALD takes place between June and August 
over a 2-3 day period. The forum comprises formal key-note addresses and chaired 
discussion sessions.31 
 
The first AALD event on 11-12 June 1993 in Washington was attended by thirty-five 
prominent but mainly out-of-office political representatives and business leaders.32 
Since that time, the AALD has grown to attract an ever increasing number of 
delegates, with participation of up to 150 people at each event.33 Without access to 
                                                     
30 As one former board member, who chose to remain anonymous, confirms, the Australian board is 
largely responsible for administrative functions, the selection process being “very much in the gift of 
the chairman”. Even after Scanlan formally abdicated his role as chairman in 2009, according to 
Andrew Robb, “he still keeps a weather eye on all things, including the invitation list”. Author 
interview with Andrew Robb, 15 July 2011. 
31 On occasion, the AALD also convenes other events, such a special address by a distinguished guest. 
For example, in 2007, the AALD organised an address by former US Vice President, Dick Cheney, to 
300 invited guests in Sydney after he met with a select group from the Dialogue. Tony Walker, 
Cheney, Rudd to Discuss Alliance, Australian Financial Review, 19 February 2007. On another 
occasion, during the 2011 Dialogue event in Perth, a pre-conference tour was organised to the 
Pilbara to showcase mining and energy operations for delegates. 
32 Those participants were Richard L. Armitage, Judith Hipplier Bello, Sandra Yates, Richard Woolcott, 
Stephen Bollenback, Dick Cheney, Patricia Ann Turner, Warwick L. Smith, James S. Gorelick, David D. 
Hale, Gregory Paul Sheridan, Emery Severin, Robert D. Hormats, Philip Lader, Phil Scanlan, Kevin 
Michael Rudd, Franklin L. Lavin, Jim Leach, Irene Kwong Moss, David Kemp, Winston Lord, Paul 
London, Steve Howard, Jill L. N. Hickson, Kevin G. Nealer, Douglas H. Paal, Carolyn Hewsen, Nicholas 
F. Greiner, Karl C. Rove, Thomas J. Schneider, Ros Gregory Garnaut, Robert B. Zoellick, Nick Bolkus, 
Peter Cook and Paul D. Wolfowitz. Official copy of the list of participants held by the author. Also, 
see Appendix B for photographs. 
33 Stephen Loosley, The Ties That Bind, The Australian, 17 May 2013, <http://www.theaustralian
.com.au/business/the-deal-magazine/the-ties-that-bind/story-e6frgabx-1226643018865>, accessed 
5 April 2015. 
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official records, the total number of  AALD attendees over its lifetime is impossible 
to verify.34 
 
One estimate, provided by Brian Toohey of the Australian Financial Review, 
reported that, between 1993 and 2008, approximately 360 delegates had attended 
the Dialogue’s meetings.35 Toohey names 55 Australian and 11 American 
participants. Research conducted by the author, based on public sources, identifies 
253 participants from 1993-2011, many of them regular attendees.36 Of these, 151 
(60%) were Australian delegates and 102 (40%) American. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate the percentage of Australian and American 
delegates by occupation. While the numbers compiled are incomplete, the data size 
is significant enough to indicate that the AALD has been fairly successful in 
penetrating both major Australian political parties and, over the years, increasingly 
engaged a significant number Australian and American political and business elites 
and key opinion makers in the media. 
 
The AALD has expanded its operations by establishing numerous other regular 
dialogue events in addition to the central mid-year forum.37 There is far less publicly 
available information about these additional dialogues. They typically attract 
smaller numbers of delegates than the central Dialogue and, consequently, less 
media attention.38 The focus of this thesis is on the central Dialogue event which is 
the largest and most influential. 
 
 
                                                     
34 The author attempted on numerous occasions to secure an interview with Phillip Scanlan – who no 
doubt has access to these records – to no avail. 
35 Toohey, The Dialogue Box. 
36 See Appendix A. 
37 These include the West Coast Leadership Dialogue and the Young Leadership Dialogue both 
established in 2007, the Honolulu Leadership Dialogue which first began in 2008, and the New York 
Leadership Dialogue established in 2009. The AALD also initiated a Leadership Dialogue Scholar 
program in 2005. 
38 A Dow Jones Factiva database search for “West Coast Leadership Dialogue” returned only 20 
unique results in December 2015. A similar search for “Young Leadership Dialogue” and “Honolulu 
Leadership Dialogue” returned seven and one unique results respectively. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Delegates by Occupation (1993-2011)* 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Breakdown of Australian Delegates by Occupation (1993-2011)* 
 
 
 
* Note that the percentages depicted include some participants who fall into more 
than one category. For example, participants may attend as a political delegate in 
one year and, having retired from politics, a business delegate in the next. Note 
that the politics category includes politicians, public officials and ex-officials. 
“Other” includes union representatives and non-affiliated individuals. 
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Themes discussed at the AALD include economics and trade, defence and security, 
foreign policy, domestic politics, innovation and technology, energy and climate, 
education, health and social inclusion. Although the scope for discussion is wide, 
the focus surrounding each AALD event is often topical. Examples of major issues 
discussed includes the 1997 East Asian financial crisis; the “war on terror” and the 
2003 invasion of Iraq; the 2008 Global Financial Crisis; climate change; Australia’s 
National Broadband Network; the ongoing threat posed by Iran and North Korea; 
the regional implications of the rise of China and the Obama administration’s 
“Pivot” to Asia. 
 
AALD sessions are exclusively for invited guests. Although the AALD is managed by 
an Australian and American board, by all accounts, Scanlan plays the decisive role in 
the section of invitees.39 Discussions at the AALD operate under a strict non-
disclosure convention that is often inaccurately described as the Chatham House 
Rule, but is, in fact, more narrow.40 The AALD’s rules prevent participants from 
disclosing the content of any comment, even where the identity of the participant is 
not revealed. Participants are permitted only to disclose their own attendance at 
AALD events and comments they themselves have made. There is strict loyalty to 
the non-disclosure convention, evidenced by the fact that there have been very few 
leaks since the AALD’s establishment. 
 
The broad objectives of the AALD were set out in the Memorandum and Articles of 
Division at the time of its establishment. This document stipulates the role of the 
AALD is to: 
 
                                                     
39 The vast majority of AALD participants interviewed by the author were personally invited by 
Scanlan. 
40 The Chatham House Rule is an international convention that any forum may choose to invoke as a 
means to ensure free and frank discussion. It permits participants to use or reveal any comments 
made at the forum as long as the identity of all participants, bar your own, is not disclosed. For the 
definition of the Chatham House Rule, see Chatham House, Chatham House Rule, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chathamhouserule>, accessed 3 
April 2016. 
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1. foster better relations between Australia and the United States of 
America whether they are of a business, economic, political, 
educational, or cultural nature; 
2. establish a platform to maintain and develop peace and 
prosperity in the future in the Asia/Pacific region; 
3. provide a forum to bring together leaders of policy and opinion in 
Australia and the United States of America; 
4. focus on matters of global and regional security, international 
trade and economics, education, health, issues pertaining to 
women, management of multi-cultural societies and domestic 
renewal; 
5. oversee the management and encourage the development of 
programs which endeavour to develop closer links between 
Australia and the United States of America.41 
 
Further indication of the AALD’s objectives is provided on the official website of the 
Dialogue which states that its mission “is to broaden and deepen mutual 
understanding between Australian and American leaders and to enhance the 
framework for regional security”. The AALD claims to operate according to the 
“principles of bilateral interest, bipartisanship, voluntarism and leadership in the 
service of others, frank exchange, intergenerational perspectives, mutual tolerance 
and personal courtesy”.42 
 
In the words of Australia’s former ambassador to the US and original AALD 
participant, Don Russell, the Dialogue was established as “a way of cementing the 
notion that [the US relationship] was a cornerstone of Australia’s overall foreign 
policy”.43 In order to achieve that objective, Scanlan made the decision to focus the 
AALD exclusively on those in positions of power and influence rather than the 
                                                     
41 Australian American Education Leadership Foundation Limited, Memorandum and Articles of 
Association, 29 April 1993, p. 22. Note that the constitution was amended in 2006 and the 
description of these official purposes were deleted and not replaced. 
42 Australian American Leadership Dialogue, AALD, <http://www.aald.org/australian-american-
leadership-dialogue>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
43 Author interview with Don Russell, 21 December 2012. 
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general public. The “initial spur to set up the Dialogue”, states Hugh White, “was to 
ensure a deeper body of support [for the alliance] amongst informed and elite 
opinion” in both Australia and the US.44 
 
As noted above, the AALD emerged in the context of widespread concern about the 
future of the alliance in the post-Cold War era, and a belief that the next generation 
of leaders did not have the same degree of emotional attachment and personal 
commitment to the alliance as those in the past. As President Bush conveyed in a 
letter to Scanlan prior to the inaugural AALD event in May 1993: 
 
The ties between the United States and Australia resulting from our 
shared experiences in the Pacific War were and are real . . . You have 
correctly identified the challenge before us – to engineer a smooth 
passing of the baton in American/Australian relations from the 
generation which forged the alliance in the presence of war to the 
generations which must work together for a permanent, productive, 
and prosperous peace.45 
 
Founding member David Kemp recalls that “Scanlan believed . . . there was no 
foundation of personal relationships which could provide links into the future”, and 
so he sought to “develop a whole series of networks between Australians and 
Americans at the leadership level that would build on and expand the relationships 
which had come out of the [Second World] War”. This perception, Kemp adds, “was 
widely shared and one he [Scanlan] generated” about the purpose of the 
Dialogue.46 This goal is described on the AALD’s website as “relationship 
management between current and likely future leaders from both countries”.47  
                                                     
44 Author interview with Professor Hugh White, 2 September 2011. 
45 Letter from George Bush to Phil Scanlan, Convenor of the Australia-America Leadership Dialogue, 
dated 31 May 1993. Quoted in Elena Douglas and Diane Stone, The Informal Diplomacy of the 
Australian American Leadership Dialogue, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 1, 
2015, p. 25. 
46 Author interview with David Kemp, 31 August 2011. 
47 This version of the website is now defunct. Australian American Leadership Dialogue, Home Page, 
<http://www.aald.org>, 9 February 2013, original archived at <http://web.archive.org/web/2013020
9070754/http://www.aald.org/index/index/page/home>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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Apart from instilling the importance of the alliance into the next generation of 
elites, discussions at AALD events, and personal relationships cultivated there, are 
intended to create tangible benefits for both countries. This is articulated on the 
AALD’s website as “leveraging Australian access in the United States, and American 
access in Australia, into real influence on matters of respective and designated 
mutual interest”.48 From an Australian perspective, Scanlan states the “primary 
aim” of the AALD is as follows: 
 
[To] help ensure that Australian policy makers and leaders in the 
broader community have knowledge of United States decision 
makers and real time understanding of their views on issues that we, 
as Australians, determine to be most important for Australia’s 
national interests.49 
 
A core purpose of the AALD, according to a current board member, is to “keep us 
both informed – keep both societies informed – on what the other’s thinking about 
so they can more best calibrate their own policy settings”.50 The intent is that 
information exchange will lead to greater cooperation in pursuing commonly 
agreed strategies in the world. According to the AALD’s website, the “high-calibre of 
discussion and debate” at Dialogue events “leads to the formation of support for 
strategic policy in both countries”.51 
 
The objectives of “relationship management” and “translating access into 
influence” are accompanied by a third objective of the AALD which is to provide an 
open forum for critical discussion and debate. Ostensibly, as a private diplomatic 
initiative operating in an unofficial capacity, the AALD provides a forum where non-
official perspectives on the relationship can be introduced and debated. The views 
                                                     
48 Australian American Leadership Dialogue, Home Page. 
49 Phillip Scanlan, Australia and the United States, Towards a Deeper Relationship, speech to the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs (WA Branch), 26 July 2005. 
50 Author interview with Professor Andrew MacIntyre, 28 June 2011. 
51 Australian American Leadership Dialogue, AALD, <http://www.aald.org/australian-american-
leadership-dialogue>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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of The Australian’s foreign affair’s editor, Greg Sheridan, are typical, although not 
universal, when he claims that discussions at the Dialogue are “frank, fearless, 
friendly, fierce and intense, with every assertion challengeable and contested”.52 
 
Accordingly, AALD board member, Professor Andrew MacIntyre, states that 
participants at the Dialogue “come in with just an incredible range of views . . . 
there’s been some of the hardest questioning of different areas where we’ve got 
interests that I’ve witnessed anywhere”.53 When asked if the AALD offered the 
opportunity for serious discussion and debate about Australia-US relations and the 
nature of US foreign policy, journalist Paul Kelly replied, “that’s certainly my 
view”.54 
 
However, on rare occasions, the AALD has been publicly criticised for failing to live 
up to this expectation or apply an adequate degree of scrutiny to the alliance and 
American foreign policy.55 Scanlan strenuously denies the allegation that the AALD 
is a “cheer squad for American foreign policy” or that dissenting viewpoints are 
pushed out. These views are “just plain dumb”, he maintains.56 Nevertheless, as 
demonstrated in Chapter Six, there is ample evidence to suggest the AALD works 
assiduously to frame discussion and debate within narrow bounds. 
 
The AALD is widely lauded as “arguably the most valuable private sector foreign 
policy initiative ever undertaken in Australia”,57 “a central institution in the US-
Australia relationship”58 and “the most important of all non-government 
                                                     
52 Greg Sheridan, Power Talking, The Australian, 23 July 2003. 
53 Author interview with Professor Andrew MacIntyre, 28 June 2011. 
54 Author interview with Paul Kelly, 20 January 2012. 
55 Scott Burchill, Gillard’s Fawning Over Obama a Bad Start on Diplomatic Front, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 30 June 2010, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/gillards-fawning-
over-obama-a-bad-start-on-diplomatic-front-20100629-zj3h.html>, accessed 5 April 2016; David Day, 
Bowing to Duchess Diplomacy, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 June 2012, <http://www.smh.com.au/
federal-politics/political-opinion/bowing-to-duchess-diplomacy-20120607-1zysh.html>, accessed 5 
April 2016; Flitton, Man of Many Words; Alan Ramsey, The Sermon Bush Wants to Hear, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 12 June 2004, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/06/11/1086749896060
.html>, accessed 5 April 2016; Toohey, The Dialogue Box. 
56 Quoted in Flitton. 
57 Stephen Loosley, Support Grows For Free Trade, Sunday Telegraph, 19 August 2001. 
58 Greg Sheridan, Financial Shadow On Alliances, The Australian, 25 September 2008. 
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organisations dedicated to the strengthening of the Australia-US alliance in all its 
manifestations; civil, political and commercial”.59 Veteran Australian diplomat, 
Richard Woolcott, says that of all the private diplomatic initiatives he has 
participated in over the decades, none are comparable to the AALD, which is “far 
and away the most successful” of them all.60 Former American diplomat, Mel 
Sembler, agrees, stating that the AALD is “admired by many other countries” who 
aim to replicate its success.61 
 
There is no precise method for measuring the impact of the AALD or, for that 
matter, the success of any private diplomatic initiative.62 Certainly, AALD 
participants are almost unanimous in declaring its extraordinary achievement in 
helping to both strengthen personal relationships and reinforce existing sentiments 
of shared values and interests. Nevertheless, the AALD’s impact in relationship 
management should not be exaggerated given it operates in the context of already 
strong, widespread and long-standing feelings of goodwill and friendship between 
leaders in both countries. 
 
The claim that the AALD has made a substantial impact at the policy level generates 
far more controversy than its apparent success at relationship management. 
Former Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, argues that while the 
Dialogue “is a good opportunity for networking . . . you can’t seriously say it has 
influenced policy. They sort of sit around and shoot the breeze”.63 Another former 
Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, holds a similar view. While “strongly in 
favour” of private diplomatic initiatives, and acknowledging the importance of the 
“substantive discussion” that takes place within the AALD, Evans ultimately views it 
as a “fairly marginal enterprise in the scheme of things”.64 
 
                                                     
59 Glenn Milne, Rudd’s Relevance Deprivation Syndrome, The Drum, ABC, 29 September 2010, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/35454.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
60 Author interview with Richard Woolcott, 22 March 2011. 
61 Author interview with Mel Sembler, 21 March 2012. 
62 This point is explored in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
63 Quoted in Toohey, The Dialogue Box. 
64 Author interview with Gareth Evans, 10 April 2012. 
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On the other hand, strong advocates and long-standing participants of the AALD, 
such as Peter Hartcher and Paul Kelly, claim it has played a direct role in diplomacy. 
Two often quoted examples are the AALD’s apparent success in helping to convince 
leaders in Washington to back Australia’s 1999 intervention into East Timor and, 
secondly, its role in facilitating the emergence of the 2005 AUSFTA.65 In general 
terms, Kelly argues that if the AALD “had never existed then I think things [between 
Australia and the US] would have been diminished. I’ve got no doubt about that”.66 
 
Those who are more detached from the AALD tend to hold a different opinion. 
When asked to identify which issues the Dialogue has played a significant role in 
impacting either Australian or US policies, the answer, according to Hugh White, is 
“none”. Since its establishment, there has been “no outcome that has occurred 
which wouldn’t have occurred without the Dialogue”.67 In a similar vein, Paul Dibb 
asks rhetorically, “Is the Dialogue all that influential? Is it really all that powerful? Or 
is it a figment of the imaginations of Scanlan and indeed, influential journalists like 
Sheridan and Kelly?” In the final analysis, Dibb argues, the AALD has not 
substantially altered “the importance, shape and direction of the relationship”.68 
 
Undoubtedly, the AALD is one small part of a much larger and long-standing 
established network of close and extensive relationships at the government, 
military, intelligence and economic levels that ultimately determine the course of 
the alliance. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to dismiss the impact of the AALD 
entirely. Chapter Seven demonstrates that the AALD’s singular success has been in 
reinforcing and deepening support for the alliance; an achievement which may be 
limited in scope but is nonetheless highly effective in ensuring the preservation of 
the status quo. 
 
                                                     
65 See, for example, Peter Hartcher, Are We Looking Less Like Americans?, Sydney Morning Herald, 
18 March 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/comment/are-we-looking-less-like-americans-20140317-
34xwx.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. More on the role of the AALD and AUSFTA is provided later in 
this chapter. 
66 Author interview with Paul Kelly, 20 January 2012. 
67 Author interview with Professor Hugh White, 2 September 2011. 
68 On the two journalists in question, Dibb adds, “One of whom I’ve got great regard for, that is Kelly, 
and the other one I don’t”. Author interview with Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb, 13 September 2011. 
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Preserving the Orthodoxy 
 
Although the AALD is singularly dedicated to strengthening the Australia-US 
relationship, it claims not to advocate any particular agenda or embody a singular, 
monolithic view of the alliance. Alexander Downer speaks for a number of 
participants when he says the AALD “is not an organisation with a point of view. It’s 
a whole lot of different points of view”.69 Former board member and participant 
Sam Lipski concurs that “You can’t talk about the Dialogue as if it has a kind of 
completely united and coherent view. It’s not a person. It’s not a monolithic 
organisation. Far from it”.70 
 
The officially sanctioned view of the AALD is that it merely provides a forum for 
discussion and debate between both countries on matters of mutual interest. As 
Greg Sheridan writes, “at Scanlan’s insistence and with the enthusiastic 
endorsement of all its participants, the Dialogue takes no position on any issue 
beyond the utility of the US-Australia relationship”.71 Much depends, however, on 
what is inferred by the “utility” of the alliance. In the eyes of former participant, 
Hugh White, the AALD’s outlook is based on questionable assumptions: 
 
[It]  embodied from the outset a certain view about what makes the 
alliance and the relationship strong, what makes it valuable to 
Australia and what might pose a threat to those strengths and 
values. It would also be fair to say . . . I think the accounts of those 
things are contestable and quite possibly wrong.72 
 
While the AALD claims its goal is to merely strengthen the Australia-US relationship 
in the interests of both countries, in reality, it functions to sustain an orthodox 
conception of the alliance. As one recent study declared, the AALD “was founded as 
                                                     
69 Author interview with Alexander Downer, 14 September 2011. 
70 Author interview with Sam Lipski, 25 October 2011. 
71 Sheridan, Power Talking. 
72 Author interview with Professor Hugh White, 2 September 2011. 
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a means of sustaining an existing historical narrative of alliance”.73 As detailed in 
Chapter One, this narrative subscribes to a view of the alliance as a “special 
relationship” rooted in shared values and common security interests, first forged in 
the mutual sacrifices suffered by both nations during WWII and solidified in every 
major conflict fought together thereafter. Once again, in the words of Hugh White:  
 
[The AALD] exposed emerging political leaders to a view of the 
alliance as something that transcended politics and even policy. It 
encouraged the view that the alliance was rooted in, and was indeed 
essential to, Australia’s national identity.74 
 
As the driving force behind the AALD, Scanlan is steadfast in his belief that “alliances 
with depth are driven by common and shared values”, and it is those “values which 
today are the glue that binds the US and Australia as strongly as ever”.75 This semi-
mystical belief in the importance of values to the Australia-US alliance underpins 
the central objective of the AALD:  to strengthen the personal relationships 
between leaders of both countries and consequently their commitment to the 
alliance. 
 
Many current and former participants echo the words of founding member, Nick 
Bolkus, when he states that the purpose of the AALD is to facilitate relationship 
building where leaders from both countries can “get to know each other and 
develop strong personal understandings” and “form strong bonds based on 
common values and interests”.76 For many AALD participants interviewed by the 
author, the personal connections it facilitates are what make it such a valuable and 
effective institution. According to journalist and long-standing AALD participant, 
Peter Hartcher, the Dialogue helps to “strengthen relationships and therefore 
                                                     
73 Douglas and Stone, The Informal Diplomacy of the Australian American Leadership Dialogue, p. 20. 
74 Hugh White, Strategic Overreach, American Review, 17 August 2014, p. 12. 
75 Phillip Scanlan, More Than Just Brothers In Arms, Australian Financial Review, 10 October 2001. 
76 Author interview with Nick Bolkus, 6 September 2011. 
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strengthen the alliance”, specifically by “creating familiarity and thickening those 
[personal] bonds”.77 
 
Apart from embodying a values-based understanding of the Australia-US 
relationship, the AALD adheres to the orthodoxy that the alliance is driven by 
mutual security interests, and specifically, that it is necessary for Australia’s 
defence. Scanlan has repeatedly argued that the alliance underwrites the security of 
Australia and, moreover, that the “defence subsidy” it provides is often 
unacknowledged and unappreciated78 – a belief restated on the AALD’s website.79 
Australia’s national interests, Scanlan wrote in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, “are fundamentally unchanged: to cement the alliance with the US in order 
to underwrite the sustained security of Australian citizens”.80 
 
Scanlan also adheres to the conventional wisdom that US hegemony, facilitated in 
part through the Australia-US alliance, is vital to the security, stability and 
prosperity of the Asia-Pacific. Scanlan writes: 
 
[The] Asia-Pacific is a region rich in economic potential and, without 
a working security network, full of crises waiting to happen. Australia 
cannot pursue its aspirations in the absence of a comprehensive, 
multi-layered US strategic engagement across the Asia-Pacific.81 
 
These beliefs and perceptions were embedded into the objectives of the AALD on 
its establishment. As a founding member of the Dialogue, Nick Greiner, explains 
that the “overriding objective, from an Australian point of view, was to ensure the 
                                                     
77 Author interview with Peter Hartcher, 29 October 2011. 
78 Scanlan, More Than Just Brothers In Arms; Phillip Scanlan, New World Disorder, Australian 
Financial Review, 3 July 2003; Phillip Scanlan, Australia and the United States, Towards a Deeper 
Relationship; Phillip Scanlan, Australia Must Learn How to Benefit from the US Alliance, The Age, 30 
January 2007. 
79 Australian American Leadership Dialogue, History, <http://www.aald.org/history>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
80 Scanlan, More Than Just Brothers In Arms. 
81 Scanlan. Also see President’s Departure Sets Legacy Deadline, Australian Financial Review, 2 
January 2007. 
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continuing positive engagement of the United States in the Pacific. Australia was, in 
a sense, a subset of that. That was undoubtedly the overriding purpose”.82 Another 
founding member of the Dialogue, David Kemp, agrees that one of the objectives 
was to “keep the American leadership on both sides focussed on the Pacific and 
East Asia” and to “influence the American strategy” by persuading the US to 
“stabilise the East Asia region”.83 
 
The importance of maintaining US engagement in the region remains a consistent 
theme at the AALD. At the third Dialogue event in 1995, one of the key messages 
presented to the Americans from the Australian delegation was the following 
imperative: 
 
Don't retreat from the region. There is a great and overriding need – 
strategically, militarily and politically – to continue the US military 
presence throughout the region. In a post-Cold War world, the 
maintenance of a forward military presence is a stabilising factor. 
The visibility of the West, as led by the United States, is critical.84 
 
Ten years later, Scanlan reiterated that “confirmation of US engagement in Asia has 
always been a regular part” of what is described as “the menu at the Leadership 
Dialogue”.85 Today, the official website of the AALD states that its mission is to 
“enhance the framework for regional security in a manner that underwrites 
economic and cultural prosperity for Australian and American citizens”.86 
 
More recently, the AALD has focused on recreating the policy orthodoxies of the 
alliance to fit the new geopolitical realities emerging from China’s growing power. 
From a regional perspective, the AALD is considered to be a “willing camp follower” 
                                                     
82 Author interview with Nick Greiner, 6 July 2011. 
83 Author interview with David Kemp, 31 August 2011. 
84 Bruce C. Wolpe, A Message to Clinton, Stick Around, Mate, Australian Financial Review, 7 
September 1995. 
85 Scanlan, Australia and the United States, Towards a Deeper Relationship. 
86 Australian American Leadership Dialogue, AALD, <http://www.aald.org/australian-american-
leadership-dialogue>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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in America’s strategy to hedge against the emergence of an undesirable multilateral 
regional order.87 According to White, the AALD’s “ethos” today is that American 
primacy can and should be sustained in the face of the Chinese challenge and that 
Australia’s best interests are in supporting them doing so.88 
 
When considered as a whole, the agenda of the AALD is not surprising given it 
accords with the long-standing bipartisan commitment among Australian foreign 
policy makers and strategic elites to preserve the alliance, regional security and 
economic framework underpinned by US hegemony. The salient point is that the 
AALD’s overriding objective is not to challenge this traditional thinking but to 
protect, strengthen and legitimise it. 
 
Corporate Influence 
 
Part of the AALD’s objective of preserving the alliance orthodoxy has been a 
commitment to accelerating the neoliberal economic order strongly promoted by 
both Australia and the US in the post-Cold War era. There are mutual interests 
between Australia’s national security elite and corporate leadership regarding 
America’s place as the world’s dominant power “on the grounds that it provides the 
hegemonic stability necessary to maintain a global neoliberal economic order that is 
favourable to Western economic interests”.89 
 
Some tension has emerged in recent times between the defence establishment, the 
intelligence community and those sections of Australia’s corporate elite with large 
business interests in China.90 Some business leaders have voiced concerns about the 
fact that Australia’s growing strategic relationship with the US appears to be 
                                                     
87 Douglas and Stone, The Informal Diplomacy of the Australian American Leadership Dialogue, p. 24. 
88 Author interview with Professor Hugh White, 2 September 2011. 
89 Erik Paul, Neoliberal Australia and US Imperialism in East Asia, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, p. 10. 
90 When developing the 2009 Defence White Paper, Australia’s defence hawks rejected the view of 
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increasingly directed at containing China.91 Nevertheless, this tension has not 
fundamentally altered Canberra’s commitment, or the AALD’s enthusiasm, for 
supporting American regional hegemony and the US “Pivot” to Asia. As Nick Bisley 
points out, Australia is “doubling down on American primacy”: 
 
Although scholarly and public debates have traversed a wide range 
of policy options, Canberra has made a very clear decision about its 
strategic future: it will cleave very closely to its alliance with the 
United States and to the vision of regional order which depends on 
continued American primacy.92 
 
When the AALD first emerged in the early 1990s, one of the key messages stressed 
to the Americans was to immediately “strengthen APEC” and take steps to ensure 
the “acceleration of the free trade regime”.93 Today, David Kemp plainly declares 
that “the Dialogue is free trade. There’s no doubt about that. It would be more [pro-
] free trade than the Australian political system as a whole or the American political 
system as a whole”.94 The most conspicuous example of the AALD’s neoliberal 
agenda is the advocacy role in played in bringing about the 2005 AUSFTA.95 
 
Advocates of the AALD frequently point to its role in facilitating the emergence of 
AUSFTA as evidence of its real impact at the policy level, although this claim has not 
                                                     
91 Vince Scappatura, The US “Pivot” to Asia, the China Spectre and the Australian-American Alliance, 
The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 12, issue 36, no. 3, 9 September 2014, <http://apjjf.org/2014/12/36/
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92 Nick Bisley, Australia and the Region that 1945 Created: The Long History of Contemporary 
Strategy, The Journal of Korean Defence Analysis, vol. 27, no. 2, June 2015, p. 257. 
93 Wolpe, A Message to Clinton. 
94 Author interview with David Kemp, 31 August 2011. 
95 The underlying neoliberal agenda of AUSFTA that sought to increase the rights of corporations and 
reduce the rights of the Australian government to regulate corporate activity have been well 
documented. Ann Capling, All the Way with the USA: Australia, the US and Free Trade, Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 2005; Linda Weiss, Elizabeth Thurbon and John Matthews, How to Kill a Country: 
Australia’s Devastating Trade Deal with the United States, Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 
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and Neoliberal Globalism: Towards Re-peripherisation in Australia, Canada and Mexico?, London: 
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gone uncontested.96 Speaking in retrospect, Scanlan maintains the AALD “made a 
significant contribution” in facilitating AUSFTA.97 Many participants of the AALD 
from both countries concur with Scanlan’s claim.98 In his in-depth account of the 
behind-the-scenes lobbying that went on during AUSFTA negotiations, the 
Australian Financial Review’s Mark Davis described the AALD as an “important locus 
for the unfolding FTA debate” where key American officials strongly promoted the 
trade agreement.99 
 
Whatever the actual impact the AALD had on the emergence of AUSFTA, Scanlan 
was certainly a fierce supporter of the agreement. He urged the then Prime 
Minister, John Howard, to broaden Australia’s push for wider economic integration 
with the US. He candidly stated that the AALD would put the subject on its own 
agenda and “strongly advocate” for FTA acceptance at official levels.100 
 
Scanlan praised AUSFTA as an “act of strategic engagement by Australia that is long 
overdue”, dismissing concerns that it might damage Australia’s sugar and diary 
industries, labelling them “uncompetitive” and in need of “transformation”. 
Opposition to the agreement by the Labor Party was, in Scanlan’s words, merely 
                                                     
96 Alexander Downer, Australia’s foreign minister when AUSFTA was being negotiated, states 
categorically that the AALD didn’t have “any influence over it one way or another”. Author interview 
with Alexander Downer, 14 September 2011. On the other hand, a number of other AALD 
participants interviewed by the author refute Downer’s claims, dismissing it as an attempt to take all 
of the credit for the trade agreement. 
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99 Mark Davis, Quick Dealing at the Business End of Trade, Australian Financial Review, 7 January 
2005. 
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“political point scoring”.101 Accordingly, Scanlan “applauded” the Howard 
government “for pursing FTA talks with the United States” and called on the 
opposition to “support a comprehensive US FTA”.102 
 
The most significant private advocate of AUSFTA from the US side of the AALD was 
the late Anne Wexler. As noted above, Wexler was a pivotal influencer in the AALD. 
Former AALD board member, Sam Lipski, refers to Wexler as the “anchor person” or 
the “Phil Scanlan at the Washington end”.103 When Wexler died in 2009, a tribute 
was placed on the home page of the AALD’s website.104 Commemorating her role as 
a serving member on the board for fifteen years, she was described as “one of our 
own” and a “key player . . . in the development of the Leadership Dialogue.” 
 
Wexler was one of Washington’s key power brokers, dubbed part of the 
“superlobbyist”105 elite in Washington and “easily the most influential female 
lobbyist in a world still dominated by men”.106 She was introduced to the AALD 
early in its development by her husband, Joseph Duffey, director of the USIA at the 
time; she later became a board member of the Dialogue. 
 
                                                     
101 Phillip Scanlan, A Trade Pact to Prise US Door Open, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 March 2004, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/03/01/1078117362609.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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Globalism, pp. 42-5. 
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105 Matt Bai, Anne Wexler: Superlobbyist, New York Times, 27 December 2009, <http://www.nytimes
.com/2009/12/27/magazine/27wexler-t.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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According to the former president and secretary of the American board of the 
AALD, Alan Dunn, Wexler was “thrilled and captivated” by her first Dialogue event 
and subsequently agreed to serve as Treasurer on the board. She proceeded to use 
her “influence” and “convening power as this uber-lobbyist in Washington to bring 
people in to participate”.107 Robert Walker, a former Republican congressman and 
later chairman of the American board of the Dialogue, became a partner in Wexler’s 
lobbying firm, still known today as Wexler and Walker Public Policy Associates. 
Robert Cramer, a former Democrat congressman and Dialogue board member, also 
joined the lobbying firm in 2009. 
 
After Australia announced its ambition to pursue a FTA with the US in late 2000, 
Wexler was commissioned by big business to fund a lobbying effort on Capitol Hill. 
The Wexler Group had previously represented the pro-NAFTA business coalition of 
Fortune 500 companies in the early 1990s and, together with her husband’s efforts 
at the USIA, employed a sophisticated propaganda campaign to sell the trade 
agreement to the American public and a reluctant Mexico and Canada.108 Wexler 
proceeded to launch the American-Australian FTA Coalition in mid-2001 as the 
prime US lobbying vehicle in pursuit of AUSFTA. The coalition consisted of over 300 
corporations and business associations including AALD supporters such as Boeing, 
ALCOA, Coca-Cola, ExxonMobil and Visy Industries.109 
 
There was some disagreement about the benefits of multilateral versus bilateral 
trade agreements within the AALD. However, there was not “plenty of vigorous 
debate” on the “merits” of AUSFTA as Scanlan has claimed. Toohey writes that 
“apparently, no one in the AALD raised the incongruity of including a highly 
protectionist measure on intellectual property in the FTA”. That is, the extension of 
                                                     
107 Author interview with Alan Dunn, 23 November 2011. 
108 Nancy Snow, Propaganda, Inc. Selling America’s Culture to the World (3rd Edition), New York: 
Seven Stories Press, 2010, pp. 115-122. 
109 A similar pro-FTA lobby group was set up in Australia – the AUSTA coalition – and included ALCOA, 
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copyright protection from 50 to 70 years, which “had nothing to do with trade 
liberalisation and everything to do with providing a windfall gain for corporations 
owning a back catalogue of movies, music and books”.110 
 
According to Mark Latham, who was leader of the opposition when AUSFTA was 
enacted, the role of the AALD was:  
 
[To] just stamp this as approved. They didn’t want anyone to 
question it or amend it as we ultimately did. So they are a voice for 
American foreign investment and free trade which they are entitled 
to be but it’s partly funded by the commercial proceeds of that 
agenda.111 
 
As Latham alludes, the AALD’s explicit “free trade” agenda is underscored by its 
extensive links to the corporate world, including as the major source of its funding. 
After its founding in 1993, Scanlan established two parent organisations to secure 
funds, enlist participants and coordinate each AALD event and associated programs. 
The Australian American Education Leadership Foundation was established to 
manage the Dialogue’s interests in Australia, and its counterpart, the American 
Australian Education Leadership Foundation, was to manage those operations 
relating to the US.112 Both organisations are entirely funded from private sources 
and declared as non-for-profit educational institutions with tax deductible status in 
their respective host nations. 
 
Although board members have changed with time, a significant proportion of 
current and former board members of both the Australian and American 
foundations have consisted of corporate executives and lobbyists.113 Contributors 
to the AALD are mostly confidential. However, the author was able to source a 
                                                     
110 Toohey, The Dialogue Box. 
111 Author interview with Mark Latham, 22 November 2011. 
112 Hereafter, the Australian American Foundation and vice versa.  
113 These include Amanda Johnston-Pell, Anne Wexler, Fleur Harlan, Heather Podesta, Hugh Morgan, 
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partial list from financial reports submitted to ASIC in Australia and the IRS in the 
United States, illustrated in Figures 3, 4 and 5 below. 
 
Figure 3: Total Fiscal Year Contributions* 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Contributions 
(American-Australian 
Foundation) 
Contributions 
(Australian-American 
Foundation) 
   
1993 unavailable 181 000 
1994 5 000 142 000 
1995 10 000 101 000 
1996 28 500 101 000 
1997 57 713 Unreported 
1998 70 000 112 910 
1999 58 500 55 610 
2000 65 000 Unreported 
2001 11 100 Unreported 
2002 87 000 Unreported 
2003 97 500 Unreported 
2004 195 000 Unreported 
2005 77 865 Unreported 
2006 165 000 Unreported 
2007 80 010 Unreported 
2008 190 000 Unreported 
2009 148 000 Unreported 
2010 365 000 Unreported 
2011 340 000 Unreported 
2012 150 000 Unreported 
   
Total USD 2 201 188 AUD 693 520 
 
* Data for American-Australian Foundation sourced from Form 990 submitted to the IRS, 
FY1998-2012. Data for Australian-American Foundation sourced from Financial Returns 
submitted to ASIC, FY1993-2009. 
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Figure 4: American Australian Education Leadership Foundation Contributors* 
 
 
      
Contributor FY2011 FY2010 FY2009 FY2008 Total 
      
ALCOA Foundation 45 000 50 000 25 000 50 000 170 000 
 
* All amounts in USD. Data for FY1997-2000 sourced from Form 990 (FY2001) submitted by 
American-Australian Foundation to IRS. Data for FY2008-2011 sourced from Form 990 
(FY2009-2012) submitted by ALCOA Foundation to the IRS. 
 
Figure 5: Australian American Education Leadership Foundation Contributors* 
 
      
Contributor FY1996 FY1995 FY1994 FY1993 Total 
      
Terrace Tower Pty Ltd 20 000 5 000 10 000 20 000 55 000 
Broken Hill Pty Ltd 40 000 40 000 40 000 40 000 160 000 
Westfield Holdings Ltd - - - 25 000 25 000 
Kellogg (Aust) Pty Ltd - - 5 000 5 000 10 000 
David Holdings Pty Ltd 5 000 5 000 10 000 10 000 30 000 
Bridge Oil Ltd  - - - 20 000 20 000 
      
Contributor FY2000 FY1999 FY1998 FY1997 Total 
      
ANZ Bank - 10 000 10 000 - 20 000 
Bank of America - - 10 000 - 10 000 
Charles Schwab 15 000 - - - 15 000 
CSR American Companies Foundation 20 000 - - - 20 000 
EDS  - 5000 5000 15 000 25 000 
Peter J Carre - 5000 5000 5000 15 000 
Phillip Morris Co Inc 10 000 15 000 15 000 5000 45 000 
Restructuring Associates - - 10 000 - 10 000 
Sembler Fund 10 000 - 10 000 10 000 30 000 
Tampa-Orlando Pinellas Jewish Fund 
(Sembler) 
- 10 000 - - 10 000 
Texas Utilities Australia - - - 10 000 10 000 
USA Agri Corp 10 000 - 5000 - 15 000 
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Burns Philip & Co Ltd - - - 5 000 5 000 
Mr Phillip Scanlan - - - 6 000 6 000 
CRA Ltd - 20 000 - 20 000 40 000 
Australian Meat & Live-stock 
Corporation 
- - 20 000 20 000 40 000 
Philip Morris Ltd - - - 10 000 10 000 
Western Mining Corporation Ltd - 15 000 15 000 - 30 000 
Arthur Anderson - - 10 000 - 10 000 
Boral Ltd - - 20 000 - 20 000 
Coopers & Lybrand - - 6 000 - 6 000 
Caterpillar of Australia Ltd 5 000  5 000 5 000 - 15 000 
Norwich Life  5 000 - - - 5 000 
Korn Ferry 5 000 - - - 5 000 
Nike Australia Pty Ltd 11 000 11 000 - - 22 000 
Ambassador Bill Lane - - 1 000 - 1 000 
Richard Pratt 10 000 - - - 10 000 
 
     
Contributor 2012 2011 1990s-2000s (12yrs) Total 
     
Pratt Foundation 100 000 100 000 660 000 (55 000 p/y) 860 000 
 
* Note all amounts in AUD. Data for FY1993-96 sourced from financial returns submitted by 
the Australian-American Foundation to ASIC. Data on Pratt Foundation is an estimate 
provided to the author by Sam Lipski (Chief Executive).114 
 
The information obtained is limited due to the lack of voluntary disclosure. 
Nonetheless, it provides a reasonable indication of both the sources and amounts of 
private funding. As might be expected, it is large Australian or American businesses 
with interests or subsidiaries in each respective country that dominate. 
 
Further confirmation about the corporate backing of the AALD can be gleaned from 
a brochure celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Dialogue in 2012. 
“Supporters” are listed as Qantas, Australia Post, NAB, Visy Industries, Chevron, 
                                                     
114 Lipski estimates the Pratt Foundation contributed approximately $55,000 p.a. for twelve or 
thirteen years and, after a small break, returned with a renewed commitment under the leadership 
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ConocoPhillips, Corrs Chambers Westgarth, AARNet, ALCOA, ANZ, BHP Billiton, 
Boeing, Brambles, CISCO, Coca Cola South Pacific, Ernst & Young, ExxonMobil, New 
Litho, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Visa and Woodside Petroleum.115 
 
Visy Industries, cited as a “key supporter” in the brochure, has been a central 
sponsor of the AALD since its early foundation years. Alan Dunn states that the late 
Richard Pratt played a key role: 
 
[He] played a very, very important function. He hosted us. He gave us 
venues where we could get together. . . he used what he had a lot of, 
which was resources and money, to sponsor us. It takes money to 
make the Dialogue run and he was a generous contributor.116 
 
Sam Lipski, a close personal friend of Pratt and Chief Executive of the charitable 
Pratt Foundation, recalls that Pratt wanted to get involved in the AALD early on 
because of his many connections with the US and he “was then very much involved 
in getting the Visy Industries business off the ground in the United States”.117 
 
Unsurprisingly, big business takes full advantage of their sponsorship and presence 
at the AALD to pursue their interests. The primary motivation is to gain access to 
government thinking on issues that may affect their interests and also make 
representations to government officials on behalf of those interests.118 The 
representative of one Australian transnational corporate donor, who wished to 
remain anonymous, provided the following reasons for the corporation’s long-
                                                     
115 Qantas is cited as a “principal supporter”; Australia Post, NAB and Visy Industries as “key 
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standing commitment to the AALD. These are: to support Australia’s national 
interests, to benefit the profile and reputation of the company and, in particular, in 
order to help understand the environment in which the company operates. 
According to this senior executive, understanding “what risks are out there, what 
trends, what debates”, and “being able to hear from the US administration, White 
House level people and, in Australia, from ministers”, is “pretty useful” for any 
company that operates internationally.119 
 
Alan Dunn concurs, arguing that business leaders who attend the AALD “get to see 
who’s making policies. They get to hear who’s making decisions and what they’re 
thinking about and what the key issues are”.120 When he was an executive at BHP 
Billiton, Tom Harley brought the company back into the AALD after it had been 
absent for some years in order to reenergise its US relationships: 
 
[BHP Billiton] had under baked its US relationships. It had 
relationships with different communities in the US where it had 
investments and so on but it had very little engagement with the 
policy makers . . . It enabled us to talk to a whole lot of people that 
we weren’t talking to before . . .121 
 
While a large company like BHP has no trouble getting access to policy makers, the 
AALD has the advantage of bringing them altogether in one room, providing the 
opportunity for multiple meetings in one trip and in one place that would otherwise 
take weeks to organise and conduct. Moreover, it is not the access per se which is 
important but the access to policy makers in context. In this way, Harley states, 
business can “see the way these people operate”. Rather than just “having a single 
point meeting and coming away”, you’re able to have “interaction with them that is 
broader.” By watching political leaders interact with others, business leaders are 
able to make better judgements about them. Again, in Harely’s words: 
                                                     
119 Author interview with participant who chose to remain anonymous. 
120 Author interview with Alan Dunn, 23 November 2011. 
121 Author interview with Tom Harley, 2 November 2011. 
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I want to have context. I want to know what motivates people. I want 
to know how consistent they are and how they adapt to different 
circumstances. You can be more predictive of their behaviours.122 
 
While the desire of the AALD to cultivate and represent the interests of big business 
is entirely legitimate, the interests and concerns of workers are not equally 
represented. The only union invited to attend the AALD is the right-wing AWU, first 
represented by Bill Shorten, and later, his successor, Paul Howes. “Bill was the first 
ever union official involved. I’m still the only union official there”, Howes declared 
in 2011. Apart from the fact that Shorten and Scanlan know each well on a personal 
level, the AWU’s sole presence, says Howes, “probably reflects” the fact that:  
 
[The AWU] has always had a very pro-US outlook on foreign policy 
issues. It goes back to the Cold War. We were the leading anti-
Communist union in Australia . . . So in the Australian labour 
movement it’s always been well known that the AWU is a pro-US 
alliance union.123 
 
It is unsurprising that the AALD holds a bias toward the interests of big business 
given the founder and driving force of the Dialogue, Phillip Scanlan, is an 
accomplished corporate executive with a history of activism as a neoliberal 
ideologue. Prior to his position as managing director of Coca Cola Amatil, Scanlan 
was the Manager of Corporate Relations and Public Affairs at Amatil (W.D. & H.O. 
Wills)124 in the early to mid-1980s. Scanlan assumed a significant public role as 
defender of the tobacco industry’s efforts to delegitimise the link between cigarette 
smoking and cancer and to thwart a ban on the advertising of tobacco products in 
                                                     
122 Author interview with Tom Harley, 2 November 2011. 
123 Author interview with Paul Howes, 5 August 2011. 
124 W.D. & H.O. Wills was the tobacco manufacturing subsidiary of Amatil, Australia's largest soft 
drink and second largest food manufacturer. In May 1989, a major corporate reorganisation saw 
Amatil sell its tobacco subsidiary to British American Tobacco (BAT). At the same time, BAT sold its 
41% interest in Amatil to the Coca-Cola Company. 
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Australia.125 In his defence of the right to advertise tobacco products, Scanlan liked 
to invoke free market principles:  
 
There is a relationship between competition in the marketplace, 
enhancement of the principal of consumer sovereignty, freedom of 
the press no less and civil liberties overall . . . people who propose 
anti-competitive measures such as advertising bans tend to 
encourage market monopoly and the first loser in monopoly 
situations is always the consumer.126 
 
Scanlan has also been associated with what has been coined the “radical neo-liberal 
movement” from the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s.127 The movement was 
characterised by a loose network of right-wing parliamentarians, businessmen, 
academics, journalists and other influential sympathisers to the neoliberal 
economic ideology that was then taking hold in the US, but was still at the margins 
of political debate in Australia. 
 
As part of the movement, a number of corporate funded think tanks and groups 
were established in an attempt to restructure the Australian economy away from a 
Keynesian/welfare type state into a neoliberal one. By the 1990s, the movement 
had successfully contributed to a shift in Australian political discourse. 
Neoliberalism was now elite orthodoxy and, with the election of the Howard 
                                                     
125 In 1983, Scanlan declared on national television that the tobacco industry believed smoking did 
not constitute a health risk. Robin Powell, Pressures Are Mounting to Curb Cigarette Advertising 
Down Under, Advertising Age, 12 September 1983. Scanlan also declared on national radio that “the 
industry believes there is no evidence to substantiate that it [nicotine] is addictive”. Phillip Scanlan, 
interview with Jane Singleton, City Extra, ABC, 18 June 1984. In an opinion piece in The Australian in 
1984, Scanlan wrote that proposed legislation to ban tobacco advertising denied the basic right of 
any citizen to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Phillip Scanlan, Rights Threatened, The 
Australian, 14 May 1984. A year later, Scanlan wrote in the Australian Financial Review that a 
proposed bill to ban tobacco advertising breached Australians’ individual rights and was in direct 
contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Phillip Scanlan, Tobacco and 
a Bill of Rights, Australian Financial Review, 6 May 1985. 
126 Scanlan in interview with Singleton, ABC City Extra. 
127 The following discussion of this movement is based on the doctoral theis by Damien C. Cahill, The 
Radical Neo-liberal Movement as a Hegemonic Force in Australia, 1976-1996, PhD Thesis, University 
of Wollongong, 2004. 
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government in 1996, the movement had become “an established part of the 
political landscape with the ear of a sympathetic government”.128 
 
One of the organisational backbones of the movement was the Crossroads 
Group,129 established by Liberal Dry MPs John Hyde and Jim Carlton. Phillip Scanlan 
was one of its 40 members. It met secretly from 1980-1986 in order to form 
strategies to intervene in key areas of public policy and related activities such as 
placing articles sympathetic to the neoliberal cause in major Australian newspapers. 
The organisation even conspired to create a cover story to conceal the true nature 
of its actions in the event of unintended public disclosure. Some activists in this 
movement subsequently moved into positions of influence in many high profile 
corporations; these included Scanlan, who became managing director of Coca-Cola 
Amatil’s beverages division. 
 
Damien Cahill, who undertook an in-depth study of the movement, has 
characterised the Crossroads Group as an important development in the history of 
the radical neoliberal movement: 
 
It brought together radical neo-liberals from academia, politics and 
business and facilitated dialogue between individuals from different 
movement organisations at a crucial time in the movement’s 
development. It thus helped to cohere the movement. That it met 
secretly, and that its existence was deliberately hidden from the 
public, allowed activists to strategise and debate free from 
scrutiny.130 
 
Shortly after the demise of the Crossroads Group, Scanlan was invited to join the 
board of yet another radical neoliberal institution, the Institute of Public Affairs 
                                                     
128 Cahill, p. 108. 
129 The group was named after the 1980 Shell-sponsored publication, Australia at the Crossroads, 
which had become the movement’s manifesto. Wolfgang Kasper, Richard Blandy, John Freebairn, 
Douglas Hocking, and Robert O’Neil, Australia at the Crossroads: Our Choices to the Year 2000, 
Sydney: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980. 
130 Cahill, The Radical Neo-liberal Movement, p. 117. 
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(IPA) in NSW, as deputy president in March 1988. When the IPA (NSW) decided to 
close and reopen operations as the conservative think tank, The Sydney Institute, in 
April 1989, Scanlan became the inaugural chairman where he played an important 
role in the early years of its establishment until 1993. The Sydney Institute’s 
executive chairman, to this day, is Gerard Henderson, also a member of the now 
defunct Crossroads Group.131 
 
Significantly, the AALD prides itself as an independent private institution able to 
maintain itself at arms-length from government, operating in the absence of direct 
government management and funding. The “mantra” that the AALD “be at arms-
length from government has been fundamental”, says former Australian Prime 
Minister and long-term Dialogue participant, Kevin Rudd.132 However, the extensive 
corporate connections and foundations of the AALD, including its dependence on 
private sources of funding, undermine its claim to be entirely independent and 
neutral. 
 
That is not to say that corporate interests have hijacked the agenda of the AALD. 
The financial and physical presence of big business is more likely a reflection of the 
fact that the alliance orthodoxy embodied by the AALD and Australia’s political 
establishment closely aligns with large corporate interests and therefore attracts 
their support. Evidently, big business has used the opportunities provided by the 
AALD to their full advantage. 
 
                                                     
131 Author interview with Gerard Henderson, 7 March 2012; Gerard Henderson, Correspondence: 
Robert Macklin and The Sydney Institute, The Sydney Institute Quarterly, issue 31, September 2007, 
pp. 15-16. 
132 Sheridan, Power Talking. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conceptualising the AALD: T2 Diplomacy or Pro-American Lobby 
Group? 
 
Conceptualising the AALD 
 
The AALD cannot be readily conceptualised or categorised. Ostensibly, as a 
dialogue-based, semi-official diplomatic process that brings together elites to 
discuss ideas with the purpose of relationship building grounded in mutual 
understanding, the AALD comfortably sits within the broad definition of track two 
(T2) diplomacy. Indeed, the Dialogue has been publicly lauded as the most 
successful example of T2 diplomacy to emerge from Australia.1  
 
On the other hand, virtually all prominent T2 dialogues in the Asia-Pacific are 
dedicated to conflict management and/or multilateral cooperation building, 
whereas the focus of the AALD is on the management of bilateral relations between 
two long-standing allies.2 Any attempt to study the AALD as an exercise in T2 
diplomacy must therefore “address T2 in the absence of conflict and stress long-
term consensus-building and friendship engagement”.3 
 
The problem of using T2 as a conceptual framework for understanding and 
evaluating the AALD is that it ignores one of the core objectives of T2, explored in 
detail below, which is to challenge official government thinking by generating 
dissent. One of the major reasons for involving non-officials in discussions with 
officials is to inject new and unorthodox approaches at the decision making level. 
The goal of the AALD, on the other hand, is to preserve orthodox thinking and 
                                                     
1 John Denton, Second-Track Diplomacy Aids Foreign Policy, The Australian, 17 July 2009, 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/second-track-diplomacy-aids-foreign-policy/story-
e6frg6n6-1225751155708>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
2 There is an acknowledged gap in the literature on the numerous smaller and bilateral type T2 
initiatives such as the AALD. See Desmond Ball, Anthony Milner and Brendan Taylor, Track 2 Security 
Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: Reflections and Future Directions, Asian Security, vol. 2, no. 3, 2006, p. 
184. 
3 Elena Douglas and Diane Stone, The Informal Diplomacy of the Australian American Leadership 
Dialogue, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 1, 2015, p. 21. 
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eschew dissenting perspectives. In this important respect, the AALD departs from 
other T2 initiatives to function more like a lobby group. 
 
There is a clear distinction made in the literature between T2 initiatives and lobby 
groups. As “epistemic communities”, T2 networks will ostensibly revise their beliefs 
in light of new or changing evidence. Unlike lobby groups, they do not attempt to 
define the terms of political debate to ensure only their preferred policy appears 
legitimate, but rather are committed to articulating expert and policy-relevant 
advice.4 The AALD, in contrast, aims explicitly to “help review and refine the 
parameters of the Australian-American bilateral relationship”5 and views with 
disdain any opinion outside of the orthodoxy. As demonstrated below, critics of the 
alliance are not invited to attend the AALD and even strong alliance supporters are 
shunned when perceived as a threat to the status quo. 
 
By drawing exclusively and carefully from elite circles that subscribe to conventional 
thinking, the AALD serves as a legitimising platform for existing government 
objectives. At first glance, this outcome appears consistent with other T2 initiatives 
that are bedevilled by what is referred to as the “autonomy dilemma”, or the 
tendency of elites to fall into line with official perspectives.6 However, this criticism 
does not strictly apply to the AALD given that the objective is not “policy change” 
but “policy continuity”; the aim being to strengthen and renew the already 
“relatively stable nature of the ideas and values surrounding the alliance”.7 
 
Evidently, the AALD is not a traditional interest group or “issue public” that targets 
participants in the policy process with a set of specific policy objectives and on 
                                                     
4 Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 
International Organisation, vol. 46, no. 1, winter 1992, p. 18; M. J. Peterson, Cetologists, 
Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling, International Organisation, vol. 
46, no. 1, 1992, pp. 148-49. 
5 Australian American Leadership Dialogue, AALD, <http://www.aald.org/australian-american-
leadership-dialogue>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
6 Herman Joseph S. Kraft, The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, 
Security Dialogue, vol. 31, no. 3, 2000. 
7 Douglas and Stone, The Informal Diplomacy of the Australian American Leadership Dialogue, pp. 
19-20. 
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behalf of a particular constituency.8 Rather, the term should be applied to the AALD 
more loosely to describe what amounts to a group of influential pro-American 
Australians, along with influential Americans, who are devoted to preserving and 
promoting an orthodox conception of the Australia-US alliance and shaping 
Australian foreign policy in a pro-American direction. 
 
Rather than engage in direct efforts to persuade elected officials, the AALD brings 
together leaders in both countries who believe in its alliance orthodoxy in an 
attempt to mutually reinforce their pre-existing beliefs. The AALD does not “lobby” 
elites so much as socialise them by facilitating the process whereby its conception 
of the alliance can be voluntarily accepted or strengthened. While many traditional 
lobby groups are motivated to shift government policy in their favour, others 
operate in a “policy watchdog” capacity to prevent adverse changes.9 The AALD falls 
into the latter category, acting as a “gatekeeper” for orthodox government 
policymaking on the alliance.10  
 
Although not a direct comparison, the AALD resembles parts of the US-based “Israel 
lobby” which consists of individuals and groups that actively work to preserve 
America’s “special relationship” with Israel but do not always engage in formal 
lobbying activities.11 Although not the focus of this paper, it is noteworthy that the 
AALD’s most successful spin-off is the Australia Israel Leadership Forum which, 
according to its critics, engages in “the uncritical boosterism of which Scanlan’s 
group gets accused in some circles”.12 Another relevant comparison is the Australia-
                                                     
8 Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, p. 166. 
9 Gyngell and Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p. 166. 
10 The socialisation and “gatekeeping” functions of the AALD, briefly touched on here, are explored 
in detail in Chapter Seven. 
11 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2007, pp. 112-114. 
12 Hamish McDonald, True Friends Must Tell The Truth, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 March 2010, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/true-friends-must-tell-the-truth-20100319-qm1p.html>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. For an example of such criticism, see Antony Loewenstein, Rudd Helps the 
Middle East Story Remain One Sided, Crikey, 4 December 2009, <http://www.crikey.com.au/2009/
12/04/rudd-helps-the-middle-east-story-remain-one-sided/>, accessed 5 April 2016. Note the AILF 
was expanded and renamed in 2012 to the Australia Israel UK Leadership Dialogue. 
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based “Jakarta lobby”, a loose group of academics, bureaucrats and journalists who, 
in the past, worked to protect Australia’s relationship with Indonesia.13 
 
The function of such lobbies is not to subvert the normal conduct of government 
policy. The Jakarta lobby did not cause Australia’s subservience to Indonesia. 
Rather, it assisted in maintaining the relationship in a way that aligned with an 
orthodox conception of Australia’s national interest.14 The same argument has been 
made of the Israel lobby in relation to American foreign policy,15 although others 
maintain, unconvincingly in the author’s opinion, that the lobby has successfully 
hijacked American and even Australian foreign policy.16 
 
The AALD should be understood along these same lines. It is one small element of 
what has been described as the “Washington lobby”, or those groups that promote 
the alignment of US and Australian foreign policy and a regional and global order 
that protects and enhances western strategic and economic interests.17 
 
Purposes, Benefits and Shortcomings of T2 Diplomacy 
 
Due to systemic changes in the international system flowing from globalisation and 
the end of the bi-polar world order after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
diplomatic practice somewhat shifted from the traditional domain of states to 
include non-state actors as well. Concomitantly, new concepts arose to take into 
                                                     
13 Scott Burchill, The Jakarta Lobby: Mea Culpa?, The Age, 4 March 1999. 
14 Clinton Fernandes, Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the Independence of East Timor, 
Carlton North, Victoria: Scribe Publications, 2004, pp. 22-24. 
15 Noam Chomsky, The Israel Lobby? ZNet, 28 March 2006, <https://chomsky.info/20060328/>, 
accessed 5 April 2016; Stephen Zunes, The Israel Lobby: How Powerful Is It Really?, Mother Jones, 18 
May 2006, <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/05/israel-lobby-how-powerful-it-really>, 
accessed 5 April 2016; Stephen Zunes, The Israel Lobby Revisited, Common Dreams, 23 December 
2007, <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2007/12/23/israel-lobby-revisited>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
16 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby; Eulalia Han and Halim Rane, Making Australian Foreign 
Policy On Israel-Palestine: Media Coverage, Public Opinion And Interest Groups, Carlton: Melbourne 
University Press, 2013. 
17 Fernandes, Reluctant Saviour, p. 24. 
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account these developments.18 One of these is the concept of “tracked” diplomacy 
or Tracks of Diplomacy (ToDs), a tri-level framework for categorising various forms 
of diplomacy by their official or non-official status, and by the mix and 
characteristics of the participants involved.19 
 
T1 refers to government-led diplomacy undertaken exclusively by policy makers 
who work through official channels. T1 encompasses the traditional notion of 
diplomacy as the “management of peaceful relations between states principally 
through negotiations between their accredited representatives”.20 This form of 
diplomatic practice includes typical bilateral negotiations among high-level officials 
to large multilateral initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, two of the largest and most established multilateral T1 
initiatives in the Asia Pacific. 
 
Both T2 and T3 are encapsulated in the more flexible and less state-centric 
definition of diplomacy that includes the participation and interests of non-state 
actors. In contrast to T1, tracks two and three are often referred to as a type of 
unofficial diplomacy or “diplomacy without diplomats”.21 While T3 largely 
comprises of civil society organisations and is more or less synonymous with 
transnational advocacy movements, T2 can be more accurately described as a form 
                                                     
18 Herman Joseph S. Kraft, Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: the Asia 
Pacific Coalition for East Timor, Global Networks, vol. 2, no. 1, 2002, pp. 50-51. 
19 An alternative concept which uses nine tracks to categorise various official and unofficial 
diplomatic activities – coined “multi-track diplomacy” – has been developed by Louise Diamond and 
John McDonald. The concept, however, is primarily used by the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. 
This study, like much of the scholarship on ToDs, utilises the basic tri-level concept. See James Notter 
and Louise Diamond, Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice, 
Occasional Paper No. 7, Washington: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, October 1996, pp. 5-6, 
<http://www.imtd.org/index.php/publications/papers-and-articles/81-publications/144-occasional-
paper-building-peace-and-transforming-conflict-multi-track-diplomacy-in-practice>, accessed 5 April 
2016. Also see Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, What is Multi-Track Diplomacy?, <http://www
.imtd.org/index.php/about/84-about/131-what-is-multi-track-diplomacy>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
20 Kraft, Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights, p. 50. 
21 Charles Homans, Track II Diplomacy: A Short History, Foreign Policy, July/August 2011, 
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/track-ii-diplomacy-a-short-history/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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of “semi-official interaction” given it includes a significant number of both official 
and non-official participants drawn from elite or influential circles.22 
 
The term T2 is generally attributed to Joseph V. Montville, a US Foreign Service 
Officer who, along with his co-researcher, psychiatrist William D. Davidson, 
conceived of it as a tool of “political psychology” that could be utilised to break 
down the human barriers between conflicting parties such as the Israelis and 
Palestinians.23 Montville defined T2 as follows: 
 
[The] unofficial, informal interaction among members of adversarial 
groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing 
public opinion, and organising human and material resources in ways 
that might help resolve the conflict.24 
 
Today, T2 is still largely conceived of in these terms.25 As Peter Jones notes, “the 
great bulk of research and writing on track two is about resolving specific conflicts 
between (usually) two parties” and typically resides within the various schools of 
“conflict resolution”.26 
 
Although Montville and Davidson were focused on resolving differences between 
hostile states, they also recognised that T2 “need not be limited to enemies” and 
could prove useful “between firm but contentious friends, such as the United States 
                                                     
22 Amitav Acharya, Engagement or Entrapment? Scholarship and Policymaking on Asian Regionalism, 
International Studies Review, vol. 13, 2011, p. 13. 
23 William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville, Foreign Policy According to Freud, Foreign Policy, no. 
45, winter, 1981-82, pp. 145-157. 
24 Quoted in Peter Jones, Filling a Critical Gap, or Just Wasting Time? Track Two Diplomacy and 
Regional Security in the Middle East, Disarmament Forum: Arms Control in the Middle East, United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), no. 2, 2008, p. 3. 
25 See, for example, Tobias Bohmelt, The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-
party Interventions, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 47, no. 2, 2010, pp. 167-178; Dalia Dassa Kaye, 
Rethinking Track Two Diplomacy: The Middle East and South Asia, Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, no. 3, June 2005; Jeffrey Mapendere, Track 
One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks, Culture of Peace Online Journal, vol. 2, 
no. 1, 2005, pp. 66-81. 
26 Jones, Filling a Critical Gap, p. 4. 
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and France”.27 Today, T2 can also be understood more widely as a cooperation 
building exercise to help frame discussion between elites and establish alternative 
norms of behaviour. Such exercises are referred to as “soft” T2 and are more about 
facilitating cooperation via mutual exchange and understanding as opposed to 
simply finding solutions to established problems that characterise the “hard” T2 
variety. According to Kaye, the objective of this type of T2 is: 
 
[Usually] not formal conflict resolution through contributions to a 
peace settlement, but rather conflict management, tension 
reduction, confidence-building and the formation of sub-regional 
identities that allow actors to frame and approach problems in 
similar and preferably cooperative way.28 
 
The “soft” interpretation of T2 is considered a useful mechanism for “region 
building” and “identity formation”, and need not be limited to security interactions 
but also economic, social or other potential forms of cooperation. In the Asia-Pacific 
in particular, multilateral policy dialogues and exchanges aimed at regional 
cooperation building have burgeoned over the last decade and a half.29 
 
T2 dialogues are often viewed as synonymous with “epistemic communities” and 
evaluated accordingly.30 Typically, an epistemic community is defined as “a network 
of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain 
                                                     
27 Davidson and Montville, Foreign Policy According to Freud, p.156. 
28 Kaye, Rethinking Track Two Diplomacy, p. 3. 
29 According to one authoritative estimate, there were 268 T2 processes in East Asia in 2008, up from 
34 in 1998. For figures, see Dialogue and Research Monitor, Overview Report 2008, Japan Centre for 
International Exchange, <http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/2008/>, accessed 5 April 2016; Dialogue and 
Research Monitor, Index of Meetings in 1988, Japan Centre for International Exchange, 
<http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/Feb99/>, accessed 5 April 2016. It has been claimed elsewhere that 
since 2007, there have been 250 regional T2 dialogues in Asia annually. Nick Bisley, Australia in Asia: 
How to Keep the Peace and Ensure Regional Security, The Conversation, 11 October 2011, 
<http://theconversation.com/australia-in-asia-how-to-keep-the-peace-and-ensure-regional-security-
3592>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
30 Kwa Chong Guan, “CSCAP: From Epistemic to Learning Community” in Desmond Ball and Kwa 
Chong Guan (eds), Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra and S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2010; Sheldon W. Simon, 
Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: the CSCAP Experience, The 
Pacific Review, vol. 15, no. 2, 2002. 
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and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or 
issue-area”.31 The function of epistemic communities is to “discuss specific issues, 
set agendas, and formulate policy alternatives outside the formal bureaucratic 
channels” while serving as “brokers for admitting new ideas into decision-making 
circles of bureaucrats and elected officials”.32 Under favourable conditions, 
epistemic communities claim to be capable of not only framing issues or defining 
interests but even setting the agenda of policy makers.33 
 
Scholarly opinion is divided on the actual influence of T2 at the policy level. In the 
zero-sum world of realism, unofficial dialogues and multilateral institutions tend to 
be viewed as “talking shops” that are either detrimental or irrelevant to 
policymaking,34 or else tightly constrained by the structural distribution of 
international power.35 Liberals and constructivists, on the other hand, argue that T2 
initiatives have played a distinctly positive role in state-to-state cooperation 
building, principally through the creation of new norms of behaviour.36 Realists 
dismiss the impact of discourse in framing state behaviour and argue instead that 
“norms are essentially what states, pursuing their strategic self-interest, make of 
them”.37 
 
There have been very few empirical studies conducted to measure the success of 
unofficial diplomatic initiatives.38 This is largely because most of the benefits of T2 
are intangible and therefore unquantifiable, making any attempt to gauge their 
                                                     
31 Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities, p. 3. However, as Acharya points out, T2 participants 
are not always endowed with the authoritative knowledge that is considered to be one of the key 
characteristics of epistemic communities. Acharya, Engagement or Entrapment?, p. 13. 
32 Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities, p. 31. 
33 Simon, Evaluating Track II Approaches, p. 171. 
34 Nicholas Khoo, Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay, International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 4, 2004; David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, Making 
Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order, International Security, vol. 
32, no. 1, summer 2007. 
35 David Capie, When Does Track Two Matter? Structure, Agency and Asian Regionalism, Review of 
International Political Economy, vol. 17, no. 2, 2010. 
36 Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional 
Change in Asian Regionalism, International Organisation, vol. 58, no. 2, 2004; Diane L. Stone, The 
ASEAN-ISIS Network: Interpretative Communities, Informal Diplomacy and Discourses of Region, 
Minerva, vol. 49, no. 2, 2011. 
37 Jones and Smith, Making Process, Not Progress, p. 150. 
38 For one notable exception see Bohmelt, The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy. 
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success at the policy level “highly problematic”.39 According to constructivist 
accounts, the proper measure of success when it comes to T2 dialogues is at the 
perceptive or ideational level. As Job phrases it, the relevant test is whether T2 has 
“altered the manner in which states perceive their security interests and formulate 
their grand strategies”.40 The difficulty is that when discourse is taken as the object 
of analysis, and interpretation and persuasion as the source of policy change, the 
“causal path between ideas and policy” is acknowledged to be a “muddy” one.41 
 
Advocates claim that one of the major advantages T2 holds over T1 is its capacity 
for discussing and proposing ideas that would otherwise be “too sensitive or 
controversial” at the official level.42 Given T2 requires less protocol and is “free of 
the constraints of official or national positions”, there exists greater opportunity to 
explore “unconventional options” and “challenge current strategies and provide 
new solutions”.43 In theory, the objective of T2 is to use this greater latitude to 
critically examine policy options in an “academic fashion” and to challenge 
“traditional thinking” on security matters rather than simply recite government 
policy.44 
 
Accordingly, one of the key ways T2 claims to have an impact at the policy level is by 
“generat[ing] dissent” which might “not be to the liking of policymakers” but 
nonetheless “alerts them to alternative ideas and approaches” against which “their 
own preferences will be benchmarked and assessed”.45 The rationale of the major 
T2 initiatives in the Asia-Pacific has been to challenge the status quo and traditional 
                                                     
39 Ball, Milner and Taylor, Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific, p. 182. 
40 Brian L. Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asian Security Order” in 
Desmond Ball and Kwa Chong Guan (eds), Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 
143. 
41 Stone, The ASEAN-ISIS Network, pp. 253-254, quote p. 254. 
42 Ball, Milner and Taylor, Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific, p. 179. 
43 Ian Buchanan and Christopher Findlay, Bolting on the Second Track Key to Regional Cooperation in 
the Asian Century, East Asia Forum, 27 June 2012, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/06/27/bolt
ing-on-the-second-track-key-to-regional-cooperation-in-the-asian-century/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
44 Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy”, p. 146. 
45 Acharya, Engagement or Entrapment?, p. 13. 
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state conceptions of security, including the encouragement of “mutuality rather 
than power balancing or hegemony”.46 
 
While challenging official positions and providing alternative perspectives is a 
fundamental objective and claimed benefit of T2, the failure to live up to this 
expectation has also been one of its perennial problems, noted in the literature as 
the “autonomy dilemma”.47 The autonomy dilemma largely derives from the fact 
that T2 participants are drawn from elite circles, closely intertwined with 
government and generally holding similar backgrounds and perspectives apart from 
the rest of civil society. Alternative views are often marginalised because T2 selects 
“groups and individuals discussing security issues that concern governing elites”. By 
drawing on these  elite circles with common worldviews, a kind of “group think” can 
develop – reinforced through “gatekeeping” – whereby favoured participants are 
continually reinvited back into the “club” while others remain excluded.48 
 
The increased intimacy between T2 and T1 is considered by some to be “not an 
altogether negative development” given that it provides T2 with a direct channel of 
influence into official circles.49 Nevertheless, there is a real concern that the more 
T2 ingratiates itself with those in power, the more likely is the potential for it to 
“simply reinforce conventional, politically acceptable approaches”.50 The notion 
that T2 provides a forum for “thinking the unthinkable” is, it has been argued, an 
equivocal claim at best, as “non-official diplomatic discourse seems almost always 
to gravitate to official positions”.51 T2 more often than not functions in a 
“cheerleading” capacity on behalf of state interests by marginalising dissident 
                                                     
46 Simon, Evaluating Track II Approaches, p.171. 
47 Kraft, The Autonomy Dilemma. Kraft has since updated his view on the autonomy dilemma, 
acknowledging that after a decade since first identifying the phenomena, it continues to operate in 
the Asia-Pacific, and is perhaps something T2 “must necessarily live with and accommodate the 
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48 Kraft, The Autonomy Dilemma, p. 348. 
49 Ball, Milner and Taylor, Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific, p. 181. 
50 Simon, Evaluating Track II Approaches, p. 194. 
51 See Seng Tan, Non-official Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: “Civil Society” or “Civil Service”?, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 27, no. 3, 2005, p. 375. 
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perspectives and accommodating “discourses that support a state-centred 
ontology” and “which aim to maintain the regional status quo”.52 
 
The AALD: Framing Discussion and Debate 
 
Although lauded as Australia’s most successful effort in T2 diplomacy, there are 
clear problems in categorising and evaluating the AALD in these terms. The core 
objective of the AALD is quite different from other major T2 initiatives. As noted, 
fearing the alliance might weaken with the loss of personal bonds between the next 
generation of rising leaders in both countries, the AALD was established to cement 
the long-standing orthodoxy that the Australia-US alliance is a “special relationship” 
rooted in shared values and common security interests. In other words, unlike other 
T2 initiatives, the overriding objective of the AALD has been to preserve the status 
quo. 
 
The “autonomy dilemma” provides important insights into how the AALD operates 
to legitimise official perspectives on the alliance. By drawing exclusively and 
carefully from elite circles that subscribe to conventional thinking, the AALD 
performs the role of a “cheer squad” for the alliance orthodoxy and all that entails 
for Australian and American foreign policy. On the other hand, as it currently exists 
in T2 dialogues, the autonomy dilemma cannot be strictly applied to the AALD given 
its objective is to reproduce, not challenge, orthodox thinking. By possessing a pre-
existing agenda that eschews dissenting perspectives, the AALD can be more readily 
characterised as a pro-American lobby group. 
 
Scanlan has explicitly rejected allegations that the AALD is a “pro-American lobby 
group”53 or a “cheer squad for American foreign policy”.54 As noted in the previous 
chapter, many supporters and participants of the AALD reject the label on the basis 
                                                     
52 Tan, p. 379. 
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that the Dialogue has no specific agenda or monolithic view, and discussion is open 
to robust criticism and debate on all matters pertaining to the Australia-US 
relationship. Contrary to these claims, however, there is ample evidence to suggest 
the AALD is structured in a way to carefully frame discussion and debate within 
narrow bounds. 
 
Given the AALD is targeted to those who possess, or are likely to possess, a 
considerable degree of influence over the direction of the Australia-US relationship, 
participation is largely constrained in political terms to the two major parties. 
Consequently, criticism at the AALD is limited to that within the politically 
acceptable mainstream where it is typical to express unquestioning loyalty to the 
alliance. As Liberal MP, Andrew Robb, explains, “Often there is not a lot of 
disagreement on some of the foreign policy issues between Labor and Liberal so 
there’s often an Australian perspective [at the AALD] . . . but not always”.55 
 
Founding member Nick Greiner concurs, stating that: 
 
[To] some extent, it would be true that while [the AALD] was fiercely 
bi-partisan, where issues were bi-partisan, which in the United States 
they often are, and indeed in Australia in foreign policy they often 
are, the contingents would tend to reflect that.56  
 
While Greiner believes discussion at the AALD “was certainly wide open”, at the 
same time, dominant perspectives are rarely if ever challenged because “in many 
ways it just reflects the prevailing views in both countries in the inner circle”.57 
 
While one of the official foundational “values” of the AALD is a commitment to 
“bipartisanship”,58 the AALD appears to attract those from the right and centre-
                                                     
55 Author interview with Andrew Robb, 15 July 2011. 
56 Author interview with Nick Greiner, 6 July 2011. 
57 Author interview with Nick Greiner, 6 July 2011. 
58 Australian American Leadership Dialogue, AALD, <http://www.aald.org/australian-american-
leadership-dialogue>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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right of politics, particularly with respect to defence and foreign affairs. Carmen 
Lawrence, former premier of Western Australia and part of the left-faction of the 
Labor Party, although never invited to the Dialogue, got the distinct impression 
during her time in office that “left-wingers were typically not invited”. This is partly 
because “those from the left tended to have more domestic, social portfolios or 
opposition spokespeople positions”, whereas those in foreign affairs and defence 
were “typically from the right and very strong on the US alliance”.59 
 
When it comes to the Labor left, Nick Bolkus believes that Scanlan would probably 
“rather have them inside the tent”. However, Bolkus adds, “the broader left is 
another thing”.60 Indeed, a number of AALD delegates expressed the view that 
participation from those on the broader left would only serve to “spoil” the 
Dialogue.61 Certainly, no member of the Australian Greens has ever been invited to 
attend, even though there may be some interest to participate.62 According to AALD 
board member Richard Woolcott, “I can’t speak for Scanlan and the board but I 
think they’d generally take the view that the Greens really were a bit too far outside 
what you might call the normal Australian attitude”.63 
 
The overriding objective of the AALD is not to facilitate critical discussion and 
debate but rather to foster an environment for building and maintaining friendships 
among elites in order to preserve and strengthen the alliance. The cordial 
environment means that, whatever opportunities there may be for serious criticism 
of the Australia-US relationship and US foreign policy, participants do not take it 
very often. According to journalist Peter Hartcher, “Many years, people are far too 
polite”.64 Even on those occasions when participants do hold seriously critical 
                                                     
59 Author interview with Carmen Lawrence, 14 November 2011. 
60 Author interview with Nick Bolkus, 6 September 2011. 
61 Author interview with Nick Bolus. David Kemp speculated that Scanlan would be unlikely to invite 
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opinions, Hugh White argues “the blush of good companionship at the Dialogue 
means they’re reluctant” to express them.65 
 
Vice-President of the Liberal Party, Tom Harley, feels that “everyone is terribly 
polite to each other [at the AALD]. It’s all a kind of group hug . . . There isn’t a 
diversity of views . . . It’s all about getting on which means agreement”. Given the 
notable absence of those who are constructively critical of US foreign policy, the 
discussion “between Australia and the US [is] almost slavish”, Harley adds.66 Former 
chairman of the American board of the AALD, Alan Dunn, naturally disagrees with 
the idea that Australians are “slavish” to the US point of view. Nonetheless, he 
concedes their criticism is “soft”. The Australians are, in his words, “sensitive 
hosts”.67 
 
While he would not describe it as a “cheer squad”, Glenn Milne, a columnist for The 
Australian, concedes that “you’re not there as a critic”. Particularly when it comes 
to international and geostrategic concerns, the main function of the AALD is 
innovative information exchange. Milne claims, “I don’t think that precludes 
criticism or questioning but it’s not really what you’re there for. You’re there to get 
a deeper understanding of policy direction in Washington mostly”.68 
 
A number of participants share this view that it is misplaced to assume the AALD is a 
forum for critical debate. As one former Labor MP and AALD participant explains: 
 
I would have been surprised if there was serious criticism of Australia 
or America at the Dialogue . . . I don’t think anyone’s said it’s an 
independent and objective look at American or Australian politics. To 
view it as something where there should be an independent critique 
of American defence plans in Iraq or whatever misses the point . . . It 
is of likeminded people. Sort of the US faction, if you like . . . It’s to 
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68 Author interview with Glenn Milne, 9 November 2011. 
CHAPTER SIX 
158 
 
promote the positive aspects of it not for us to critique their world 
view.69 
 
Peter Hartcher, a long-time AALD participant, states that while there have been 
“junctures” in which “very real disagreement and very robust exchange” has 
occurred, “radicals or opponents or critics probably don’t get invited to join. I 
haven’t noticed any turning up”. Nevertheless, Hartcher hastens to add, it is not 
valid to criticise the AALD for excluding critics because the objective of the Dialogue 
“is not to have robust discussion and debate about whether we should have an 
alliance. It’s to have robust discussion and debate about how to make the alliance 
work better and work in the national interest”.70 
 
Accordingly, the claim that the AALD facilitates robust and critical debate comes 
with an important qualification. As former head of the AWU, Paul Howes, argues, 
while the AALD is “one of those forums where you’re encouraged to challenge the 
orthodoxy and speak your mind freely without retribution”, at the same time, “It’s 
not a forum for critiques of the US relationship; for being an anti-American forum. 
There are plenty of those forums. It’s called the United Nations”.71 
 
In a similar vein, Professor Andrew MacIntyre, who assumed a position on the 
Australian board of the AALD in December 2009, does not share the 
characterisation of the Dialogue as a “cheer squad” for the alliance and American 
foreign policy. “My experience of it is there’s been some of the hardest questioning 
. . . that I’ve witnessed anywhere”, at least between “people who really knew what 
they were talking about and whose opinions were significant”. There are limits to 
the range of opinion, MacIntyre concedes, with most delegates believing that both 
Australia and the US are “force[s] for good in the world”. Yet “within that range, you 
get vigorous debate”.72 
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Certainly, as Hartcher points out, given the AALD is a “private exercise in second 
track diplomacy” and not a “tax payer funded public institution”, there is no 
“responsibility to invite the full spectrum of views”.73 Nevertheless, the dangers of 
repudiating a questioning or critical agenda ought to be apparent. As Carmen 
Lawrence notes, by facilitating such an environment: 
 
You create an echo chamber and you hear people saying what 
confirms your existing views and prejudices. You don’t get to hear 
other voices that might question the conclusions you’ve reached. In 
the case of the US-Australia alliance . . . that’s led to some pretty 
bloody outcomes.74 
 
Indeed, some former participants of the AALD feel that because it is something of a 
“cheer squad” for the alliance, there was not a lot of opposition before the invasion 
of Iraq.75  
 
More recently, the AALD has been criticised for failing to raise important but 
difficult questions regarding the Australia-US alliance in the face of changing power 
relations in the Asia-Pacific. When asked how the AALD might respond to his 
opinion of late that US primacy may be bad for regional stability, White says “I can 
answer . . . very plainly. I don’t think it would go down at all well which probably 
explains why I haven’t been invited for quite a long time”. The dynamics of the 
Dialogue over the last decade in particular, White goes on to say, have resulted in 
an effort to “conceal, perhaps even to evade, rather than to identify and address” 
                                                                                                                                                      
Indonesia. Although today, MacIntyre states, he “find[s] the resources” himself to attend. 
Incidentally, MacIntyre is considered to have been a part of the “Jakarta lobby”. He was a fierce 
defender of the record of achievements of the New Order regime when he was first invited to attend 
the AALD, depicting President Suharto as a great leader who brought stability to Indonesia. See, for 
example, Jamie Mackie and Andrew MacIntyre, “Politics” in Hal Hill (ed), Indonesia’s New Order: The 
Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994. 
73 Author interview with Peter Hartcher, 29 October 2011. 
74 Author interview with Carmen Lawrence, 14 November 2011. 
75 Flitton, Man Of Many Words; Brian Toohey, The Dialogue Box, Australian Financial Review, 24 
April 2008. 
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the core questions facing the Australia-US relationship. “For that reason”, White 
concludes, “I think the Dialogue ends up being bad for the alliance”.76 
 
White’s status as a prominent thinker who has departed from the status quo 
regarding the utility of the Australia-US alliance and US primacy in the Asia-Pacific 
has raised significant controversy in elite circles in Australia and the US.77 Noted 
foreign policy commentator and long-time AALD participant, Greg Sheridan, 
instantly denounced White’s thesis on the alliance and the rise of China as 
“distorted”, “stupid”, “weird” and “positively insane”.78 In one instance, White’s 
name was scrubbed from the invitation list of a prestigious gathering of American 
and Australian elites on account of his “sin” of leading the public debate in Australia 
“in a direction the superpower didn’t like”.79 
 
In the case of the AALD, Lipski states that he does not “ever recall a conversation 
with anybody that I overheard in which the conversation went along the lines of we 
can’t have [Hugh White]”. Although Lipski doesn’t discount the possibility entirely: 
“I never remember a conversation where either Phil . . . but maybe he did. Phil’s not 
a child. He’s a seasoned political operator and maybe . . . Ask him. Ask him 
directly”.80 Another former board member was equally ambiguous: “He [Hugh 
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White] could be right” about being dropped off the list. “Who would know? 
Because there isn’t a way to test it”.81 
 
Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb is also of the view that the AALD sidelines dissenting 
views. The central problem of the Dialogue, according to Dibb, is that Scanlan does 
not tolerate even mild criticism: 
 
In my experience . . . if you make even the slightest of criticisms of 
the United States you’re not invited again. That’s not just my 
experience . . . my colleague Hugh White . . . he would have the same 
view. As would former secretaries of defence and chiefs of defence 
force who I know have been to those occasions and would agree you 
have to watch what you say. Frankly, I think that is unacceptable. It is 
a serious problem of an effectively one-man band who determines 
who will be invited and who won’t and who doesn’t tolerate 
criticism.82 
 
In Dibb’s eyes, the claim by some supporters of the AALD that it holds no particular 
agenda for how the Australia-US relationship ought to evolve is “bullshit”. In his 
experience, “That’s not the way it feels to be there. It is all carefully orchestrated. It 
is all carefully controlled. It is not an open and frank Dialogue. The good part of it is 
proselytising”. While Dibb believes the US alliance is the “most important single 
security relationship we have by a huge margin”, and that Australia receives 
“enormous benefits from the alliance”, the problem he has with the Dialogue “is 
the way in which this exclusive club is run as a non-critical shop”.83 
 
Of course, the AALD has many supporters who deny these criticisms. Former board 
member, Stephen Loosley, for example, maintains that “The Dialogue is concerned 
with keeping the relationship with the Americans very healthy, contemporary and 
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strong. Beyond that, it doesn’t have any particular ideological or philosophical 
flavour”.84 Others are less unequivocal. When asked if the AALD sidelines dissenting 
viewpoints, Nick Greiner responded with qualified uncertainty: 
 
Well I think that’s right and I think Phil exerted . . . I mean the truth is 
Phil was the only one running it. I mean he had some help. And yes, I 
think that’s true. Would he have turned down some foreign affairs 
critic of the Iraq war if they wanted to come? You’d have to ask him. I 
don’t know. Look that’s broadly right. It’s not an open slather.85 
 
Certainly, the AALD attracts a lot of private criticism regarding the selection process 
and what is widely perceived as Scanlan’s overbearing personality and excessive 
control over the invitation list. Even among strong supporters of the AALD, there 
are numerous complaints of the Dialogue being too “top-down driven”, while 
Scanlan himself is described by various participants as a “monomaniac”, “comrade-
leader” and a “one-man band” – none willing to say so on the record. While the 
success of the AALD is, in part, widely attributed to Scanlan’s extraordinary personal 
contacts and capacity to network,86 the unfortunate consequence, according to a 
number of participants, is that the AALD is more or less a gathering of Scanlan and 
his “mates”. 87 
 
Unsurprisingly, there is an element of convergence between Scanlan’s friendship 
circle and the prevalence of orthodox alliance loyalists at the AALD. When one 
former senior Australian diplomat and AALD participant was asked if he thought the 
Dialogue was a cheer squad for American foreign policy, he responded by stating 
“there is a bit of that”. He goes onto explain: 
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If I were to guess, Scanlan would be very much of the type to not get 
people on who rocked the boat as he would see it. He sees it as a 
dialogue with people he knows; right thinking people who are in 
favour of the Australian-American relationship. Anybody who 
questions aspects of it he wouldn’t favour.88 
 
Former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans agrees, stating that during his time at the 
AALD, Scanlan had a suspicion of anyone “other than those who fell over 
themselves to demonstrate passion and affection for the US”. The “measuring stick 
applied” was “not just are you a friend of the US but are you a devotee”. 
Consequently, continues Evans, the AALD is very much a “cheer squad” and a “love-
in”, not “an environment in which it’s comfortable for people to be critical, certainly 
on any fundamental issues”.89 
 
Ostensibly, the inclusion of journalists at the AALD ensures greater critical debate is 
injected into discussions, and important revelations about the inner workings of 
Australia-US relationship are conveyed to the public. Although it is “not really 
attempting to influence public opinion”, Paul Kelly argues, by inviting media 
representatives and key opinion makers into discussions, the AALD has nonetheless 
indirectly impacted the “the media debate, coverage, analysis and commentary 
about the relationship” by making it “more intensive” and “sophisticated”.90 
 
Similarly, Fairfax journalist Peter Hartcher argues that the AALD helps to frame 
public debate surrounding the alliance, notwithstanding the strict non-disclosure 
convention of the Dialogue. Specifically, the participation of journalists is crucial for 
salvaging important disclosures that would otherwise remain private: 
  
From a journalist’s point of view there’s only one question: Is it 
better that journalists are invited and have the opportunity to try to 
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disclose some of the content or is it better that we are not? It’s my 
view that it’s better if we are invited which gives us at least the 
opportunity to bring some of that to the public and that’s exactly 
what I’ve done.91 
 
Hartcher recalls an instance during the 2011 Dialogue in Perth, when an interesting 
discussion erupted regarding clashing interests between the US and China in the 
South China Sea. “Because of the rules of the game”, Hartcher says, “I’m in the 
room on the condition that I don’t rush out and put the whole damn thing in the 
paper. So I accept the rules and all the journalists there do”. After the session was 
over, Hartcher approached the main American representative, Kurt Campbell, and 
asked him to state on the record what “the main thrust of the US’s concerns” were. 
Hartcher believes that “What I’m trying to do, and I think succeeding, is bringing 
those core concerns and arguments and difficulties that go on inside the 
relationship and inside the alliance and bringing them to the wider Australian 
public”.92 
 
While certainly important, conveying the concerns of decision makers to the public 
can come at the risk acting as a mere scribe or transmitter for official policy 
perspectives.93 In any case, the public would also benefit from greater critical 
analysis of the role of the AALD in managing Australia’s relationship with the US. 
Research conducted by the author found that of the more than 1500 news items 
published with reference to the AALD since its establishment in 1993 to December 
2015, less than a handful critically addressed its role in shaping the Australia-US 
alliance. 
 
The key journalists who are invited to participate in the AALD are generally in 
agreement with, or are unquestioning of, the alliance orthodoxy that the AALD 
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serves to protect and promote. Paul Kelly and Peter Hartcher are cases in point. 
Hartcher sees the AALD as a “national asset”,94 while Kelly characterises it as “a 
distinct and positive force for good”.95 Unsurprisingly, Kelly and Hartcher have been 
chosen by Scanlan to present an analysis of Australian politics each year to 
delegates at the AALD. 
 
Foreign editor of The Australian, and prominent alliance loyalist, Greg Sheridan, is 
the other key journalist in attendance at the AALD. In his 2006 book, The 
Partnership, which examines the Australia-US alliance during the Bush-Howard 
years, Sheridan devotes a small section to praising the successes of the AALD, 
labelling it “the most significant exercise in private diplomacy ever undertaken in 
Australian history”.96 Sheridan was the only journalist invited to attend the 
inaugural AALD event in 1993, and has been to most, if not all, events since.97  
Former AALD board member, Sam Lipski, argues that “of all the people at the 
Australian end”, Sheridan has been one of the most intimately involved Dialogue 
participants and, in some ways, is “the public chronicler of it”.98 
 
One of the few investigative articles published about the role of the AALD in 
managing Australia’s relationship with the US was written by Fairfax journalist Brian 
Toohey in 2008.99 Toohey, who has never been invited to the AALD, characterises 
the Dialogue as “basically another lobby group for boosting the US-Australia 
relationship”.100 From the perspective of the AALD, the participation of journalists 
has the advantage of subjecting them “to what are basically views all in favour of 
the alliance”. Accordingly, Toohey holds some concerns about those journalists who 
are keen to be heavily involved:  
 
                                                     
94 Author interview with Peter Hartcher, 29 October 2011. 
95 Author interview with Paul Kelly, 20 January 2012. 
96 Greg Sheridan, The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance Under Bush and 
Howard, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006, pp. 311-318, quote p. 317. 
97 As Sheridan declares in his book, “I was the only journalist at that first meeting”. Sheridan, The 
Partnership, p. 313. 
98 Author interview with Sam Lipski, 25 October 2011. 
99 Toohey, The Dialogue Box. 
100 Author interview with Brian Toohey, 28 November 2011. 
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I do find it a little bit odd that journalists want to be a member of an 
organisation as dedicated to a political goal such as strengthening 
the alliance. I would have thought if you were writing about foreign 
policy or defence you should be a little bit more neutral about these 
things. Of course, if you are writing an opinion piece you can have an 
opinion but . . . [not those journalists involved in] news analysis and 
so forth.101 
 
While Toohey acknowledges that there are benefits for journalists attending the 
AALD, he also recognises the costs: 
 
I can see why journalists want to go. It gives them an inside view of 
what’s happening. I can’t see that it’s informed many of the 
journalists who are present to be more critical about things. If 
anything, I think some of the journalists were probably misled about 
the value of going into Iraq.102 
 
In his investigative report for the Australian Financial Review, Toohey discovered 
the 2002 Dialogue event in the White House – attended by a number of high-level 
US administration officials – had the “advantage of letting Australians know a war 
was coming”. However, because of the closed nature of the meeting, no journalist 
revealed to the public what had been said. Nor did anyone query Washington’s 
wisdom of invading Iraq and deposing a secular regime. According to AALD 
participant and then Fairfax director of Corporate Affairs, Bruce Wolpe, “It was not 
really that sort of occasion - it was about presenting and listening.”103 
 
In his book, The Partnership, Sheridan mentions the private White House meeting in 
2002 where Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleeza Rice, Karl Rove and a number 
of other administration figures conducted half-hour sessions with AALD members; 
                                                     
101 Author interview with Brian Toohey, 28 November 2011. 
102 Author interview with Brian Toohey, 28 November 2011. 
103 Toohey, The Dialogue Box. 
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one after another. According to Sheridan, the sessions provided “an opportunity to 
hear American views from the top, and to express Australian views back into the 
process” in the lead-up to the Iraq war.104 He does not, however, mention the fact 
that no one from the Australian delegation spoke out against the war as reported 
by Toohey. 
 
There are clearly powerful incentives for journalists to attend the AALD. Most 
participating journalists view it as a “great gig”, in the words of former journalist 
Maxine McKew, providing the opportunity to negotiate on-the-record interviews 
with key decision makers.105 It is also “very flattering to be mingling with the people 
who are in these powerful positions”, says Fairfax journalist Hamish McDonald. 
“Some people really get off on that”.106 
 
For one instructive example of how the AALD appeals to the inflated sensibilities of 
some journalists, witness Greg Sheridan boast about his high-level connections and 
exclusive access to its “secret” discussions: 
 
I was seated opposite Dick Cheney and at right angles to Paul 
Wolfowitz, now US Vice-President and Deputy Secretary of Defence . 
. . The Dialogue lunched informally in the hotel’s little back garden. 
There I shared a table with Brent Scowcroft, who had been the elder 
George Bush’s national security adviser, and Bob Zoellick, who would 
become George W. Bush’s trade representative. At the next table 
was Karl Rove, now Bush’s most intimate adviser, and Rich Armitage, 
now the Deputy Secretary of State. I can’t tell you what was said 
because it was all off the record.107 
 
According to independent author and journalist, Antony Loewenstein, “it is obvious 
why” journalists refuse to challenge the AALD’s agenda: “Being close to top officials 
                                                     
104 Sheridan, The Partnership, p. 317. 
105 Margaret Simons, Agent of Influence, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 November 2003. 
106 Author interview with Hamish McDonald, 15 November 2011. 
107 Greg Sheridan, Power Talking, The Australian, 23 July 2003. 
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and politicians makes them feel connected and important. Being an insider is many 
reporters’ ideal position. Independence is secondary to receiving sanctioned links 
and elevated status in a globalised world”.108 
 
The reason more broadly, however, derives from the fact that support for the AALD 
flows from the wider loyalty the US alliance enjoys as an entrenched part of 
Australia’s elite political culture. Consequently, there are pressures on journalists to 
conform to the mainstream consensus about Australia’s relationship with the US, 
not least of which is the fear of being marginalised. McDonald notes that for those 
journalists who work for a mainstream newspaper, as he does: 
 
If you don’t conform you can find yourself on the outside, not getting 
access to anyone for a long time. Questioning those current 
paradigms can be a very lonely experience. You might find yourself 
not in touch with people in the institutions of power but with people 
on the fringes.109 
 
Relatedly, there are many inducements for journalists who conform – study tours, 
fellowships, grants and so forth – which can quickly vanish for those who depart 
from the status quo. As McDonald points out, “There is a lot of money for people 
who produce work that reinforces what powerful people want to hear”.110 
 
                                                     
108 Antony Loewenstein, Wikileaks Challenges Journalism-Politics Partnership, The Drum, ABC, 10 
December 2010, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-12-10/wikileaks_challenges_jounalism-
politics_partnership/42042>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
109 Author interview with Hamish McDonald, 15 November 2011. 
110 Author interview with Hamish McDonald, 15 November 2011. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Alliance Management and the Socialisation of Elites 
 
Socialisation, Cooption and Propaganda 
 
The evidence provided in Chapter Six strongly suggests that the AALD works 
assiduously to avoid entertaining perspectives outside the orthodoxy and that 
challenge the “special relationship” narrative. This chapter illustrates how the AALD  
frames discussion and debate and functions to socialise elites – inculcating 
orthodox attitudes about the alliance – by providing a number of important 
material and psychological inducements to remain committed to the status quo. 
 
In this respect, a parallel can be drawn between the AALD and public diplomacy. 
Specifically, the AALD’s socialisation function resembles that of US foreign leader 
and exchange programs which aim to coopt elites in the hope of strengthening 
America’s relationships with its closest allies. This socialisation function is a subtle 
but highly effective process that lays the groundwork for the engineering of consent 
and, in the case of the AALD, for preserving and strengthening the orthodox 
conception of the alliance in the minds of Australian elites. 
 
Part of the stated mission of the AALD is to “broaden and deepen mutual 
understanding between Australian and American leaders”.1 Otherwise known as 
socialisation, this objective is understood as an important benefit and positive 
outcome of T2 which contributes to the development of shared understandings 
between participants.2 Indeed, of all the claimed benefits of T2, “virtually all 
participants and analysts . . . cite its most important role as a socialisation 
mechanism”.3 In the context of conflict resolution and conflict management, 
                                                     
1 Australian American Leadership Dialogue, AALD, <http://www.aald.org/australian-american-
leadership-dialogue>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
2 Desmond Ball, Anthony Milner and Brendan Taylor, Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: 
Reflections and Future Directions, Asian Security, vol. 2, no. 3, 2006, pp. 180-181. 
3 Brian L. Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asian Security Order” in 
Desmond Ball and Kwa Chong Guan (eds), Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A 
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socialisation is a valuable tool for helping to reduce tensions and increase 
cooperation, including by transmitting alternative norms into the policymaking 
process.4 
 
The socialisation function of T2, however, is very different to that of the AALD which 
operates to preserve and strengthen personal relationships between two long-
standing allies and is grounded in an historical orthodox narrative of alliance. With 
this goal in mind, socialisation is not so much about developing shared 
understandings but rather inculcating orthodox attitudes about the Australia-US 
relationship. As one recent study points out: 
 
The AALD represents a distinctive kind of leadership over the long 
term to instil a common faith in the alliance among new generations 
of policy leaders. The task is consensus-building, norm construction, 
the filtering and reassemblage of ideas, and the socialisation of 
elites.5 
 
There is some acknowledgment in the literature on T2 and epistemic communities 
of the potential for participants to become “entrapped” or “coopted” by 
governments because of a fear of losing access and influence.6 However, when it 
comes to alliance management, the more important and relevant insights into the 
process of socialisation, as a conscious mechanism of cooption, can be found in the 
                                                                                                                                                      
CSCAP Reader, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra and S. 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2010, p. 
143. 
4 Ball, Milner and Taylor, Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific, p. 180-181; Dalia Dassa Kaye, 
Rethinking Track Two Diplomacy: The Middle East and South Asia, Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, no. 3, June 2005, pp. 15-42. 
5 Elena Douglas and Diane Stone, The Informal Diplomacy of the Australian American Leadership 
Dialogue, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 1, 2015, pp. 22-23. Emphasis added. 
6 Amitav Acharya, Engagement or Entrapment? Scholarship and Policymaking on Asian Regionalism, 
International Studies Review, vol. 13, 2011; Sheldon W. Simon, Evaluating Track II Approaches to 
Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: the CSCAP Experience, The Pacific Review, vol. 15, no. 2, 2002, 
p. 168. 
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international relations field of public diplomacy and, specifically, the long-standing 
and very successful American practice of foreign leader and exchange programs.7 
 
T2 and public diplomacy do share a number of characteristics. Although typically 
studied as two distinct fields, the connections between them are acknowledged in 
the literature, and practitioners often speak of both with similar goals in mind.8 
According to Cull, the fields of T2 and public diplomacy constitute overlapping 
circles, the exact boundaries between them unclear.9 The absence of a clear 
distinction between the two fields stems partly from the fact that there is no 
singular definition of public diplomacy, with much scholarly debate about its exact 
meaning and function.10 In its simplest and arguably most common interpretation, 
public diplomacy is defined as “an international actor’s attempt to conduct its 
foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics”.11  
 
Typically, public diplomacy consists of one-directional information campaigns 
distributed to mass audiences via news, film, TV and radio broadcasts. It also 
commonly includes bidirectional activities such as education and cultural exchanges 
and foreign leader visitor programs that ostensibly operate on the basis of a 
                                                     
7 Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power” or “getting others to want the outcomes that you want” is 
also relevant for articulating the function of socialisation in alliance management. Nye identifies 
exchanges, among other public diplomacy instruments, as an example of the power of the state to 
“entice and attract” foreign governments and, especially, foreign publics. Joseph S. Nye, Public 
Diplomacy and Soft Power, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 616, 
March 2008, p. 95. Also see Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New 
York: Public Affairs, 2004. 
8 See, for example, Gareth Evans, Australia and Asia: The Role of Public Diplomacy, address to the 
Australia-Asia Association, Melbourne, 15 March 1990, <http://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/
1990/150390_fm_australiaandasia.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
9 Nicholas J. Cull, “Introduction” in Joseph J. Popiolkowski and Nicholas J. Cull (eds), Public 
Diplomacy, Cultural Interventions & the Peace Process in Northern Ireland: Track Two to Peace?, USC 
Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School, University of Southern California, Los Angeles: 
Figueroa Press, 2009, p. 2. 
10 In some cases, public diplomacy is restricted to government engagement with foreign publics. See 
Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and 
Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Others extend the term 
to include non-state actors. See Bruce Gregory, Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field, 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 616, March 2008, p. 276. Others 
extend it further still to include business communication or public relations. See Benno H. Signitzer 
and Timothy Coombs, Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Convergences, Public 
Relations Review, vol. 18, no. 2, 1992. 
11 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, p. xv. 
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reciprocal exchange of ideas and information or “mutual understanding”.12 It is 
these kinds of bidirectional activities, sometimes referred to as “dialogue-based 
public diplomacy”,13 that are most often categorised as a subset of T2. Indeed, 
when the original term “track two diplomacy” was coined by Montville, “scientific 
and cultural exchanges” were included as examples.14 
 
While the focus of T2 is typically conflict resolution and conflict management, the 
primary objective of foreign leader and exchange programs is almost exclusively on 
alliance management and the preservation and strengthening of existing 
relationships. America’s premier International Visitor Leader Program (IVLP)15 has 
been extraordinarily successful in solidifying support for American foreign policy 
objectives among US allies. In his landmark study of the IVLP, Scott-Smith 
demonstrates that the program had its greatest impact in binding European states 
to the American transatlantic alliance during the Cold War.16 
 
The primary target audiences of foreign leader and exchange programs are foreign 
elites and what is referred to as the “successor generation” of up-and-coming 
leaders. The IVLP alone attracts more than 5000 international visitors annually and 
has engaged more than 200 000 people since its establishment in 1940, including 
over 330 current or former Chiefs of State or Heads of Government. Notable 
                                                     
12 The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, which provided the legislative authority for the Fulbright Program 
and other exchange and leader programs in the US, declared that the purpose of these activities was 
“to enable the Government of the United States to increase mutual understanding between the 
people of the United States and the people of other countries . . . and thus to assist in the 
development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations, between the United States and other 
countries of the world”. Officially the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. Cited in 
Nancy Snow, Propaganda, Inc. Selling America’s Culture to the World, 3rd edition, New York: Seven 
Stories Press, 2010, p.88. 
13 Shaun Riordan, Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm?, Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, no. 95, November 
2004, <http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20041100_cli_paper_dip_issue95.pdf>, 
accessed 5 April 2016; Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, Moving from Monologue to Dialogue 
to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy, Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, vol. 616, March 2008, pp. 10-30. 
14 William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville, Foreign Policy According to Freud, Foreign Policy, no. 
45, winter, 1981-82, p. 155. Also see Kaye, Rethinking Track Two Diplomacy, pp. 5-6. 
15 Prior to 2004, the IVLP was known as the International Visitor Program (IVP). 
16 Giles Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire: The US State Department’s Foreign Leader Program in the 
Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950-70, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2008. 
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Australian participants include Tony Abbott, Julia Gillard, Quentin Brice, Paul 
Keating, William Hayden, Malcolm Fraser and Gough Whitlam.17 
 
Significantly, the same fear arising from the passing of the WWII generation of 
leaders in Australia and America that drove Scanlan to create the AALD also drove 
US foreign leader and exchange programs to focus more on the successor 
generation of leaders in Western Europe. As a former US Public Affairs Counsellor 
explains in relation to US-German relations: 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, both Americans and Germans 
concerned with US-German relations began to recognise a problem 
posed by the gradual passing from positions of power and influence 
of a generation of Germans and Americans, many of whom had 
formed a network of human relationships linking the two nations 
since World War II . . . The generation taking their places had no 
similar formative experiences . . . This gap of knowledge and 
understanding was perceived as posing a danger to the future 
cohesion of the German-American relationship.18 
 
Although exchange programs are predicated on mutual understanding, their 
approach to socialising elites is more akin to cooption. While socialisation can 
consist of a mutual transference or two-way exchange of ideas, values and norms, 
as Ikenberry and Kupchan point out, when relating to a hegemonic power, 
socialisation can also result in a “process through which national leaders internalise 
the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon” and which are 
                                                     
17 US Department of State, International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), US Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, <http://eca.state.gov/ivlp>, accessed 5 April 2016. Although Tony Abbott’s 
name is not mentioned on the IVLP website, elsewhere Abbott has revealed “It was the US 
Information Agency that organised my first trip to America as a member of parliament”, apparently 
in 1995. See Tony Abbott, the Australia-US Alliance and Leadership in the Asia-Pacific, address to the 
Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C., 18 July 2012, <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/
2012/11/the-australiaus-alliance-and-leadership-in-the-asiapacific>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
18 Giles Scott-Smith, Searching for the Successor Generation: Public Diplomacy, the US Embassy’s 
International Visitor Program and the Labour Party in the 1980s, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, vol. 8, 2006, pp. 223-224. 
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consistent with its notion of international order. One of the mechanisms by which 
this occurs is “normative persuasion”. That is, where norms are transferred and 
subsequently internalised through various forms of direct contact with elites in a 
target state. Ikenberry and Kupchan identify diplomatic channels, cultural 
exchanges and foreign study as instruments of normative persuasion.19 
 
Scott-Smith details the specifics of the socialisation process employed by the IVLP to 
bond US allies to American hegemony, describing how the program entices 
participants to voluntarily accept a pre-laid pathway via the provision of a number 
of psychological and material inducements. These include bestowing a sense of self-
importance; facilitating personal affinities giving the impression everyone is on the 
same side; providing access to the corridors of power and assisting in the 
development of high-level contacts which create opportunities for career 
enhancement.20 
 
As a result, participants are left with a taste of the benefits they can reap by 
assuming an attitude consistent with the interests of the hegemon and in 
accordance with their own personal interests and beliefs. As a voluntary and 
participatory form of persuasion, Scott-Smith describes the IVLP as engaged not so 
much in the “engineering of consent than the creation of circumstances for its 
realisation, and it is often highly effective”.21 
 
There is a long-standing debate about whether or not public diplomacy equates to 
propaganda, with attempts to distinguish the so-called “white” or truthful 
propaganda activities of official public diplomacy with the more deceitful “grey” and 
“black” varieties.22 In practice, however, public diplomacy has frequently been used 
as a euphemism for propaganda. The USIA, the premier public relations agency of 
the US, until its demise in 1999, worked closely with the CIA on numerous covert 
                                                     
19 John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, Socialisation and Hegemonic Power, International 
Organisation, vol. 44, no. 3, summer 1990, pp. 289-90. 
20 Scott-Smith, Searching for the Successor Generation. 
21 Scott-Smith, p. 233. 
22 David W. Guth, Black, White, and Shades of Gray: The Sixty-Year Debate Over Propaganda versus 
Public Diplomacy, Journal of Promotion Management, vol. 13, 2008. 
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warfare operations throughout the Cold War;23 thereafter morphing from an anti-
Communist outfit into an instrument of corporate propaganda.24 
 
Even the so-called non-propagandistic subset of US foreign leader and exchange 
programs have been subjected to politicisation. In an apparent attempt to secure 
their independence, exchange programs were made administratively separate from 
the USIA when it was first established in 1953. Senator James William Fulbright in 
particular worked hard to ensure the program which bore his name remained a part 
of the US State Department, which it did until 1978, never to be conducted as 
propaganda. He believed “the value of such exchanges was in the opportunity for 
expansion of knowledge, wisdom, and empathy”.25 His efforts, however, were not 
entirely successful, with both the Fulbright Program and the IVLP explicitly 
connected to US foreign policy objectives, including as a means to secure troops for 
America’s war against Vietnam.26 
 
Although not propaganda per se, the main techniques that lie behind US foreign 
leader and exchange programs today derive from research into propaganda and 
psychological warfare studies in the post-WWI and early post-WWII eras. In 
particular, it was the idea of targeting elites and opinion makers, that originated in 
the work of Walter Lippmann, Edward Bernays and Harold D. Lasswell, and 
subsequently revolutionised by social psychologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld, that laid the 
basis of all future US information campaigns, including education and cultural 
exchanges. Further research and subsequent practice into the political effectiveness 
                                                     
23 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency. A sample of the USIA’s more 
nefarious covert propaganda activities include participation in the US counterinsurgency campaign in 
the Philippines in the 1950s, the overthrow of Mohammad Mosadegh in Iran and Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzman in Guatemala in 1953, the US invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the US 
invasion of Grenada in 1983. 
24 Snow, Propaganda, Inc. 
25 Nancy Snow, International Exchanges and the US Image, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 616, no. 1, 2008, p. 209. 
26 Giles Scott-Smith, Mapping the Undefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Exchange 
Programs within International Relations Theory, Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, vol. 616, March 2008, p. 181. In Australia too, the Fulbright Program came under 
significant pressure to reinforce US government foreign policy goals, and was possibly subjected to 
CIA penetration. Alice Garner and Diane Kirkby, “Never a Machine for Propaganda?” The Australian-
American Fulbright Program and Australia's Cold War, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 44, no. 1, 
2013, pp. 117-133. 
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of exchanges revealed that they were most effective, not in converting critics, but in 
solidifying the opinions of those who already held positive predispositions toward 
the US. 
 
Lippmann’s keystone texts, Public Opinion (1922)27 and The Phantom Public 
(1925),28 were both largely based on his wartime propaganda experiences with the 
Committee on Public Information (CPI), the organisation responsible for all aspects 
of American propaganda at home and abroad during WWI. Lippmann’s key 
contribution was his theory that public opinion could be controlled through the 
manipulation of symbols implanted into the public mind by those recognised in 
society to be authoritative figures.29 Lippmann’s work was reinforced by Edward 
Bernays, the so-called “Father of Public Relations”, who argued in his seminal work 
on propaganda in 1928 that “If you can influence the leaders, either with or without 
their conscious cooperation, you automatically influence the group which they 
sway”.30 
 
Like Lippmann, Lasswell viewed propaganda as the “control of opinion by significant 
symbols”.31 The focus of his dissertation was on the practice of propaganda during 
WWI. Lasswell aimed to uncover the techniques of American, British, French and 
German wartime propaganda, not only in demoralising and mobilising hate against 
the enemy, but also preserving the friendship of allies and neutrals. It was his 
revelations on the latter that provided the crucial insight into the importance of 
personal interaction in shaping the minds of elites.  
 
In concluding his assessment on the use of inter-allied propaganda, Lasswell 
discerned that “among all the means to be exploited, the use of personal 
                                                     
27 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, New York: The Free Press, 1922. 
28 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925. 
29 According to Lippmann, authoritative individuals who possessed the power to give meaning and 
importance to such symbols; chosen “by birth, inheritance, conquest or election, they and their 
organised following administer human affairs”. Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 144. 
30 Edward Bernays, Propaganda, Brooklyn: IG Publishing, 2005 [1928], p. 73. 
31 Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 
& Co. LTD, 1927, p. 9. 
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influencing is peculiarly important”.32 This was particularly true when it came to 
London’s propaganda efforts aimed at drawing the US into WWI. Rather than 
preaching entrance into the war directly, the British established myriad associations 
with influential and eminent Americans. As Lasswell describes it:  
 
Behind the scenes, and behind the news and pictures and speeches, 
there flows a mighty stream of personal influencing. The war was 
more debated in private than public. The doubters were won by 
friendship or flattery, logic or shame, to fuse their enthusiasm in the 
rising wave of Allied sentiment.33 
 
Lasswell characterises these institutionalised personal connections as “the social 
lobby”, where the “personal conversation, and the casual brush . . . forged the 
strongest chain between America and Britain”. The power of the social lobby came 
from “The sheer radiation of aristocratic distinction [which] was enough to warm 
the cockles of many a staunch Republican heart, and to evoke enthusiasm for the 
country which could produce such dignity, elegance and affability”.34 Lasswell was 
describing what the British referred to as “duchessing” as a subtle but effective 
means of propaganda.35 
 
Although Lippmann, Bernays and Lasswell made important contributions, it was the 
founder and director of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Colombia 
University, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, who revolutionised the importance of personal 
influence in mass communication.36 While the conventional wisdom held that 
                                                     
32 Lasswell, p. 160. 
33 Lasswell, p. 157. 
34 Laswell, p. 157. 
35 George Orwell later famously described duchessing in relation to British MPs “who get patted on 
the back by dukes and are lost forever more”. Quoted in Simon Leys, The Intimate Orwell, The New 
York Review of Books, 26 May 2011, 
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/may/26/intimate-orwell/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
36 On the revolutionary nature of Lazarsfeld’s work in communications studies, see the collection of 
articles in Politics, Social Networks, and the History of Mass Communications Research: Rereading 
Personal Influence, special edition of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, vol. 608, November 2006. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
178 
 
media messages influenced the public directly,37 Lazarsfeld hypothesised a “two-
step flow of communication” whereby “opinion leaders” mediated the information 
that came from the mass media. His findings were first published in 1944, in the 
book, The People’s Choice,38 and updated after further research in his landmark 
study with Elihu Katz in 1955, Personal Influence.39 
 
The development of the personal influence or two-step model had a profound 
impact on the practice of public diplomacy. The concept suggested that the key to 
any information campaign required the successful targeting of local opinion leaders 
who could serve as the principle channels of influence to the public and provide a 
multiplier effect into their specific social and professional networks. These and 
other similar state-of-the-art techniques were all introduced into official American 
public diplomacy efforts, including foreign leader and exchange programs.40 
 
One of the most important discoveries to emerge from behaviourist socio-scientific 
research on the political effectiveness of foreign leader and exchange programs in 
securing American foreign policy objectives during the 1950s was their utility in 
alliance management. Specifically, it was revealed that “instead of converting critics 
or opponents to a different way of thinking, the most value came from reinforcing 
existing perceptions”. The greatest success was realised in exchanges whose 
“conviction, motivation, and capacity to act in accordance with the viewpoint 
fostered by the program were intensified by the exchange experience”.41 
 
                                                     
37 The dominant theory of mass communication at the time was the Hypodermic Needle Model or 
“magic bullet” theory which suggested that media messages were “injected” or “shot” straight into a 
passive audience.  
38 Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People’s Choice: How the Voter Makes Up 
His Mind in a Presidential Campaign, New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. 
39 Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass 
Communications, New York: The Free Press, 1955.  
40 Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare 
1945-1960, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 72-73; Scott-Smith, Mapping the Undefinable, 
p. 177. 
41 Scott-Smith, p. 179. Emphasis in original. 
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Although US exchanges have at times been employed to convert hostile 
participants,42 the early research, and subsequent practice, made it clear that in 
international relations, “exchanges are primarily a potent weapon for sustaining the 
status quo rather than changing it”, and are most successful “if a certain level of 
curiosity about cultural affinity with the host country already exists”.43 While 
participants may not become “converts”, nonetheless, a “reorientation in outlook 
takes place that is all the more subtle, cohesive, and defensible because it is partly 
driven by individual interests”.44  
 
Although conventionally portrayed as a product of civilian research, the evolution of 
the “personal influence” concept from its germination in 1944 to its maturation in 
the 1950s – and the general development of the area of mass communications 
studies – grew largely out of US government and military funded research into 
propaganda.45 Innovations such as the “opinion leader” phenomena, although 
labelled communications research, could just as easily be categorised as 
psychological warfare studies. As one leading scholar of communications studies 
points out, “Either description is accurate; the distinction between the two is that 
the former term tends to downplay the social context that gave birth to the work in 
the first place”.46 
 
Deepening Support for the Status Quo 
 
Like US foreign leader and exchange programs, the central function of the AALD is 
alliance management through socialisation. The founding objective of the Dialogue 
was to preserve the strong and intimate relationship between Australia and the US, 
inculcating the next generation of elites with a common faith in the “special 
relationship”. 
                                                     
42 Snow writes that during her time working with the IVLP in the mid-1990s most participants had a 
predisposition to support the US, although some were specifically chosen for their strong anti-
American feelings. Snow, Propaganda, Inc, p. 96. 
43 Scott-Smith, Mapping the Undefinable, p. 180. 
44 Scott-Smith, p. 182. 
45 Simpson, Science of Coercion, pp. 52-53, 72-74. 
46 Simpson, p. 71. 
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Critics, commenting from the outside, have speculated that Americans use the 
AALD to socialise or “duchess” Australian leaders into believing American interests 
and values are always the same as Australian ones.47 While this certainly occurs, it is 
also important to note that the AALD is first and foremost an Australian-driven 
exercise. The result is the rather peculiar situation whereby a group of pro-
American Australians facilitate the socialisation of other Australians into acquiescing 
or reinforcing American hegemonic interests. 
 
According to founding AALD participant and former Liberal MP, David Kemp, it 
should not be surprising that the Dialogue functions to deepen support for the 
alliance among less enthusiastic or even hostile participants. Kemp believes there is 
a conscious and targeted effort on the part of the AALD to coopt the anti-American 
elements in Australian politics. Scanlan, he argues: 
 
[Captured] in the Dialogue, the very strong pro-Americans and 
immersed in their company the people who’ve got a less intuitive 
liking for the United States. He’s provided a forum through which the 
[pro-]Americans can duchess the anti-Americans and show them 
they’re not so bad after all. It’s been highly successful.48 
 
Moreover, Kemp argues, there exists a kind of hidden objective of the AALD to 
target the left-faction of the Labor Party: 
 
In a way, if the Dialogue was more focussed on the Labor Party that’s 
probably one of its main jobs. I suspect Phil wouldn’t articulate that. 
He might. But to concede the work of the Dialogue is more directed 
                                                     
47 Scott Burchill, Gillard’s Fawning Over Obama a Bad Start on Diplomatic Front, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 30 June 2010, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/gillards-fawning-
over-obama-a-bad-start-on-diplomatic-front-20100629-zj3h.html>, accessed 5 April 2016; David Day, 
Bowing to Duchess Diplomacy, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 June 2012, <http://www.smh.com.au/
federal-politics/political-opinion/bowing-to-duchess-diplomacy-20120607-1zysh.html>, accessed 5 
April 2016; Alan Ramsey, The Sermon Bush Wants to Hear, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 2004, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/06/11/1086749896060.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
48 Author interview with David Kemp, 31 August 2011. 
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to the Labor Party than it is to the Liberals is quite a big concession. 
And I don’t think there would ever be an official concession to that 
effect.49 
 
While he doesn’t characterise it as the result of conscious intent, Andrew Robb also 
identifies the “somewhat anti-American” component of the Labor Party as one 
where the AALD has played an important role in helping to remind participants of 
the value of Australia-US relationship. Commenting specifically on former Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard’s public emergence as an ardent supporter of the US alliance, 
Robb argues that, while he “wouldn’t just put it down to the Dialogue . . . it was 
certainly a significant contributor”.50 
 
Despite these observations, it is highly unlikely that the AALD functions to convert 
“anti-American” critics. As already noted, serious critics of the AALD are not invited 
to participate, so there are none to convert. In the words of journalist and long-time 
AALD participant, Peter Hartcher, “I can’t think of critics that have been brought in 
and converted . . . I don’t think critics are invited . . . I just don’t know that it works 
like that. Maybe they’d like it to but I just don’t think it’s had that effect”.51 
 
The same can be said of mild critics of Australia’s relationship with the US, 
specifically those in the left-faction of the Labor Party, primarily because they also 
do not attend the AALD. Their absence is not proof of a specific exclusion policy, but 
rather more likely due to the fact that those in the Labor Party who inhabit defence 
and foreign affairs positions are generally from the pro-American right faction. As 
journalist and AALD participant Glenn Milne points out, “the aim of the Dialogue is 
to pick future leaders which means, by the nature of ALP internal politics, broadly 
disqualifies most of the left”.52 
 
                                                     
49 Kemp qualifies his remarks by stating, “In any case, that is just a point of view I am expressing, not 
something I have ever gleaned from Dialogue organisers or from Phil”. Author interview with David 
Kemp, 31 August 2011. 
50 Author interview with Andrew Robb, 15 July 2011. 
51 Author interview with Peter Hartcher, 29 October 2011. 
52 Author interview with Glenn Milne, 9 November 2011. 
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To some extent, the AALD does “preach to the converted”, in the words of one 
former Labor MP and Dialogue participant, “The people who go are the ones who 
are very interested in the relationship anyway. There is an element of it being self-
serving to that extent”.53 Nevertheless, it would be wrong to dismiss the impact of 
the AALD entirely on account of this fact, as some critics appear to do. Professor 
Hugh White, for example, although critical of the role the AALD plays in managing 
Australia’s relationship with the US, believes that the lack of diverse opinion among 
participants should not be taken too seriously:  
 
It’s just a group of people who are getting together to have a chat. 
It’s perfectly reasonable they should choose people they want to talk 
to. All of us are a bit inclined to prefer to talk to people whom we 
agree with. In a sense it misses the point and kind of buys the 
Dialogue’s own puffery to think there’s some requirement that it be 
representative.54 
 
White’s indifference to the lack of diversity at the AALD is premised on the 
assumption that it has no real influence in directing the course of the relationship. 
He claims, “If I thought that it had a significant impact on the management of the 
relationship I’d take a different view, but I don’t, so I don’t worry about it”.55 
 
Certainly, there is no evidence to suggest the AALD has a transformative impact on 
the nature or direction of the Australia-US relationship. The most one could say is 
that some participants are prodded into taking further steps in a trajectory they 
were already on. While it may be “subtle”, a former Labor MP explains, the AALD 
“does nudge you a little bit in that [pro-American] direction if you’re not already 
there”.56 When asked if he believed the AALD was useful in encouraging those who 
may be less enthusiastic about the US alliance to “come over”, Richard Woolcott, 
                                                     
53 Author interview with participant who chose to remain anonymous. 
54 Author interview with Professor Hugh White, 2 September 2011. 
55 Author interview with Professor Hugh White, 2 September 2011. 
56 Author interview with participant who chose to remain anonymous. 
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while careful not to exaggerate its influence, replied, “Yes I think so. Particularly 
people who haven’t been deeply involved in foreign policy”.57 
 
At the very least, many participants attest to the fact that their views have been 
consolidated by the AALD. The remarks by Liberal MP, Kelly O’Dwyer, are typical in 
this regard when she states that “through the discussions that we had there, my 
views have become even more solid on just how important that relationship is. 
Although it did start from a very high base”.58 This experience is not universal. 
Former Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, concedes that the AALD might hold 
the potential for shaping participants’ perceptions or opening their minds to the US. 
However, “it didn’t have that effect on me”, Downer adds, “but I knew a lot about 
America before I ever went to the Dialogue”.59 
 
Contrary to those who dismiss the relevance of the AALD, it does have a real impact 
in managing Australia’s relationship with the US, primarily by reinforcing existing 
perceptions among current elites and reproducing alliance orthodoxies in the minds 
of the “successor generation”. As demonstrated below, the AALD achieves this by 
providing many of the same material and psychological inducements that have 
proven so successful in American foreign leader and exchange programs to socialise 
participants and bind them to the US hegemonic system. 
 
Socialisation and the Successor Generation 
 
One of the primary mechanisms for socialisation identified in foreign leader and 
exchange programs is the sense of self-importance bestowed upon participants 
simply for being invited into an elite and prestigious program. While the AALD 
certainly has its critics, it too is generally held in high-esteem in elite circles. 
Australians who participate in the AALD, says Kemp, “don’t just say, oh well it was 
                                                     
57 Author interview with Richard Woolcott, 22 March 2011. 
58 Author interview with Kelly O’Dwyer, 21 October 2011. 
59 Author interview with Alexander Downer, 14 September 2011. 
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good. They say it was fantastic; magnificent; irreplaceable”.60 Consequently, Paul 
Howes adds, “it’s the type of thing you don’t say no to”.61  
 
According to current board member, Andrew MacIntyre, “demand exceeds 
supply”.62 Stephen Loosley, founding member of the AALD and board member from 
1999-2010, confirms that:  
 
[The] Dialogue always has far more applications for delegate status 
than we’re able to accommodate from very senior people. When 
you’ve got a queue of people knocking at the door to be involved, 
that’s the best test of how relevant and significant the organisation is 
perceived to be or actually happens to be.63 
 
The potential to be overcome by the sheer stature of the event has been duly 
noted. Although not a participant herself, former premier of Western Australia, 
Carmen Lawrence, states that during her time as a politician, “I certainly remember 
that a lot of comments made suggested to me that [Dialogue participants] felt this 
was a really a big treat”.64 More tellingly, a former senior Australian diplomat and 
AALD participant observes: 
 
[By] being invited Australians feel a bit privileged. Being let into the 
inner sanctum and hearing for a couple of days a group of highly 
articulate and intelligent Americans captures them. And they do 
become very pro-American. But I don’t think it’s a conspiracy it’s just 
the way it happens.65 
 
The impact of the AALD alone in duchessing Australian elites should not be 
exaggerated. American leaders are renowned for taking every opportunity to 
                                                     
60 Author interview with David Kemp, 31 August 2011. 
61 Author interview with Paul Howes, 5 August 2011. 
62 Author interview with Professor Andrew MacIntyre, 28 June 2011. 
63 Author interview with Stephen Loosley, 11 January 2012. 
64 Author interview with Carmen Lawrence, 14 November 2011. 
65 Author interview with participant who chose to remain anonymous. 
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promulgate the notion of America’s “special relationship” with Australia and do so 
in a number of different forums. Nevertheless, the effect of the AALD is far from 
incidental, particularly for those who are not used to witnessing American power 
first hand. As Sam Lipski notes: 
 
You come [to the AALD in Washington] and it’s big. It’s the State 
Department. It’s the centre of world power. The Americans do things 
in impressive ways. There’s no question that the Washington end of 
the Dialogue for Australian participants, the Rudds and the Julias of 
this world being examples . . . it’s heavy stuff.66 
 
One former ALP parliamentarian, who was a relatively junior person at the time of 
his first and only AALD event, recalls that: 
 
[As a] political figure you like to be at the centre of the action so to 
speak. Even if that’s a bit of an unconscious sort of thing. Because of 
the long period the Dialogue’s been around, that it’s established, 
that it’s well reputed amongst high officials, I think attendance at 
that and being part of that does add to your positive view of the 
alliance . . . Everyone who goes basks in the glory of it. I don’t mean it 
literally like that. Everyone who goes there I noticed felt like I’m at 
the Australia-US Dialogue. It had a degree of cachet in attending . . . I 
think that adds a lot to what people feel about the alliance and so 
on.67 
 
In the ALP generally, according Mark Latham, receiving an invitation to attend the 
AALD is considered to be a necessary ticket for rising through party ranks:  
 
Sometimes there is a feeling in politics that you want to belong. 
People coming through the ranks might think [sic] oh I’ve made it 
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67 Author interview with participant who chose to remain anonymous. 
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now that I’ve been invited to this club. When I first became a Shadow 
Minister in 1996, shortly thereafter, people like Gareth Evans, Kim 
Beazley, Arch Bevis and few others were being whisked off to 
Washington for a big conference and there were high expectations 
about it beforehand. Then you wonder, [sic] gee, what do I have to 
do to be invited to that level of seniority in the system? . . . For those 
who do get lulled into it there’s that feeling of I’ve made it now. So 
it’s the peak body for this.68 
 
Although White is unperturbed by what he views as the otherwise incidental impact 
of the AALD in managing Australia’s relationship with the US, he does concede that, 
“for a young parliamentarian . . . an invitation to the Leadership Dialogue is a pretty 
hefty thing. . . this can be quite formative in developing the views of people who are 
coming into leadership positions”. Given that the AALD embodies a values-based 
conception of the alliance and refuses to confront core questions regarding its 
future utility, White acknowledges that “it does make it harder for future leaders 
thus influenced to understand the alliance effectively . . . And to that extent its 
influence has been unfortunate”.69 
 
The creation of personal affinities, and the accompanying sentiment that everyone 
is on the same side, is another important aspect of socialisation identified in US 
foreign leader and exchange programs. Similarly, one of the core functions of the 
AALD is to create a friendly atmosphere where relationship building can take place. 
The objective is to solidify the alliance by reinforcing notions of shared values and 
interests. While Australia is certainly viewed as politically and strategically 
important to America, many political participants of the AALD share the sentiments 
of this former Labor MP and Dialogue participant: 
 
Over my twenty years in parliament, state and federal, I’ve met a lot 
of US officials and citizens. I’ve always detected a strong element of 
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goodwill and friendship towards Australia which exceeds our 
importance to them in many ways, if one was strictly objective about 
it . . . [The Americans] keep coming back [to the AALD] because they 
quite like us and there are personal relationships.70 
 
Although the AALD is not responsible for creating this attitude, it certainly plays a 
part in reinforcing it. AALD participants today are almost unanimous in declaring 
that one of the major achievements of the AALD over the years has been, in Andrew 
Robb’s words, to “constantly reinforce the things we’ve got in common and the 
history of our relationship and the value of maintaining it going forward”.71 
 
Reminiscent of Lasswell’s concept of the “social lobby”, there exists a number of US 
“movers and shakers” at the AALD whose job it is to reinforce this view, persistently 
emphasising the apparent fact of America’s “special relationship” with Australia. 
Over the lifetime of the AALD, the key Americans responsible for cultivating the 
relationship in this way have been Kurt Campbell, Stanley Roth, Robert Zoellick and, 
above all, Richard Armitage. It is the business of such people, Alan Ramsey writes in 
the Sydney Morning Herald, “in changing political perceptions of Washington’s 
national interest”.72 Describing the atmosphere at the AALD, Ramsey provides his 
own interpretation of the way the “social lobby” functions: 
 
What do they do? Well, along with the American ‘participants’, they 
have dinners, get squired around the place, meet all the top people, 
and generally get schmoozed if not duchessed as they hold private 
talk-fests, among themselves and with members of the US 
Administration.73 
 
Armitage, who received an Order of Australia in 2010 for furthering the relationship 
between Australian and American defence forces and intelligence services, is 
                                                     
70 Author interview with participant who chose to remain anonymous. 
71 Author interview with Andrew Robb, 15 July 2011. 
72 Ramsey, The Sermon Bush Wants to Hear. 
73 Ramsey, The Sermon Bush Wants to Hear. 
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particularly effective in projecting the illusion that the Australia-US relationship is 
grounded in shared values forged in joint sacrifice. As one astute journalist 
observed during the 2003 AALD event, Armitage “knows how to make his pitch 
believable. He is direct, and there is enough candour and humour in it to make him 
very persuasive”.74 
 
Armitage likes to advertise the fact that his attendance at the AALD comes at his 
own expense, “not because the State Department wouldn’t send me, of course they 
would, to an important ally like Australia, but because I believe in this”.75 Many 
Australians, such as journalist Greg Sheridan, believe him at his word: “The fact 
Armitage, as Deputy Secretary of State, one of the busiest men in the world, makes 
the effort to travel to Australia to attend a private talkfest is evidence” of America’s 
commitment to Australia.76 
 
It is this kind of sentiment fostered by the AALD that Professor Hugh White finds 
particularly troubling. “It is very easy to slip into the illusion – which of course the 
Americans are always willing to project to Australians, partly for their own reasons 
— that this is a relationship that transcends interests and goes to values”.77 In the 
case of Armitage, White explains that: 
 
[He]fairly famously has often spoken of the relationship very much in 
terms of the shared blood sacrifice and all that sort of stuff. That 
what really matters is that Australians and Americans have bled 
together in every war since World War I . . . I’m not one of those who 
dismisses that sort of stuff. I just don’t think that’s the basis on which 
                                                     
74 Tim Dodd, Arise Australia, Global Leader..., Australian Financial Review, 15 August 2003. 
75 Peter Hartcher, Forum Plays A Vital Role in Healthy US-Australia Links, Australian Financial Review, 
10 August 2001. 
76 Greg Sheridan, Power Talking, The Australian, 23 July 2003. 
77 Daniel Flitton, Man of Many Words, The Age, 11 August 2007, 
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we can either judge the present value of the relationship or ensure 
its future strength.78 
 
The impact of people like Armitage, and the entire AALD enterprise, is greatest on 
those up-and-coming leaders who generally possess a positive pre-disposition 
toward the alliance but are yet to consolidate their views. This is consistent with the 
research and practice of US foreign leader and exchange programs which evolved to 
target with greater focus the “successor generation” specifically because they were 
more likely to be successfully influenced. 
 
The AALD was established, in Scanlan’s words, with the intention that it would 
become “an institution of influence over the next generation”.79 It has since 
become renowned for its uncanny ability to successfully target future leaders in 
both countries.80 Andrew Robb recalls that, in the early years, the AALD did choose 
“people who were likely to be future leaders . . . And many of the people that they 
did invite within seven or eight years were leaders. Either in opposition or in 
government”.81 
 
The drive to engage the younger generation remains crucial to the strategy of the 
AALD today. Paul Howes, no doubt a targeted future leader himself, believes that 
engaging the younger generation “probably plays more of a role than [engaging] 
current leaders. I think Phil is really driven on that because he does put a lot of 
effort on the next generation”. Reflecting on his own participation at the AALD since 
2007, Howes recalls, “When you look through the Dialogue, when you look at the 
young participants, you see five future Prime Ministers sitting there, ten future 
foreign affairs people”.82 
 
                                                     
78 Author interview with Professor Hugh White, 2 September 2011. 
79 Paul Kelly, The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia, Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Publishing, 2010, p. 163. 
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The desire to reach even further into the next generation of emerging leaders drove 
the establishment of the Young Leadership Dialogue (YLD) in 2007.83 According the 
AALD’s website, the purpose of the YLD is to “to secure the long term future of the 
AALD mission of mutual understanding between Australian and American leaders 
through a consistently flowing pipeline of young leaders”.84 John W. H. Denton, 
Partner and Chief Executive Officer of Corrs Chambers Westgrath and Dialogue 
participant, sees both the AALD and the YLD as an exercise in what he refers to as 
“succession planning”. That is, “seeking to deepen the generational succession for 
the relationship”. In that regard, the YLD has been an “important policy innovation 
in the organisation itself”.85 
 
One often quoted example of a well-targeted leader is former Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd. He is “such a striking example that the others seem to pale by comparison”, 
declares Sam Lipski.86 Paul Kelly agrees that Rudd “is a really conspicuous example” 
of how the AALD has had an influence over the next generation of leaders.87 Rudd 
was one of the initial attendees invited to participate in the first AALD event in 1993 
“long before anyone had heard of him”, Nick Greiner recalls.88 
 
As a young Queensland bureaucrat, Rudd was unfamiliar with the US and, according 
to Paul Kelly, “became educated in American ways and built his US networks 
virtually entirely from the Dialogue”.89 As Rudd has himself acknowledged, “The 
truth is, I'd never even visited the US before the first Dialogue, so concentrated an 
Asianist had I become”.90 
 
                                                     
83 Noteworthy political participants of the YLD have included Liberal MPs Jamie Briggs and Kelly 
O’Dwyer, Labor MPs Chris Bowen and Amanda Rishworth and former head of the AWU, Paul Howes. 
84 Australian American Leadership Dialogue, Young Leadership Dialogue, <http://www.aald.org/
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85 Author interview with John W. H. Denton, 15 February 2012. 
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89 Kelly, The March of Patriots, p. 163. 
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Rudd is a good example of what is perhaps the greatest single contributing factor to 
the process of socialisation; the access provided to high-level officials and all that 
entails for career advancement. Rudd used the extensive networking opportunities 
afforded by the AALD to advance his political career. As Sam Lipski notes: 
 
Everyone knows that Rudd, from the moment he smelt power in 
Washington, assiduously cultivated every link and network created 
by the Dialogue. He didn’t just cultivate, he poured water and seed 
and growth and he just couldn’t get enough of it. It became quite 
important in his growing ambition to become Prime Minister. Look at 
his relationship with [Hillary] Clinton . . . All those doors were opened 
for him by the Dialogue.91 
 
Rudd later evolved into one of Labor’s strongest supporters of the alliance and a 
committed participant at almost every AALD event since its establishment. At the 
fifteenth annual Dialogue in 2007, Rudd gave an emphatic speech about the 
importance of the US alliance, where his enthusiasm for American exceptionalism 
and US hegemony was on full display: 
 
America is an overwhelming force for good in the world. It is time we 
sang that from the worlds’ rooftops . . . let there be no retreat of 
America from the world. Let there be no retreat of America from the 
Asia-Pacific region. Let there be no retreat of America from our 
region.92 
 
Two years later, in 2009, addressing the AALD for the first time as Prime Minister, 
Rudd continued in the same vein, declaring that “US global and regional leadership” 
is something “which we, in this country, Australia, are proud to support, and we 
intend to be your partners for the future”. Rudd concluded his speech in reverence 
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of the AALD, exclaiming “I salute this Dialogue. I salute each and every one of you 
who have been participants in it”. For Rudd, and indeed his wife Therese, the 
Dialogue was more than just “an important informal network” to help strengthen 
the relationship, but also a place where American participants “have become part 
of our wider family”.93 Significantly, it was Rudd who appointed his long-time friend, 
Phillip Scanlan, to the position of Consul-General in New York in 2008. 
 
While the impact of the AALD in shaping Rudd’s thinking is impossible to measure 
precisely, the fact that it had an impact is difficult to deny. As someone who held a 
positive pre-disposition toward the US, but did not have any personal links, nor had 
visited America, the AALD opened many doors. Consequently, Rudd was able to 
forge close connections with, and make himself known to, the US political elite. The 
primary factor behind the development of Rudd’s strong relationship with the US 
was his ambition. The role of the AALD was to help facilitate the realisation of that 
ambition. The AALD socialisation mechanism was the path laid before him, with no 
obligations but plenty of benefits, as an inducement to remain committed to the 
status quo. 
 
Rudd’s experience with the AALD has parallels with that of UK Prime Ministers Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown and their experiences with the IVLP. Blair and Brown were 
ambitious young Labour MPs in the 1980s with very little connection to the US. 
Brown, like Rudd, had never been to the US, nor did he have any personal links with 
Americans prior to his experience with the IVLP. Blair was also introduced to the 
Washington elite through the IVLP when he was still relatively unknown in US 
circles. The experience had a profound impact on the belief systems of both men 
and, consequently, helped to realign their party’s international stance in accordance 
with American interests.94 
 
 
                                                     
93 Kevin Rudd, speech to the Australian American Leadership Dialogue, Melbourne, 15 August 2009. 
94 Scott-Smith, Searching for the Successor Generation.  
CHAPTER SEVEN 
193 
 
Gatekeeping 
 
The socialisation function of the AALD is one part of its “gatekeeping” role to 
prevent adverse changes to orthodox government policymaking on the alliance. In 
addition, entry and performance at the AALD is often used as a benchmark for 
earning the equivalent of a stamp of approval, or disapproval, on the ability of 
Australian political leaders to manage the US alliance. This function appears to be 
limited to the Labor Party where accusations of “immaturity” or “weakness” on 
defence matters, and the inability to “responsibly manage” the US alliance, are 
generally directed.95 The experience of former opposition leader, Mark Latham, and 
former Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, are two prominent examples. 
 
Latham was quickly identified as a danger to the alliance orthodoxy after his first 
major foreign policy speech as opposition leader, when he implied the Australia-US 
relationship was an unequal partnership.96 Consequently, the then Prime Minister, 
John Howard, characterised Latham as “indifferent” toward the alliance and a 
threat to its existence.97 Similarly, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer argued that 
Latham “should not be debating the US alliance in the midst of the war on 
terrorism” and that his behaviour gave the impression he was “anti-American”.98 
Experts in Australian strategic studies identified Latham’s position on the alliance as 
                                                     
95 Andrew O’Neill, “Regional, Alliance and Global Priorities of the Rudd-Gillard Government” in James 
Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), Middle Power Dreaming: Australia and the World Affairs 2006-2010, 
South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 280. 
96 Mark Latham, Labor and the World, address to the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 
7 April 2004. Reproduced at Australianpolitics.com, <http://australianpolitics.com/2004/04/07/
labor-and-the-world-latham-foreign-policy-speech.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. Two earlier 
incidents before Latham became opposition leader also troubled orthodox alliance loyalists. In July 
2002, Latham described John Howard as an “arse licker” and, seven months later, George W. Bush as 
the most dangerous and incompetent US president in recent history and the Australians who 
followed him as “a conga line of suck-holes”. Robert Manne, Little America: How John Howard Has 
Changed Australia, The Monthly, March 2006, p. 30. 
97 PM Accuses Latham of “Indifference” to US Alliance, ABC News, 11 June 2004, <http://www.abc
.net.au/news/2004-06-11/pm-accuses-latham-of-indifference-to-us-alliance/1991070>, accessed 5 
April 2016. 
98 Latham “Undermining” US alliance, ABC News, 13 April 2004, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2004-
04-13/latham-undermining-us-alliance/169506>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
194 
 
a threat to the long-term bipartisan commitment of the security relationship that 
Bob Hawke and Kim Beazley had extended during the 1980s.99  
 
Although Latham had declared Labor’s support for the core aspects of the 
alliance,100 his position on both the Iraq War and AUSFTA were of serious concern 
to orthodox alliance loyalists. Paul Kelly and Peter Hartcher wrote in their respective 
broadsheets that should Latham be elected prime minister, his position on Iraq 
would likely harm the relationship.101 When it came to AUSFTA, Paul Kelly argued 
that, as the most “vital decision on the US relationship for years”, support for the 
agreement, despite all its “defects”, was a “test of Labor’s ability to have a 
successful relationship with the US”, and of Latham’s “maturity” to rise above the 
“anti-Americanism” that infects the ALP.102 
 
It is revealing that support for both of these policies was considered a benchmark of 
Latham’s ability to manage the alliance given that Australia’s participation in the 
invasion of Iraq was technically contrary to the ANZUS Treaty and opposed by the 
vast majority of Australians.103 Moreover, as the occupation of Iraq dragged on, it 
became increasingly unpopular.104 On AUSFTA too, public opinion steadily declined 
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from 65 per cent in support of the agreement, when negotiations started, to 35 per 
cent when the deal was concluded in 2004.105 Lacking popular support, the 
Australian government was instead driven to support AUSFTA by the lobbying 
efforts of certain Australian and American corporate groups who perceived benefits 
from the FTA.106 
 
In response to the “flak” Latham received for his departure from the status quo 
regarding the alliance, Scanlan warned that the Australia-US relationship needed 
“hard work and constant nurturing” and that “every Australian political leader 
needs to develop his or her own understanding of the depth and the breadth of the 
alliance with the US”. Scanlan proceeded to “warmly welcome” Latham to the 
upcoming AALD event in 2004 which, he proclaimed, was about “achieving mutual 
understanding between leaders, not merely consensus”.107 
 
While Latham initially accepted the invitation to attend the AALD, he later retracted 
his decision for fear of being embarrassed politically on account of his views on the 
alliance.108 As Robert Manne wrote at the time, “among this elite group Latham was 
by now almost the only important dissident on the question of the American 
alliance”.109 In conversation with the author, Latham added that the presence of 
pro-alliance journalists at the AALD was another reason for his decision to 
withdraw. As Latham rhetorically asks, 
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Who wants to rub up against dozens of Sheridan, Kelly and Hartcher 
articles bagging you for your foreign policy views if you’re trying to 
make your way through the system? Who wants to take on the press 
establishment in Australia? . . . Where would you end up in the 
system if you took them on?110 
 
Alexander Downer responded to Latham’s withdrawal from the AALD by arguing 
that it illustrated his decision to “cut and run from the US relationship”, and that he 
should have gone and “demonstrated his credentials to manage the relationship in 
a mature fashion”.111 Similarly, on the American side, Armitage “expressed regret” 
that Latham had cancelled his planned trip to the AALD in Washington, professing 
that it would have been an occasion for him to “get exposure to the length, the 
breadth, the depth of this relationship”. Armitage had “made plain that he thought 
Mr Latham neither understood nor appreciated the alliance”.112 According to 
Richard Woolcott: 
 
The Americans [at the AALD] probably wanted to influence [Latham] 
in a more pro-American direction, and I suppose some other 
Australian members of the Dialogue wanted to see him more 
committed to the alliance. But that never happened so in a sense, 
that’s hypothetical.113 
 
When Kevin Rudd assumed the position of leader of the Labor Party in December 
2006, participation at the AALD was once again viewed as a litmus test for indicating 
the necessary maturity to manage the relationship. Rudd was “strongly urged to 
attend” the upcoming AALD in January 2007 by other members of his party as a 
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symbol reaffirming Labor’s rejection of Latham’s attitude toward the alliance.114 
Similarly, Bob Carr’s long-standing attendance at the AALD was widely cited in the 
media as evidence of his capacity to responsibly manage the alliance after he was 
appointed foreign minister in the Gillard government in 2012.115 
 
While Latham illustrates how the AALD operates to censure those who depart from 
the status quo, Julia Gillard demonstrates what is required to gain approval. 
Gillard’s performance at the 2008 Dialogue event, where she gave her first foreign 
policy address as deputy Prime Minister, was carefully watched and assessed in 
elite circles. Gillard looked to reassure her audience of 300 Australian and American 
elites that the alliance transcended the power of any single leader or party; a subtle 
reference to both Latham’s ambivalence toward the alliance and the dangers posed 
by George W. Bush’s immense unpopularity. Gillard reassured her audience that the 
alliance was “bigger than any person, bigger than any party, bigger than any 
government, bigger than any period in our history together”. The AALD, Gillard 
added, is “full of committed advocates, of true believers”, in the Australia-US 
relationship.116 
 
Gillard’s address to the AALD was recognised as “one of the most, not strident, but 
positive statements of the value of the alliance that anyone has given on either side 
of politics”.117 According to Mel Sembler, former US ambassador to Australia, Gillard 
“wowed the Americans” with her content and presentation and “everybody loved 
it”.118 Peter Hartcher, reporting on the event for the Sydney Morning Herald, wrote 
                                                     
114 Cynthia Banham, US Meeting May Provide A Potent Symbol for Rudd, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 
December 2006, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/us-meeting-may-provide-a-potent-
symbol-for-rudd/2006/12/10/1165685553923.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
115 Greg Sheridan, Bob Carr Right Choice for Foreign Job, The Australian, 3 March 2012; Laurie Oakes, 
Julia Gillard Finds a Spine, Turns Defeat Into A Breathtaking Win, Herald Sun, 3 March 2012, 
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/opinion/julia-gillard-finds-a-spine-turns-defeat-into-a-
breathtaking-win/story-fn56baaq-1226287818689, accessed 5 April 2016; Simon Benson, How 
Suicidal ALP Spawned a Saviour, The Daily Telegraph, 2 March 2012; Stefanie Balogh, US Had No 
Concerns About Bob Carr’s Appointment As Foreign Minister, The Australian, 1 April 2012. 
116 Peter Hartcher, Curtin Call and Excellent Debut, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 June 2008, <http://
www.smh.com.au/news/peter-hartcher/curtin-call-an-excellent-debut/2008/06/26/1214472672972
.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
117 Author interview with Andrew Robb, 15 July 2011. 
118 Hartcher, Curtin Call and Excellent Debut. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
198 
 
that propositions such as Australia and the US working together “to help build a 
world where civilisation will persist”, as Gillard phrased it, was “music to American 
ears”. Hartcher concluded his assessment of Gillard’s performance at the AALD by 
stating: 
 
Julia Gillard has come a long way since the Victorian Socialist Left. 
She has made a sophisticated and successful international debut, and 
moved herself credibly into a new category of leadership . . . In doing 
so, she has reaffirmed Australia’s place as America's uniquely reliable 
ally.119 
 
The specific role played by the AALD in assisting Gillard’s elevation to leadership 
material in the eyes of the establishment is perhaps best articulated by Kelly, who, 
immediately after the 2008 AALD event, wrote: 
 
Coming from the Labor Left and once a loyal supporter of the anti-
American Mark Latham, Gillard has been inducted into the political 
culture and rituals of the alliance. This is a prime function of the 
dialogue. She has become a true believer.120 
 
Later, in conversation with the author, Kelly elaborates on what he meant, pointing 
out that Gillard’s address to the AALD “was in the Benjamin Franklin room at the 
State Department. He added, “It’s a very special event, in a very special forum, in a 
very special room. That’s what I meant when I talked about Gillard being inducted 
into the rituals of the relationship”.121 
 
In other words, according to Kelly, Gillard had both been assisted and affirmatively 
judged by the AALD on her transition as an orthodox alliance loyalist. Any question 
over her commitment to the status quo arising from her affiliation with the left 
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could be laid to rest now that she had been unreservedly accepted by the AALD. 
Journalist Hamish McDonald believes that Kelly’s remarks are “astonishingly frank 
as an admission or almost a boast” that showed how the AALD welcomed Gillard 
into “the inner priesthood of the highest strategic circles”; and as such, “Pretty 
stunning”.122 
 
Upon assuming the prime ministership, Gillard’s performance at the AALD was once 
again recalled and heralded as evidence of her maturity to manage the alliance 
relationship. Sheridan wrote that Gillard had moved her “national security identity 
bang in[to] the middle of the mainstream”. The evidence provided was her 
attendance for several years at the AALD and her speech at the 2008 Dialogue event 
where she was “clear and declarative about her attachment to the US alliance”.123 
 
The Australian Financial Review wrote Gillard was careful to indicate that her 
government would be a “safe transition”, promising to honour Australia’s alliance 
with the US, and that she had “impressed [by] taking part in such forums as the 
Australian American Leadership Dialogue and the Australia-Israel forum”.124 The 
Sydney Morning Herald’s editorial on Gillard’s foreign policy agenda claimed it 
promised little change “as the former campus radical has made the transition to the 
safe mainstream consensus without a ripple”. The editorial concluded by stating: 
 
[Gillard] has been a participant in the second-track diplomacy effort 
known as the Australian-American Leadership Dialogue, and in the 
newer Australia-Israel forum set up last year. In these two sensitive 
areas, where politicians are carefully watched for deviation by 
powerful lobbies, she has flagged her adherence to the norm.125 
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Australian elite circles and the American establishment carefully watch future 
Australian leaders at the AALD for adherence to the status quo. The AALD is “almost 
an American veto on who is acceptable to be a political leader in this country and 
who’s not”, argues Mark Latham. “You can be absolutely assured”, Latham 
continues, that if Gillard hadn’t proven herself at the Dialogue “she wouldn’t have 
been a candidate for the leadership . . . that got rid of Rudd”.126 
 
Certainly, a number of leaked diplomatic cables revealed by WikiLeaks suggest that 
the US embassy viewed acceptance at the AALD as an important indicator of 
Gillard’s commitment to the status quo. A cable sent on 13 June 2008, under the 
sub-heading, “Gillard the Pro-American”, describes how previous concerns about 
Gillard’s apparent “ambivalent” feelings toward the alliance were assuaged since 
she became the Deputy Leader of the Labor Party and indicated “an understanding 
of its importance”. Apart from going “out of her way to assist the [US] embassy”, 
the other evidence provided was her attendance and performance at the AALD 
where, it was noted, she “is now a regular attendee . . . and will be the principal 
government representative to the AALD meeting in Washington at the end of 
June”.127 
 
A comment added to the end of the cable by a US diplomatic staff member reveals 
reservations about the authenticity of Gillard’s alliance loyalty: “it’s unclear whether 
this change in attitude reflects a mellowing of her views or an understanding of 
what she needs to do to become leader of the ALP. It is likely a combination of the 
two”. However, a year later, after a lengthy character assessment of Gillard 
recorded in a cable sent on 10 June 2009, these reservations became irrelevant as 
the embassy felt confident her “pragmatism” would ensure compliance to the 
alliance orthodoxy. In a cable sub-headed, “A Left-Winger Now a Pragmatist”, 
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Gillard’s performance at the 2008 AALD event was once again highlighted as 
evidence of this fact.128 
 
While performance at the AALD was certainly viewed as an important indicator of 
Gillard’s alliance loyalty, the degree to which it also influenced her transition into a 
“true believer” of the alliance is a more difficult question to answer. Citing the 
influence of the AALD and US political exchange programs, Mark Latham credited 
Washington for Gillard’s transformation into an orthodox alliance loyalist: 
 
You have to hand it to those guys in Washington, they have a way of 
making lefties like Gillard change their minds on foreign policy. 
Within the space of two years, they converted her from a highly 
cynical critic of all matters American into yet another political 
sycophant. The poor woman has been brainwashed.129 
 
While Gillard might have formally placed herself in the left faction of the Labor 
Party, there’s no indication that she actually subscribed to that ideological position, 
particularly on foreign policy issues. Gillard famously declared in 2010 that she did 
“not have a passion for foreign affairs”, and it was not foreign policy that caused her 
“to get active in the labour movement”.130 Even Kelly concedes that he would not 
use the word “transformative” to characterise the AALD’s impact on Gillard, 
although, in his mind, there was not “any doubt at all that the Dialogue influenced 
Gillard’s attitude toward the alliance and facilitated her own involvement with the 
alliance and with the United States”.131 It appears as though, at most, being a part 
of the culture and rituals of the AALD helped Gillard to “learn the foreign policy 
game” 132 that requires strict adherence to the orthodox view of the alliance. 
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Whatever impact the AALD might have had on Gillard’s attitude toward the alliance, 
it was certainly utilised by her as a tool to demonstrate publicly her acceptance of 
its orthodoxy. As Hartcher argues, “it wasn’t the Dialogue that persuaded Gillard to 
embrace the alliance or move to the right. That was the journey that Gillard was on. 
The Dialogue gave her the opportunity to parade her credentials and to, if you like, 
seal the deal”.133 The AALD helped Gillard to demonstrate that she was not a “left-
winger or a Lathamite or a Victorian”, as Paul Howes observes, but instead that she 
held “a very mature calibre of opinion on the understanding and nature” of the 
Australia-US relationship.134 
 
The AALD is perfectly suited to help current and future leaders refute those critics 
who might cast doubt upon their alliance loyalty. Writing in The Australian after 
Gillard had been elevated to prime minister, Sheridan wrote that the right-faction 
of the Labor Party had, until recently, placed a veto on her desire to lead. However, 
as he notes: 
 
From at least the time she became deputy leader, Gillard shrewdly 
and effectively set about removing that veto on herself. She did this 
in part by attending the Australian American Leadership Dialogue 
and another similar dialogue with Israel. On a couple of occasions at 
the Australian American dialogue she was the senior Australian 
politician present, and she was fulsome in her endorsement of the 
US alliance.135 
 
John W. H. Denton explains what participation in the Dialogue projects to 
establishment forces as follows: 
 
                                                     
133 Author interview with Peter Hartcher, 29 October 2011. 
134 Author interview with Paul Howes, 5 August 2011. 
135 Greg Sheridan, Continuity in Foreign Affairs but Questions Remain, The Australian, 1 July 2010. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
203 
 
Continuous participation in the Dialogue is a clear manifestation of 
your support for the prime role of America in Australian foreign 
policy concerns. It puts you mainstream in foreign policy thinking . . . 
[The mainstream thinking] with the US is the primacy of the ANZUS 
relationship to Australia’s defence and geo-strategic concerns . . . 
Gillard has been able to position herself in the mainstream by 
affiliating herself with the Dialogue . . . It’s like, well that’s fact. You 
can’t say I’m anti-American. I participate in the Australian American 
Leadership Dialogue . . . So you’re able to position yourself, 
therefore, clearly and unmistakably in the middle of mainstream 
Australian foreign policy thinking. It also sets mainstream thinking 
about foreign policy.136 
 
The case of Mark Latham suggests that the AALD is not always successful as a 
socialisation mechanism. One of its central objectives, after all, is to strengthen the 
importance of the alliance in the minds of the next generation. Latham, however, 
represented “a younger strand of ALP opinion that, surprisingly, is not steeped in 
the alliance”.137 Although Latham was “unsteepable”, in the words of Sam Lipski,138 
the AALD played an important role by censuring his insistence on departing from 
the status quo. For a “pragmatist” like Gillard, on the other hand, the prime 
function of the AALD was to provide an endorsement of her transition into the 
mainstream consensus and her induction into the alliance orthodoxy. 
 
Significantly, neither Latham nor Gillard ever posed a serious threat to the alliance. 
While Latham held a critical position on the alliance that was atypical in modern 
Australian politics, the reality was that he continued to support its core elements. 
Latham was also surrounded by pro-alliance loyalists who would not have permitted 
him to depart very far from the status quo if he were prime minister. Indeed, just 
three months after his first foreign policy address questioning Australia’s 
                                                     
136 Author interview with John W. H. Denton, 15 February 2012. 
137 Kelly, If Push Comes To Shove. 
138 Author interview with Sam Lipski, 25 October 2011. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
204 
 
dependence on the US, Latham began to soften his position, particularly with 
regard to Australia’s involvement in Iraq. Although Latham delivered the new 
position, Kim Beazley revealed that “the policy is based on discussions with me and 
Kevin Rudd”.139 
 
After Latham retired from politics and revealed in his memoirs that he believed the 
Australia-US relationship was “just another form of neo-colonialism”, and 
questioned the “the long-term need” of the alliance, the Labor Party quickly 
distanced themselves.140 Then opposition defence spokesman, Robert McClelland, 
claimed that Latham would have been “rolled” if these attitudes were known at the 
time.141 When Rudd became opposition leader, he chose McClelland for his 
replacement as shadow foreign minister because he was considered “a safe pair of 
hands on the alliance”.142 McClelland is also a participant of the AALD. 
 
 In an interview with the author, Australian columnist, Glenn Milne, argues that 
although the AALD has not faced a formidable challenge thus far in terms of 
dissident political elites in Australia, it “will have to start muscling up” and really 
“prove its worth” if, in the future, there were to arise any “high level questioning of 
the value of the relationship and the place of the United States in the Pacific”.143 
Given the high degree of alliance loyalty professed at the elite level in Australia, the 
AALD is unlikely to have to seriously prove itself anytime soon. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Australia-US Alliance: Who Benefits? 
 
From the perspective of traditional international relations theory, there is no 
“special relationship” between Australia and the US. According to the dominant 
realist school, “international relations are dominated by national interests and . . .  
talk of shared values and moral causes is simply how politicians sell wars and 
interventions abroad.”1 Notwithstanding the cultural familiarity that exists between 
the five English-speaking nations of the Anglosphere, realists “counsel against 
confusing the fellow feeling that individuals and families share with the calculations 
of states”.2 
 
Constructivists, in contrast, argue that state behaviour does indeed go beyond the 
mere calculation of national interests as understood by realists, and moves into the 
realm of identify formation. Missing from the picture painted by realists is “racism, 
nationalism, colonialism, imperialism, and other macro-historical processes, which 
imply that sovereign states are also historical and cultural nations bound by all kinds 
of discourses, institutions and practices”.3 According to this perspective, there is 
something unique and significant about the Anglosphere nations, rooted in a 
historical and collective racialised identity that endures to the present.4 
 
In dismissing the conventional values-oriented understanding of Australia’s alliance 
with the US, this thesis broadly concurs with the unsentimental realism of power 
politics, albeit with the crucial distinction that elite interests and not “national 
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interests” primarily determine state behaviour.5 There is no qualitative distinction 
between the so-called special relationships of the Anglosphere and many of 
Washington’s other significant bilateral relationships.6 Australia and the UK aside, 
the US has at one time or another applied the term “special relationship” to Israel, 
Brazil, pre-communist China and the Federal Republic of Germany, among others, 
and has described no less than Israel, Japan, Canada, France and India as its best 
friend or strongest ally.7 
 
While broadly correct, realists go too far in dismissing the notion of the Anglosphere 
as simply an illusion. Political elites in both Britain and Australia have at times 
bought into the “special relationship” mythology, making its existence “more a 
delusion than an illusion; delusional in the over-confidence and self-importance it at 
times gives these states individually and collectively”.8 Moreover, when it comes to 
Washington’s alliance management calculations, mutual interests are less relevant 
than the capacity to deliver benefits. It is “usefulness” that is the primary glue that 
binds America’s most important alliances together.  
 
The quintessential special relationship between the US and the UK is a case in point. 
As others have argued,9 the post-WWII relationship between the UK and the US 
assumed its special importance primarily on account of Britain’s continued, albeit 
diminished, role as a world power. From Washington’s perspective, the UK’s special 
value derived from its willingness to use its significant military and intelligence 
capacities and traditional influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia in 
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ways that more or less complemented America’s vision for global order. The UK also 
played a pivotal role in Europe where its significant military capacities were utilised 
to lead the way in the containment of the Soviet Union. 
 
Conversely, British leaders understood that their waning global influence was 
dependent on US patronage and military superiority, especially with respect to 
preserving Britain’s stronghold in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.10 The UK thus 
opted to become a junior partner in an American-led global world order provided 
British interests were protected. As the UK’s power began to erode from the 1960s, 
so too did its usefulness as a credible partner to the US.11 Nevertheless, London 
continued to view its special relationship with Washington as one important factor 
in preserving its unilateral ability to influence the world.12 
 
This thesis has taken a similar approach with respect to the Australia-US alliance, 
critically evaluating the relationship from the perspective of who benefits. Typically, 
the usefulness of the alliance to Australia is portrayed in terms of its defence value. 
The alliance has variously been understood as an insurance policy or deterrent 
against attack, essential for maintaining regional and global stability and, since the 
1970s, crucial to Australia’s self-reliant defence posture. Conversely, from America’s 
perspective, Australia has been a reliable long-standing ally and an enthusiastic 
supporter of Washington’s diplomatic, strategic and economic engagement in the 
Asia-Pacific region and beyond. 
 
Much more than just providing for the defence of Australia, elites have long 
emphasised the benefits of the alliance in bolstering Australia’s regional status as a 
“leading middle power” and an “Asia-Pacific power” that can “punch above its 
                                                     
10 As Anthony Eden expressed in 1952, when it came to defence organisations in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia, “Our aim should be to persuade the United States to assume the real burdens in 
such organisations, while retaining for ourselves as much political control – and hence prestige and 
world influence – as we can”. James Peck, Washington’s China: The National Security World, the Cold 
War, and the Origins of Globalism, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006, fn 98, p. 282. 
11 As the Kennedy administration bluntly expressed, Washington regarded London as its “lieutenant 
(the fashionable word is partner)”. Curtis, The Great Deception, p. 26. 
12 On this point, see David Goldsworthy, Australian External Policy and the End of Britain’s Empire, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 51, no. 1, 2005, p. 23. 
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weight”. By ensuring Australia maintains an “edge” over Southeast Asia in military 
and intelligence capabilities, and elevating Canberra’s status in regional and global 
governance regimes, the alliance is seen to augment Australia’s capacity to 
favourably shape its strategic and economic environment. 
 
Although allying to the global hegemon undoubtedly provides some defence 
benefits, this thesis has argued that the alliance makes far more sense in terms of 
bolstering Australia’s power-projection capabilities than it does in ensuring 
Australian security, particularly given the enduring absence of actual or potential 
threats. While increasing Australia’s defence capabilities and enhancing Australia’s 
regional power are potentially complementary objectives, they are also quite 
distinct. The primary value of the alliance today, this thesis has argued, is on the 
latter. 
 
Ostensibly, Australia’s desire to play a regional leadership role is motivated by a 
long-standing commitment to maintaining peace and stability. In reality, this thesis 
has argued, Australia has consistently acted in concert with the US in ways that 
undermine security and stability but preserve American hegemony. The desire to 
see the continuation of US hegemony at all costs has served two complementary 
objectives: to ensure the capacity for shaping the strategic and economic outlook of 
the Asia-Pacific remains with the West, and that Australia’s position as the leading 
middle power in Southeast Asia remains secure. 
 
This thesis has challenged the liberal and constructivist critiques of Australia’s 
alliance with the US and the notion that traditional security anxieties and cultural 
attachments to the Anglosphere are the primary reasons for its endurance. 
Although undoubtedly a significant driving force behind Canberra’s alliance-reliance 
mentality, Australia’s strategic culture consists of racialised security anxieties and 
an equally enduring, and arguably more powerful, imperialist spirit that favours 
western predominance, including a greater Australian influence, over Asia’s 
strategic and economic affairs. Far from acting irrationally, policy makers have 
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exhibited a shrewd understanding of Australia’s national interests as understood by 
strategic elites when conducting their alliance management calculations. 
 
Highlighting the imperialist motivations behind Australia’s alliance-reliance 
mentality does not preclude an acknowledgement of genuine security fears. 
Australia’s sense of strategic vulnerability, cultural attachments to the Anglosphere 
and imperialist spirit (later “middle power” dreaming) have interacted in mutually 
constitutive ways. Australian imperialism during the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries, for example, did have a quasi-defensive aspect as part of the cycle of 
rivalry between the British Empire and other expansionist European powers.13 
 
During the Cold War, Australia’s desire to restore and expand the western-imperial 
order in Asia played out within the very real and dangerous great power 
competition between the US and the Soviet Union. However, the conventional view 
that Australia’s security was bound to the outcome of a global conflict between 
western democracy and communist totalitarianism was deeply flawed. The 
objective of checking Soviet/Chinese aggression played only a minor role in US 
foreign policy during the Cold War. The much larger game was the extension of 
American capitalism and the efforts to crush those nationalist independence 
movements that threatened Washington’s influence in the third world.14 
 
The major security threats to Australia in the post-WWII era have, somewhat 
paradoxically, resulted from Australia’s alliance with the US.15 The threat of direct 
nuclear attack during the Cold War was a consequence of hosting sensitive 
American intelligence facilities, notably Pine Gap. The threat of a terrorist attack in 
                                                     
13 Tom O’Lincoln, Australia’s Pacific War: Challenging a National Myth, Australia: Interventions 
Publishers, 2011, p. 24. 
14 While the conventional view of the Cold War, including some sharply critical variants, contends 
that it was primarily a confrontation between two superpowers, the historical record demonstrates 
that the central dynamic was, for the Soviet Union, a war against its satellites, and for the US, a war 
against the third world. See Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, London: Vintage Books, 1992, 
especially pp. 9-68. 
15 As Beeson writes, “For a country with no obvious enemies, the main threats to Australian security 
since World War II have, paradoxically enough, actually resulted from its US alliance”. Mark Beeson, 
American Hegemony: The View from Australia, SAIS Review, vol. 23, no. 2, 2003, p. 117. 
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Australia after 11 September 2001 was greatly exacerbated as a result of Australia’s 
participation in America’s “war on terror”. Today, there is the possibility of Australia 
being drawn into a wider US-Sino conflagration as Canberra ties itself to 
Washington’s vision for retaining hegemony in Asia. 
 
The costs of the US alliance have been considerable, and yet it has been a long-
standing convention among strategic elites in Australia to argue they are far 
outweighed by the benefits.16 Part of the miscalculation is due to elite and state-
centred approaches to “national security” which “too often achieve[s] security at 
the expense of other states and communities, making security meaningless”. The 
only meaningful approach is to “focus security on human beings, to see it as a 
process of emancipation from injustice and hardship rather than a defence against 
abstract threats to national integrity”.17 
 
Apart from wilfully ignoring the pernicious consequences of US foreign policy to 
others, the “special relationship” narrative has served to skew the cost-benefit 
analysis in favour of the alliance by projecting the illusion that it remains 
indispensable to Australian security and reflective of core Australian values. The 
true “value” of the alliance, this thesis has argued, derives from its contribution to 
maximising state power, an objective pursued irrespective of the costs to the 
“human security” of Australia, the Asia-Pacific region and the world. 
 
Managing Elite Opinion 
 
Despite the overwhelming support for the alliance at both the public and elite 
levels, there is nothing inevitable about its centrality to Australian defence and 
foreign policies into the future. Public opinion can swing quickly with events, and 
                                                     
16 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Defence Relations with the United States, Canberra: Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2006, pp. 8, 87; Gary Brown and Laura 
Rayner, Upside, Downside: ANZUS After Fifty Years, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, 
Department of the Parliamentary Library, Current Issues Brief, no. 3, 2001-02; H. G. Gelber, The 
Australian American Alliance: Costs and Benefits, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968. 
17 Anthony Burke, “Critical Approaches to Security and Strategy” in Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball 
(eds), Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific, Crows Nest, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2006, p. 153. 
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strategic elites are always cognisant of the possibility of an “ultra-left wing Labor 
government” emerging that might decide to follow the “New Zealand model” of the 
mid-1980s and effectively withdraw Australia from the ANZUS Treaty.18 
 
Partly in response to these concerns, a number of private initiatives were 
established in the 1990s and 2000s with the objective of strengthening the 
Australia-US relationship and insulating it from change in the post-Cold War world. 
Primary among these was the AALD, established explicitly to preserve the centrality 
of the Australia-US relationship into the future at a time when personal 
relationships between elites in both countries were perceived to be at risk.  
 
The spawning of the idea for the establishment of the AALD in 1992 was timely. In 
the aftermath of the Cold War, a number of critical scholars on the fringes of the 
intellectual milieu in international relations recognised that the time was ripe for 
challenging the orthodoxy in Australia’s security thinking and the “institutionalised 
habits of mind” that posed an obstacle to reform.19 The AALD’s objective, on the 
other hand, was precisely the opposite: to entrench the alliance orthodoxy in the 
minds of elites and prevent any change to the status quo. The AALD was the 
embodiment of Australia’s elitist approach to regionalism in the 1990s, operating 
on the “assumption that economic and military security . . .  is best pursued through 
a dialogue of elite officials and academics”.20 
 
The AALD’s agenda was somewhat obscured by its self-identification as an effort in 
T2 diplomacy, ostensibly dedicated to the benign objectives of relationship building 
and mutual understanding. However, it was not difficult to hazard a guess at what 
the outcome might be from a gathering of carefully selected participants drawn 
from elite circles discussing mutual concerns behind closed doors in an institution 
                                                     
18 Paul Dibb, “Australia-United States” in Brendan Taylor (ed), Australia as an Asia Pacific Regional 
Power: Friendship in Flux, London: Routledge, 2007, p. 45. 
19 The Authors and Editors, “Introduction - Breaching Institutionalised Habits of Mind” in Graeme 
Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and 
Security Thinking After the Cold War, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996, pp. 1-9. 
20 David Sullivan, “Sipping a Thin Gruel: Academic and Policy Closure in Australia’s Defence and 
Security Discourse” in Cheeseman and Bruce (eds), p. 62. 
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dedicated to preserving the status quo. Upon its establishment, critics of the 
alliance presciently warned that the AALD could turn into “another instance of 
Australia trying to ingratiate itself with the United States, instead of trying to form a 
genuinely independent foreign policy”.21 
 
Much later, external critics speculated that the private and exclusive nature of the 
discussions at the AALD, and the sense of prestige associated with privileged access 
to powerful American policy makers, bred an unhealthy and uncritical relationship 
on Australia’s part. According to this critique, the AALD operated as a mechanism 
for “duchessing” Australian leaders into behaving as if American interests were the 
same as Australian interests, much in the same way the British had achieved in the 
past. 
 
In the absence of any serious critical investigation into the AALD, this thesis set out 
to address these competing claims and to critically evaluate the AALD’s role in 
managing Australia’s relationship with the US. The existing literature on T2 
diplomacy provided important insights into the institutional structures inherent in 
the AALD, and other T2 dialogues, that lead it to eschew critical debate and adopt 
official or orthodox policy positions. Nevertheless, the T2 literature ultimately 
proved limited in providing an adequate explanatory framework for a bilateral 
private initiative dedicated to alliance management. 
 
Instead, this thesis turned to the literature on lobby groups. Lobby groups are 
distinguishable from T2 by their pre-existing agenda to define the terms of political 
debate in ways that suit their own preferred policy outcomes. In the case of the 
AALD, the agenda is to preserve the notion of Australia’s “special relationship” with 
the US, dictating an ever-closer alignment of foreign policies. In effect, the AALD 
functions in a “policy watchdog” capacity to prevent changes to the status quo. 
However, unlike traditional interest groups, the AALD preserves and promotes the 
                                                     
21 Dennis Phillips, then lecturer in American history and politics at Macquarie University, quoted in 
Kate Cole-Adams, Born Again Allies, Time, 7 June 1993. 
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alliance orthodoxy not by lobbying decision makers directly but facilitating the 
socialisation of elites. 
 
The socialisation role of the AALD is supported by the evidence presented in this 
thesis, drawn from numerous interviews with present and former participants. 
While a number of critical voices affirm this view, others have dismissed the idea as 
“rubbish”.22 Australian leaders, defenders of the AALD argue, possess a great deal of 
experience in dealing with American rhetoric, and they are highly unlikely to be 
swayed by what is essentially a few days of discussion and debate. 
 
However, the “social lobby”, identified long-ago by propaganda theorist Harold D. 
Lasswell, can and does act as a subtle but powerful tool of persuasion. It is far more 
sophisticated than mere duchessing and was developed over decades of research 
into communications studies and public diplomacy practice. The AALD, although a 
uniquely private initiative, exhibits many of the same material and psychological 
inducements identified in scholarship as being successfully employed to preserve 
America’s alliance relationships. 
 
It is not the contention of this thesis, advocated by some critics of the AALD, that 
the US has effectively hijacked Australian foreign policy by convincing political elites 
to defend American strategic and economic interests that Australia does not 
share.23 Critics of the alliance are not converted at the AALD into “true believers”. 
The reality is far more limited and subtle. The AALD functions to solidify a set of 
orthodox ideas which elites from both countries have long shared. Although limited 
in scope, the AALD does have a real impact in shaping the preferences of Australian 
elites who already hold a predisposition toward the alliance orthodoxy. 
 
The findings of this thesis are limited by a number of research constraints. The 
author was denied permission to participate in the AALD and compelled to 
                                                     
22 Author interview with Nick Greiner, 6 July 2011. 
23 See, for example, David Day, Bowing to Duchess Diplomacy, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 June 2012, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/bowing-to-duchess-diplomacy-20120607
-1zysh.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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investigate it as an outsider. There was no opportunity to directly question the 
founder and driving force behind the AALD, Phillip Scanlan, who was unresponsive 
to repeated interview requests. A comprehensive review of the AALD was impeded 
by the lack of access to official documents, including a complete list of participants. 
Interviews were limited to participants identified from public sources and willing to 
cooperate. The strict non-disclosure convention of the AALD made some 
interviewees reluctant to speak forthrightly and others to entirely refuse 
participation.24 
 
The American perspective on the AALD is largely absent from this thesis. The focus 
is on the Australian perspective given the initiative for the AALD’s establishment 
came from Australia and its agenda reflects an Australian context and ambition. 
Nevertheless, the requirement to evaluate the impact of the AALD in the American 
context is noted. So too is the need to evaluate the role of other AALD initiatives 
such as the West Coast Leadership Dialogue, the Honolulu Leadership Dialogue, the 
New York Leadership Dialogue and the Leadership Dialogue Scholar. Given limited 
time and space, the focus of this thesis was restricted to the central AALD event. 
 
This thesis provides a number of avenues for further research. The framework 
developed for this research project can be used to critically evaluate other private 
diplomatic initiatives that function to preserve orthodoxy. The Australia Israel 
Leadership Forum (AILF), established in 2009 by property developer Albert Dadon, 
is an obvious candidate for an academic inquiry along these lines because it was 
specifically modelled on the AALD.25 Although Dadon, like Scanlan, claims he holds 
no particular agenda,26 the AILF appears to function in similar capacity to the AALD, 
                                                     
24 A number of participants who declined to be interviewed by the author cited the strict non-
disclosure convention of the AALD as the reason. For example, journalist Daniel Flitton justified his 
decision not to be interviewed on the grounds that the AALD is “not a Chatham House Rule event 
but off-record”. Consequently, “as a working journalist . . . trust from others that when I agree 
something is off-the-record that it remains off-record is crucial to my job”. Correspondence with 
Daniel Flitton, senior correspondent for The Age,  14 August 2011. 
25 Hamish McDonald, World’s A Stage for Softly, Softly Diplomats, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 July 
2011, <http://www.smh.com.au/zoom/archive/d2510238>, accessed 5 April 2016. Note the AILF 
was expanded and renamed in 2012 to the Australia Israel UK Leadership Dialogue. 
26 Tony Walker, The Extraordinary Reach of Albert Dadon, Australian Financial Review, 10 April 2010. 
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performing the role of a lobby group27 and a “gatekeeper”28 with respect to 
preserving Australia’s “special relationship” with Israel. 
 
As already noted, the AALD is only one small element of what has been described as 
the much larger “Washington lobby”. Non-government institutions engaged in 
Australian foreign policy activism, such as the United States Studies Centre and the 
Lowy Institute for International Policy, play an important role in managing elite and 
public opinion in Australia. Similar to the AALD, the role of these institutions, and 
other elite sectors of academia and the media, argues Professor Clinton Fernandes, 
is to “establish the consensus out of which no viable candidate for foreign minister 
can be expected to diverge.” 29 Building on the findings of this thesis, further 
investigation into the role and impact of the “Washington lobby” in Australian 
foreign policy making is warranted. 
 
Turning to the future, one of the indicators of success of the AALD, according to 
supporters, is its longevity, expansion and capacity to attract increasing numbers of 
elites in both countries. Ironically, notwithstanding its phenomenal endurance and 
growth, one of the perennial questions hanging over the AALD has been its future 
viability. Given the success of the Dialogue is largely attributed to the personal 
dedication and energy of its founder, Phillip Scanlan, some participants have raised 
questions about its long-term survival. The AALD, Kemp believes, “has depended 
very heavily on Scanlan and I think in my own mind there’s always been a question 
of whether the Dialogue would survive [Scanlan’s departure]”.30 
 
                                                     
27 Suspiciously, until 2012, the AILF was recorded as conducting lobbying activities through McManus 
Skotnicki & Associates in the Australian Government Register of Lobbyists. Commonwealth of 
Australia, Australian Government Register of Lobbyists, Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, <http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
28 Like the AALD, with respect to Julia Gillard’s loyalty to the US alliance, participation in the AILF was 
cited by leaked US embassy cables, among other things, as evidence that Gillard had “thrown off the 
baggage of being from what one analyst called the ‘notoriously anti-Israel faction’ of the ALP”. US 
Embassy Canberra, “Pro-Israel”, cable #1074, 10 June 2009, reproduced at The Age, 
<http://images.theage.com.au/file/2010/12/15/2096934/Cables.htm?rand=1292396653979>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
29 McDonald, World’s A Stage for Softly, Softly Diplomats. 
30 Author interview with David Kemp, 31 August 2011. 
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On the other hand, because Scanlan’s centralised management style evinces 
criticism among some participants, his eventual departure is also viewed as a 
potentially positive development. In particular, there is the perception among some 
members of the Liberal Party that Scanlan holds a bias toward the Labor Party.31 In 
one instance, an influential Liberal Party figure threatened to discourage members 
of the Party from attending the AALD unless a strict protocol of bipartisanship was 
implemented.32 
 
More recently, Scanlan’s perceived partisanship has fuelled speculation about the 
AALD’s demise,33 a charge strongly refuted by Scanlan who insists the Dialogue’s 
trajectory “remains onward and upward”.34 Interestingly, in early 2016, there was 
an apparent split with the American board of the AALD, the official reason being 
“the Americans want to build a broader and more independent institution so senior 
political and business figures can strengthen the US-Australia alliance outside of 
Scanlan’s orbit”.35 The newly established American Australian Council consists of 
numerous high-profile strategic and corporate elites, and is chaired by one of 
America’s most powerful lobbyists, Tony Podesta. 
 
Management issues aside, the prospects for genuine reform of the AALD in ways 
that address the major concerns raised in this thesis are slim. Genuine dialogue 
requires not just a commitment to mutual understanding but “spirited debate” and 
the willingness on the part of Washington (and Canberra) to “consider the real 
                                                     
31 According to Kemp, many in the Liberal Party believe Scanlan is “closer to people like [Kim] Beazley 
and the other Labor pro-Americans”, even though Scanlan himself probably “identifies as a Liberal.” 
Author interview with David Kemp, 31 August 2011. 
32 Although Scanlan eventually relented, according to this senior Liberal figure, he did so while 
“spitting chips and raving and foaming at the mouth”. Author interview with participant who chose 
to remain anonymous. 
33 Will Glasgow and Joe Aston, The Demise of Phil Scanlan and the Australian American Leadership 
Dialogue, Australian Financial Review, 4 February 2015. 
34 Phillip Scanlan, Leader Dialogue Still Strong, Australian Financial Review, 5 February 2015. 
35 Will Glasgow, Will Turnbull Save Scanlan’s Australian American Leadership Dialogue with a DD?, 
Australian Financial Review, 9 March 2016. The new American board, renamed the American 
Australian Council, still has listed as its parent foundation the American Australian Education and 
Leadership Foundation. American Australian Council, Foundation Structure, <http://american
australiancouncil.org/about/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
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possibility that its thinking, policies, and actions might be wrong”.36 Even so, the 
hope that fundamental change might occur by “speaking truth to power” is 
doubtful and wrongheaded.37 As critics of American public diplomacy argue, “to 
imagine that significant pillars of American foreign policy . . .  will be modified 
through engagement is, in practice, a fantasy”.38 
 
Significantly, in the case of T2, scholars have suggested potential remedies to the 
“autonomy dilemma” so that perspectives outside of the politically acceptable 
mainstream might be seriously entertained. Specifically, greater collaboration with 
T3 initiatives, or grassroots civil society organisations, has been offered as a means 
to break the monopoly of elite views and interests at the official level.39 Unlike T1 
and T2, discussions at the T3 level, Herman J. S. Kraft explains: 
 
[Are] often based on a critical perspective that tends to oppose 
mainstream government policies. They question the hierarchy of 
priorities and the assumptions that underlie the framework behind 
these policies.40 
 
However, attempts to utilise T2 as a bridge between T1 and T3 have ended in 
failure, partly because elites have proven unforthcoming in their expressions for a 
genuine dialogue with civil society.41 In the case of the AALD, although nominally an 
                                                     
36 Edward Comor and Hamilton Bean, America’s “Engagement” Delusion: Critiquing a Public 
Diplomacy Consensus, International Communication Gazette, vol. 74, no, 3, 2012, p. 214.  
37 As Chomsky argues, so far as elites remain in their institutional roles, they are unlikely to be 
persuaded by informed discussion. Noam Chomsky, Power and Prospects: Reflections on Human 
Nature and the Social Order, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1996, pp. 60-1. 
38  Comor and Bean, p. 213. 
39 Amitav Acharya, Democratisation and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism in Southeast 
Asia, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2, 2003, p. 386; Brian L. Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational 
Contribution to the Evolving Asian Security Order” in Desmond Ball and Kwa Chong Guan (eds), 
Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra and S. Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2010, p. 150; Herman Joseph S. Kraft, The 
Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Security Dialogue, vol. 31, no. 3, 
2000, p. 353. 
40 Herman Joseph S. Kraft, Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: the Asia 
Pacific Coalition for East Timor, Global Networks, vol. 2, no. 1, 2002, p. 52. 
41 Alan Collins, A People-Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar or Closed for Civil Society Organisations?, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 30, no. 2, 2008; Katherine Marie G. Hernandez, Bridging Officials 
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exercise in T2 diplomacy, the fact that it exists solely to sustain the alliance 
orthodoxy means there is little hope of reform along the lines suggested in existing 
scholarship. 
 
Finally, there is the larger question of whether the AALD is a benign or malign force 
in the management of Australia’s relationship with the US. The answer to that 
question largely depends on one’s belief in the value of the alliance and its role in 
the world. For orthodox alliance loyalists who hold the “special relationship” 
sacrosanct, the AALD plays a crucial role in supporting the infrastructure of personal 
relationships that helps to keep it strong. On the other hand, for those who adopt a 
critical approach along the lines this thesis has taken – and are deeply concerned 
about the many pernicious impacts of the alliance as it has historically functioned – 
the AALD has not served the interests of Australians well.  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
and the Peoples of ASEAN: The Role of the ASEAN People’s Assembly, a paper prepared for the 
Anniversary Conference of the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, 22 October 2010. 
  
219 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Abbott, Tony, the Australia-US Alliance and Leadership in the Asia-Pacific, address 
to the Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C., 18 July 2012, <http://www.heritage
.org/research/lecture/2012/11/the-australiaus-alliance-and-leadership-in-the-
asiapacific>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Acharya, Amitav, Democratisation and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism 
in Southeast Asia, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2, 2003, pp. 375-390. 
 
Acharya, Amitav, Engagement or Entrapment? Scholarship and Policymaking on 
Asian Regionalism, International Studies Review, vol. 13, 2011, pp. 12-17. 
 
Acharya, Amitav, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and 
Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, International Organisation, vol. 58, no. 2, 
2004, pp. 239-275. 
 
Aksan, Cihan, and Bailes, Jon (eds), Weapon of the Strong: Conversations on US 
State Terrorism, London: Pluto Press, 2013. 
 
Albinski, Henry S., ANZUS: The United States and Pacific Security, Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1987. 
 
Alomes, Stephen, Dober, Mark, and Hellier, Donna, “The Social Context of Postwar 
Conservatism” in Curthoys, Ann, and Merritt, John (eds), Australia’s First Cold War 
1945-1953, Vol 1, Society, Communism and Culture, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1984. 
 
American Australian Council, Foundation Structure, <http://americanaustraliancoun
cil.org/about/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
220 
 
Anderson, Tim, Hegemony, Big Money and Academic Independence, Australian 
Universities’ Review, vol. 53, no. 2, 2010, pp. 11-17. 
 
Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), East China Sea: What Australians Think, 
19 January 2015, <http://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/east-china-sea-
what-australians-think>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Australian American Leadership Dialogue, AALD, <http://www.aald.org/australian-
american-leadership-dialogue>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Australian American Leadership Dialogue, History, <http://www.aald.org/history>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Australian American Leadership Dialogue, Home Page, <http://www.aald.org>, 9 
February 2013, original archived at <http://web.archive.org/web/20130209070754/
http://www.aald.org/index/index/page/home>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Australian American Leadership Dialogue, Honolulu 2012, 21-23 October Honolulu, 
Hawaii. 
 
Australia-United States Ministerial (AUSMIN) Consultations, 2011 Joint 
Communique, 15 September 2011, <http://dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-
america/ausmin/Pages/ausmin-joint-communique-2011.aspx>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
Australian American Leadership Dialogue, Young Leadership Dialogue, 
<http://www.aald.org/young-leadership-dialogue>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Australian American Education Leadership Foundation Limited, Memorandum and 
Articles of Association, 29 April 1993. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
221 
 
Australian Consulate-General New York, Enduring Bond: 60 Years of ANZUS, 2012 
photo exhibition, 17 April 2012, <http://www.newyork.usa.embassy.gov.au/nycg/
EnduringBondEnduringBond.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Australian Politics, 1951 Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States (ANZUS), <http://australianpolitics.com/topics/foreign-policy/anzus-
treaty-text>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Ayson, Robert, Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific: Towards a Conceptual 
Understanding, Asian Security, vol. 1, no. 2, 2005, pp. 190-213. 
 
Ayson, Robert, Australia’s Defence Policy: Medium Power, Even Bigger Ambitions?, 
The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, vol. 22, no. 2, 2010, pp. 183-196. 
 
Ayson, Robert, and Ball, Desmond, Can a Sino-Japanese War be Controlled?, 
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 56, issue 6, 2014, pp. 135-166. 
 
Ayson, Robert, “Australasian Security” in Ayson, Robert, and Ball, Desmond (eds), 
Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2006. 
 
Babbage, Ross, Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030, Kokoda Papers, no. 15, February 
2011 , <http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Documents/KP15Strategic
Edge.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Babbage, Ross, DWP 2016: Five Key Questions, The Strategist, Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute (ASPI), 29 February 2016, <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/dwp-
2016-five-key-questions/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Bai, Matt, Anne Wexler: Superlobbyist, New York Times, 27 December 2009, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/27/magazine/27wexler-t.html>, accessed 5 
April 2016. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
222 
 
Baker, John, and Paal, Douglas H., “The US-Australia Alliance” in Blackwell, Robert 
D. and Dibb, Paul (eds), America's Asian Alliances, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. 
 
Ball, Desmond, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia, 
Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1980. 
 
Ball, Desmond, Australian Defence Planning: Problems and Prospects, Pacifica 
Review, vol. 12, no. 3, 2000, pp. 281-294. 
 
Ball, Desmond, The Strategic Essence, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
vol. 55, no. 2, 2001, pp. 235-248. 
 
Ball, Desmond, Campbell, Duncan, Robinson, Bill, and Tanter, Richard, Expanded 
Communications Satellite Surveillance and Intelligence Activities Utilising Multi-
beam Antenna Systems, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, Special 
Report, 28 May 2015, <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Torus-
SATCOM.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Ball, Desmond, Milner, Anthony, and Taylor, Brendan, Track 2 Security Dialogue in 
the Asia-Pacific: Reflections and Future Directions, Asian Security, vol. 2, no. 3, 
2006, pp. 174-188. 
 
Ball, Desmond, Robinson, Bill, and Tanter, Richard, The Higher Management of Pine 
Gap, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, Special Report, 18 August 
2015, <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/The-Higher-Management-
of-Pine-Gap.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Ball, Desmond, Robinson, Bill, and Tanter, Richard, The Militarisation of Pine Gap: 
Organisations and Personnel, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 
Special Report, 13 August 2015, <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
The-militarisation-of-Pine-Gap.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
223 
 
Balogh, Stefanie, US Had No Concerns About Bob Carr’s Appointment As Foreign 
Minister, The Australian, 1 April 2012. 
 
Banham, Cynthia, US Meeting May Provide A Potent Symbol for Rudd, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 11 December 2006, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/us-
meeting-may-provide-a-potent-symbol-for-rudd/2006/12/10/1165685553923
.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Barack Obama, speech to the Australian Parliament in Canberra, The Australian, 17 
November 2011, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/national-affairs/obam
as-speech-to-parliament/story-fnb0o39u-1226197973237>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Barker, Geoffrey, Scanlan Against NAFTA Bid, Australian Financial Review, 12 August 
1997. 
 
Barker, Geoffrey, Time For A Balanced Debate on Defence, Australian Financial 
Review, 21 June 2012, <http://www.afr.com/news/policy/defence/time-for-
balanced-debate-on-defence-20120620-j2jck>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Beazley, Kim, DWP 2016: A Throwback to a Harder Era, The Strategist, Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 2 March 2016, <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/
dwp-2016-a-throwback-to-a-harder-era/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Beckley, Michael, China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure, International 
Security, vol. 36, no. 3, 2011, pp. 41-78. 
 
Beckley, Michael, The Myth of Entangling Alliance: Reassessing the Security Risks of 
US Defence Pacts, International Security, vol. 39, no. 4, 2015, pp. 7-48. 
 
Beckley, Michael, The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is 
Limited, PhD Thesis, Colombia University, New York, 2012. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
224 
 
Beeson, Mark, Can Asia’s Alliances Still Keep the Peace?, Global Asia, vol. 9, no. 3, 
2014, pp. 100-107. 
 
Beeson, Mark, “Australia and Asia: The Years of Living Aimlessly” in Singh, Daljit, 
and Smith, Anthony (eds), Southeast Asian Affairs 2001, Singapore: Institute for 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2001. 
 
Beeson, Mark, American Hegemony: The View from Australia, SAIS Review, vol. 23, 
no. 2, 2003, pp. 113-131. 
 
Beeson, Mark, Can Australia Save the World? The Limits and Possibilities of Middle 
Power Diplomacy, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 5, 2011, 
pp. 563-577. 
 
Beeson, Mark, East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After 
American Hegemony, The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 7, issue 2, no. 2, 8 January 2009, 
<http://apjjf.org/-Mark-Beeson/3008/article.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Beeson, Mark, Invasion by Invitation: The Role of Alliances in the Asia-Pacific, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3, 2015, pp. 305-320. 
 
Beeson, Mark, Issues in Australian Foreign Policy July to December 2013, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 60, no. 2, 2014, pp. 265-278. 
 
Beeson, Mark, and Broome, Andre, Hegemonic Instability and East Asia: 
Contradictions, Crises and US Power, Globalisations, vol. 7, No. 4, 2010, pp. 507-
523. 
 
Beeson, Mark, and Higgott, Richard, The Changing Architecture of Politics in the 
Asia-Pacific: Australia’s Middle Power Moment? International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific, vol. 14, 2014, pp. 215-237. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
225 
 
Bell, Coral, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, St. Leonards: Allen 
& Unwin, 1993.  
 
Bell, Coral, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era: The Next Landscape of World Politics, 
Lowy Institute Paper 21, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2007, 
<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/end-vasco-da-gama-era>, accessed 5 
April 2016. 
 
Bell, Philip, and Bell, Roger, Implicated: The United States in Australia, Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 1993. 
 
Bell, Roger J., Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations and the Pacific War, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1977. 
 
Bello, Walden, “Globalisation, Insecurity, and Overextension” in Heijmans, Annelies, 
Simmonds, Nicola, and Veenv, Hans van de (eds), Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: 
An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, Project of the 
European Centre for Conflict Prevention, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. 
 
Benson, Simon, How Suicidal ALP Spawned a Saviour, The Daily Telegraph, 2 March 
2012. 
 
Bernays, Edward, Propaganda, Brooklyn: IG Publishing, 2005 [1928], p. 73. 
 
Berteau, David J., Green, Michael J., Kiley, Gregory, and Sezchenyi, Nicholas, US 
Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment, 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), August 2012, <https://csis.org/
publication/pacom-force-posture-review>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Bishop, Julie, US-Australia: The Alliance in an Emerging Asia, speech presented at 
the Canberra Conference, Canberra, 18 June 2014, <http://foreignminister.gov.au/
speeches/Pages/2014/jb_sp_140618b.aspx?>, accessed 5 April 2015. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
226 
 
  
Bisley, Nick, An Ally For All The Years To Come: Why Australia Is Not A Conflicted US 
Ally, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 4, 2013, pp. 403-418. 
 
Bisley, Nick, Australia and the Region that 1945 Created: The Long History of 
Contemporary Strategy, The Journal of Korean Defence Analysis, vol. 27, no. 2, June 
2015, pp. 247-261. 
 
Bisley, Nick, Australia in Asia: How to Keep the Peace and Ensure Regional Security, 
The Conversation, 11 October 2011, <http://theconversation.com/australia-in-asia-
how-to-keep-the-peace-and-ensure-regional-security-3592>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Bisley, Nick, Enhancing America’s Alliances in a Changing Asia-Pacific: The Case of 
Japan and Australia, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 20. no. 1, 2006, pp. 47-73. 
 
Bisley, Nick, and Taylor, Brendan, Conflict in the East China Sea: Would ANZUS 
Apply? Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), Ultimo, NSW, 2014. 
 
Bloomfield, Alan, and Nossal, Kim Richard, Towards an Explicative Understanding of 
Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada, Contemporary Security Policy, 
vol. 28, no. 2, August 2007, pp. 286-307. 
 
Blum, William, Killing Hope: US Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II, 
Monroe, US: Common Courage Press, 2004. 
 
Bohmelt, Tobias, The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-party 
Interventions, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 47, no. 2, 2010, pp. 167-178. 
 
Brabin-Smith, Richard, Force Expansion and Warning Time, Security Challenges, vol. 
8, no. 2, 2012, pp. 33-47. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
227 
 
Brodine, Virginia, and Selden, Mark (eds), Open Secret: The Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine 
in Asia. Why We Are Never Leaving, New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 
 
Broinowski, Alison, Allied and Addicted, Melbourne: Scribe, 2007. 
 
Broinowski, Alison, Howard’s War, Melbourne: Scribe, 2003. 
 
Broomhill, Ray, “From Lucky Country to Banana Republic? The Political Economy of 
Australian Development in a Long-Run Perspective” in Bowes, Paul, Broomhill, Ray, 
Gutierrez-Haces, Teresa, and McBride, Stephen (eds), International Trade and 
Neoliberal Globalism: Towards Re-peripheralisation in Australia, Canada and 
Mexico?, London: Routledge, 2008. 
 
Brown, Gary, Breaking the American Alliance: An Independent National Security 
Policy for Australia, Canberra: Australian National University, 1989. 
 
Brown, Gary, and Rayner, Laura, Upside, Downside: ANZUS After Fifty Years, Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Current 
Issues Brief, no. 3, 2001-02. 
 
Brugger, Suzanne, Australians and Egypt, 1914-1919, Carlton, VIC: Melbourne 
University Press, 1980. 
 
Buchanan, Ian, and Findlay, Christopher, Bolting on the Second Track Key to 
Regional Cooperation in the Asian Century, East Asia Forum, 27 June 2012, <http://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/06/27/bolting-on-the-second-track-key-to-regional-
cooperation-in-the-asian-century/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Burchill, Scott, Australia’s International Relations: Particular, Common and Universal 
Interests, East Melbourne: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1994. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
228 
 
Burchill, Scott, Gillard’s Fawning Over Obama a Bad Start on Diplomatic Front, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 30 June 2010, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/
political-opinion/gillards-fawning-over-obama-a-bad-start-on-diplomatic-front-
20100629-zj3h.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Burchill, Scott, Radical Islam and the West: The Moral Panic Behind the Threat, The 
Conversation, 16 June 2015, <https://theconversation.com/radical-islam-and-the-
west-the-moral-panic-behind-the-threat-43113>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Burchill, Scott, The Jakarta Lobby: Mea Culpa?, The Age, 4 March 1999. 
 
Burke, Anthony, “Critical Approaches to Security and Strategy” in Robert Ayson and 
Desmond Ball (eds), Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific, Crows Nest, Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 2006. 
 
Burke, Anthony, Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
 
Cahill, Damien C., The Radical Neo-liberal Movement as a Hegemonic Force in 
Australia, 1976-1996, PhD Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2004. 
 
Cameron-Smith, Alexander, Australian Imperialism and International Health in the 
Pacific Islands, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 41, no. 1, 2010, pp. 57-74. 
 
Camilleri, Joseph, A Leap Into the Past - In the Name of the ‘National Interest’, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 57, no. 3, 2003, pp. 431-453. 
 
Camilleri, Joseph, Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence, South 
Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
229 
 
Camilleri, Joseph, The Howard Years: Cultural Ambivalence and Political Dogma, 
Borderlands E-Journal, Special Issue: Cultural Ambivalence, Cultural Politics: 
National Mythologies of Australia, Asia and the Past, vol. 3, no. 3, 2004. 
 
Cannon, William, How Will Australia’s Strategic Culture Inform its Engagement in 
the Indo-Pacific region?, Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West 
Cultural and Economic Studies, vol. 11, issue 1, article 3, 2014, pp. 10-21. 
 
Capie, David, When Does Track Two Matter? Structure, Agency and Asian 
Regionalism, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 17, no. 2, 2010, 291-
318. 
 
Capling, Ann, All the Way with the USA: Australia, the US and Free Trade, Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 2005. 
 
Capling, Ann, Australia and the Global Trade System: From Havana to Seattle, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
Carey, Alex, Australian Atrocities in Vietnam, Sydney: Comment Publishing 
Company, 1968. 
 
Carr, Andrew, FactCheck: Is Defence Spending Down to 1938 Level? The 
Conversation, 3 September 2013, <https://theconversation.com/factcheck-is-
defence-spending-down-to-1938-levels-17427>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Carr, Andrew, Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systemic Impact Approach, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 1, 2014, pp. 70-84. 
 
Carr, Andrew, “Learning to Act Like a Major Power – Australia as a Top 20 Nation” in 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Are We A Top 20 Nation or a Middle 
Power? Views on Australia’s Position in the World, 18 December 2014, <https://
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
230 
 
www.aspi.org.au/publications/are-we-a-top-20-nation-or-a-middle-power-views-
on-australias-position-in-the-world>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Carr, Andrew, Winning the Peace: Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia-Pacific, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2015. 
 
Catley, Robert, and McFarlance, Bruce, From Tweedledum to Tweedledee: The New 
Labor Government in Australia. A Critique of its Social Model, Sydney: Australia and 
New Zealand Book Company, 1974. 
 
Cavallaro, James, Sonnenberg, Stephan, and Knuckey, Sarah, Living Under Drones: 
Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, a report 
by the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law 
School, Stanford, and the Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law, New York, 
2012. 
 
Cha, Victor D., Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia, International 
Security, vol. 34, no. 3, 2010, pp. 158-196. 
 
Chang, Ha-Joon, Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of 
Capitalism, New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008. 
 
Chang, Ha-Joon, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical 
Perspective, London: Anthem Press, 2003. 
 
Channer, Hayley, Steadying the US Rebalance to Asia: The Role of Australia, Japan 
and South Korea, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Canberra, 10 November 
2014, <https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/steadying-the-us-rebalance-to-asia-
the-role-of-australia,-japan-and-south-korea>, accessed 25 January 2015. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
231 
 
Chatham House, Chatham House Rule, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
<http://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chathamhouserule>, accessed 3 April 
2016. 
 
Cheeseman, Graeme, “Back to ‘Forward Defence’ and the Australian National Style” 
in Cheeseman, Graeme, and Bruce, Robert (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread 
Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War, Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 1996. 
 
Cheeseman, Graeme, From Forward Defence to Self-Reliance: Changes and 
Continuities in Australian Defence Policy 1965-90, Australian Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 26, no. 3, 1991, pp. 429-445. 
 
Cheeseman, Graeme, and Bruce, Robert (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread 
Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War, Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 1996. 
 
Cheeseman, Grame, and Kettle, St John (eds), The New Australian Militarism: 
Undermining Our Future Security, Sydney: Pluto Press, 1990. 
 
Cheeseman, Graeme, and McKinley, Michael, Moments Lost: Promise, 
Disappointment and Contradictions in the Australian-United States Defence 
Relationship, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, pp. 
203-220. 
 
Chomsky, Noam, Deterring Democracy, London: Vintage Books, 1992. 
 
Chomsky, Noam, For Reasons of State, London: Penguin Books, 2003 [1973]. 
 
Chomsky, Noam, Hypocrisy of the West: East Timor, Horror and Amnesia, Le Monde 
Diplomatique, October 1999, <http://mondediplo.com/1999/10/02chomsky/>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
232 
 
 
Chomsky, Noam, Pirates and Emperors, Old and New: International Terrorism in the 
Real World, London: Pluto Press, 2002. 
 
Chomsky, Noam, Power and Prospects: Reflections on Human Nature and the Social 
Order, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1996. 
 
Chomsky, Noam, The Israel Lobby? ZNet, 28 March 2006, <https://chomsky.info/20
060328/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Chomsky, Noam, and Herman, Edward S., The Washington Connection and Third 
World Fascism: The Political Economy of Human Rights, Volume 1, Montreal: Black 
Rose Books, 1980. 
 
Chomsky, Noam, and Herman, Edward S., After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina 
and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology: The Political Economy of Human Rights, 
Volume 2, Cambridge, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1979. 
 
Chomsky, Noam, and Vltchek, Andre, On Western Terrorism: From Hiroshima to 
Drone Warfare, London: Pluto Press, 2013. 
 
Christine De, and Gerster, Robin (eds), Occupying the “Other”: Australia and 
Military Occupations From Japan to Iraq, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Newcastle 
upon Tyne, UK, 2009.  
 
Clark, Gregory, In Fear of China, Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1967. 
 
Clark, Pilta, Keating’s US Vision Is Still Cloudy, Sydney Morning Herald, 31 December 
1991. 
 
Clements, Nicholas, The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania, St Lucia, 
Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 2014. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
233 
 
 
Cochrane, Peter, Industrialisation and Dependence: Australia’s Road to Economic 
Development, 1870-1939, St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 
1980. 
 
Cockburn, Patrick, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution, 
London: Verso, 2015. 
 
Cole-Adams, Kate, Born Again Allies, Time, 7 June 1993. 
 
Collins, Alan, A People-Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar or Closed for Civil Society 
Organisations?, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 30, no. 2, 2008, pp. 313-331. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Defence Relations with the United States, 
Canberra: Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2006. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Canberra: 
Department of Defence, 27 November 1989. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Government Register of Lobbyists, 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, <http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence White Paper 2013, Canberra: Department of 
Defence, 2013. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 
2030, Defence White Paper 2009, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, Guarding Against Uncertainty: Australian Attitudes to 
Defence, Report on Community Consultations, Canberra: Department of Defence, 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
234 
 
2015, <http://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/docs/GuardingUncertainty.pdf>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National 
Security, Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2013. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, The Defence of Australia 1987, Canberra: Department 
of Defence, 1987. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, Threats to Australia’s Security: Their Nature and 
Probability, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing House, 1981. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2016 Defence White Paper, Canberra: Department of 
Defence, 2016. 
 
Comor, Edward, and Bean, Hamilton, America’s “Engagement” Delusion: Critiquing 
a Public Diplomacy Consensus, International Communication Gazette, vol. 74, no, 3, 
2012, pp. 203-220. 
 
Drew Cottle, “Diggers for Democracy? The Australians in Occupied Afghanistan and 
Iraq” in Christine De Matos and Robin Gerster (eds), Occupying the “Other”: 
Australia and Military Occupations From Japan to Iraq, Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, 2009. 
 
Cotton, James, and Ravenhill, John, “Middle Power Dreaming: Australian Foreign 
Policy During the Rudd-Gillard Governments” in Cotton, James, and Ravenhill, John 
(eds), Middle Power Dreaming: Australia and the World Affairs 2006-2010, South 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
235 
 
Cowan, Geoffrey, and Arsenault, Amelia, Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to 
Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 616, March 2008, pp. 10-30. 
 
Cox, Lloyd, and O’Connor, Brendon, Australia, the US, and the Vietnam and Iraq 
Wars: “Hound Dog not Lapdog”, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 47, No. 
2, 2012, pp. 173-187. 
 
Creveld, Martin Van, The Rise and Decline of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Crough, Greg, and Wheelwright, Ted, Australia: A Client State, Melbourne: Penguin 
Books, 1982. 
 
Cull, Nicholas J., “Introduction” in Popiolkowski, Joseph J., and Cull, Nicholas J. (eds), 
Public Diplomacy, Cultural Interventions & the Peace Process in Northern Ireland: 
Track Two to Peace?, USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School, 
University of Southern California, Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2009. 
 
Cull, Nicholas J., The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American 
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008. 
 
Cumings, Bruce, The Korean War: A History, New York: The Modern Library, 2011. 
 
Curran, James, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War, Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2015. 
 
Curtis, Mark, The Great Deception: Anglo-American Power and World Order, 
London: Pluto Press, 1998. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
236 
 
Curtis, Mark, Web of Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the World, London: Vintage Press, 
2003. 
 
Davidson, William D., and Montville, Joseph V., Foreign Policy According to Freud, 
Foreign Policy, no. 45, winter, 1981-82, pp. 145-157. 
 
Davies, Andrew, and Thompson, Mark, Known Unknowns: Uncertainty About the 
Future of the Asia-Pacific, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Canberra, Issue 
35, October 2010, <https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/special-report-issue-35-
known-unknowns-uncertainty-about-the-future-of-the-asia-pacific>, accessed 5 
April 2016. 
 
Davies, Andrew, and White, Harry, Taking Wing: Time to Decide on the F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Canberra, March 2014, 
<https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/taking-wing-time-to-decide-on-the-f-35-
joint-strike-fighter>, accessed 5 April 2015. 
 
Davis, Mark, Forging a New Trade Route, Australian Financial Review, 5 January 
2005. 
 
Davis, Mark, Quick Dealing at the Business End of Trade, Australian Financial 
Review, 7 January 2005. 
 
Day, David, Bowing to Duchess Diplomacy, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 June 2012, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/bowing-to-duchess-
diplomacy-20120607-1zysh.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Deery, Phillip, Menzies, the Cold War and the 1953 Convention on Peace and War, 
Australian Historical Studies, vol. 34, no. 122, 2003, pp. 248-269. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
237 
 
Denton, John, Second-Track Diplomacy Aids Foreign Policy, The Australian, 17 July 
2009, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/second-track-diplomacy-aids-
foreign-policy/story-e6frg6n6-1225751155708>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Dialogue and Research Monitor, Index of Meetings in 1988, Japan Centre for 
International Exchange, <http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/Feb99/>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
Dialogue and Research Monitor, Overview Report 2008, Japan Centre for 
International Exchange, <http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/2008/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Dibb, Paul, “America and the Asia-Pacific” in Ayson, Robert, and Ball, Desmond 
(eds), Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific, Crows Nest, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
2006. 
 
Dibb, Paul, “Australia-United States” in Taylor, Brendan (ed), Australia as an Asia 
Pacific Regional Power: Friendship in Flux, London: Routledge, 2007. 
 
Dibb, Paul, remarks to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 9 August 1999, <http://nautilus.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/Ball-Dibb-testimony-to-JSCOT-Inquiry-into-An-
Agreement-to-extend-the-period-of-operation-of-the-Joint-Defence-Facility-at-
Pine-Gap.-Report-26-1999.pdf>, accessed 10 October 2015. 
 
Dibb, Paul, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister for 
Defence, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March 1986. 
 
Dibb, Paul, The Asia-Pacific Region Post Cold War, seminar presented to the 
Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade on the ANZUS Alliance, Canberra, 11 August 1997. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
238 
 
Dibb, Paul, “The Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: The History of an Idea” in 
Huisken, Ron, and Thatcher, Meredith (eds), History as Policy: Framing the Debate 
on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy, Canberra: Australian National University 
E Press, 2007. 
 
Dibb, Paul, “The Strategic Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region” in Blackwell, 
Robert D., and Dibb, Paul (eds), America's Asian Alliances, Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2000. 
 
Dibb, Paul, US-Australia Alliance Relations: An Australian View, Strategic Forum, 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, no. 216, August 
2005. 
 
Dibb, Paul, Why I Disagree with Hugh White on China’s Rise, The Australian, 13 
August 2012, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/why-i-disagree-with-
hugh-white-on-chinas-rise/story-e6frg6zo-1226448713852>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Dibb, Paul, and Brabin-Smith, Richard, Australian Defence: Challenges for the New 
Government, Security Challenges, vol. 9, no. 4, 2013, pp. 45-64. 
 
Dibb, Paul, and Lee, John, Why China Will Not Become the Dominant Power in Asia, 
Security Challenges, vol. 10, no. 3, 2014, pp. 1-21. 
 
Dobell, Graeme, The Alliance Echoes and Portents of Australia’s Longest War, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 6, no. 4, 2014, pp. 386-396. 
 
Dodd, Tim, Arise Australia, Global Leader..., Australian Financial Review, 15 August 
2003. 
 
Donnini, Frank P., ANZUS in Revision: Changing Defence Features of Australia and 
New Zealand in the Mid-1980s, Alabama: Air University Press, February 1991. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
239 
 
Doran, Chris, and Anderson, Tim, Iraq and the Case for Australian War Crimes Trials, 
Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 56, 2011, pp. 283–299. 
 
Dorling, Philip, The Origins of the ANZUS Treaty: A Reconsideration, South Australia: 
Flinders Politics Monographs, Flinders University, 1989. 
 
Douglas, Elena, and Stone, Diane, The Informal Diplomacy of the Australian 
American Leadership Dialogue, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 69, 
no. 1, 2015, pp. 18-34. 
 
Dower, John W., Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq, New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company Inc, 2010. 
 
Dower, John, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II, London: 
Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1999. 
 
Downer, Alexander, Latham Cuts and Runs From US Relationship, press release 
from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 12 May 2004, <http://foreignminister.gov.au/
releases/2004/040512.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Downer, Alexander, Should Australia Think Big or Small in Foreign Policy, speech to 
the Centre for Independent Studies: The Policymakers Forum, 10 July 2006. 
 
Dupont, Alan, Transformation or Stagnation? Rethinking Australia’s Defence, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 57, no. 1, 2003, pp. 55-76. 
 
Dutt, Nitish K., The United States and the Asian Development Bank, Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, vol. 27, no. 1, 1997, pp. 71-84. 
 
Dyster, Barrie, and Meredith, David, Australia in the International Economy in the 
Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
240 
 
Edwards, Peter, Curtin, MacArthur and the “Surrender of Sovereignty”: A 
Historiographical Assessment, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 
2, 2001, pp. 175-185. 
 
Edwards, Peter, Permanent Friends? Historical Reflections on the Australian-
American Alliance, Lowy Institute Paper 8, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 
Sydney, 13 December 2005, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/perm
anent-friends-historical-reflections-australian-american-alliance>, accessed 5 April 
2015. 
 
Edwards, Peter, seminar on the ANZUS Alliance presented to the Defence Sub-
Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 
Canberra, 11 August 1997. 
 
Edwards, Peter, with Pemberton, Gregory, Crises and Commitments: The Politics 
and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965, 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992. 
 
Elliot, Geoff, and Mathieson, Clive, Phil Scanlan and the American Connection, The 
Australian, 16 May 2013, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/the-deal-
magazine/the-american-connection/story-e6frgabx-1226641967547>, accessed 5 
April 2016. 
 
Emmers, Ralf, “The US Rebalancing Strategy: Impact on the South China Sea” in 
Buszynski, Leszek, and Roberts, Christopher, (eds), The South China Sea and 
Australia’s Regional Security Environment, National Security College Occasional 
Paper, no. 5, September 2013. 
 
Evans, Gareth, Australia and Asia: The Role of Public Diplomacy, address to the 
Australia-Asia Association, Melbourne, 15 March 1990, <http://www.gevans.org/
speeches/old/1990/150390_fm_australiaandasia.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
241 
 
Fernandes, Clinton, Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the independence of 
East Timor, Carlton North, Victoria: Scribe Publications, 2004. 
 
Firth, Stuart, Australia’s Policy Towards Coup-Prone and Military Regimes in the 
Asia-Pacific: Thailand, Fiji and Burma, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 
67, no. 3, 2013, pp. 357-372. 
 
Flitton, Daniel, Man of Many Words, The Age, 11 August 2007, <http://www.theage
.com.au/news/in-depth/man-of-many-words/2007/08/10/1186530610605.html>, 
accessed 5 April. 
 
Fraser, Malcolm, with Roberts, Cain, Dangerous Allies, Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2014. 
 
Fruhling, Stephan, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, Canberra: 
Defence Publishing Service, Department of Defence, 2009. 
 
Fruhling, Stephan, Australian Defence Policy and the Concept of Self-Reliance, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 5, 2014, pp. 531-547. 
 
Fullilove, Michael, The Birthplace of the Fortunate, 2015 Boyer Lectures, 18 October 
2015, <http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/boyerlectures/2015-10-
18/6689512#transcript>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Garner, Alice, and Kirkby, Diane, “Never a Machine for Propaganda?” The 
Australian-American Fulbright Program and Australia’s Cold War, Australian 
Historical Studies, vol. 44, no. 1, 2013, pp. 117-133. 
 
Garran, Robert, True Believer: John Howard, George Bush and the American 
Alliance, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2004. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
242 
 
Gelber, H. G.,  The Australian American Alliance: Costs and Benefits, Baltimore: 
Penguin Books, 1968. 
 
George, Alexander (ed), Western State Terrorism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. 
 
George Bush Comes to Town, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 January 1992. 
 
George, James, and McGibbon, Rodd, Dangerous Liaisons: Neoliberal Foreign Policy 
and Australia’s Regional Engagement, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 33, 
no. 3, 1998, pp. 399-420. 
 
Gill, Bates, and Switzer, Tom, The New Special Relationship, Foreign Affairs, 19 
February 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/australia/2015-02-
19/new-special-relationship>, accessed 5 April 2015. 
 
Glasgow, Will, and Aston, Jo, The Demise of Phil Scanlan and the Australian 
American Leadership Dialogue, Australian Financial Review, 4 February 2015. 
 
Glasgow, Will, Will Turnbull Save Scanlan’s Australian American Leadership Dialogue 
with a DD?, Australian Financial Review, 9 March 2016. 
 
Glass, Charles, Syria Burning: ISIS and the Death of the Arab Spring, New York: OR 
Books, 2015. 
 
Glasser, Bonnie S., Armed Clash in the South China Sea, Contingency Planning 
Memorandum No. 14, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012, <http://www.cfr
.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>, accessed 15 April 2016. 
 
Glosserman, Brad, The Australian Canary, The Diplomat, 23 November 2011, 
<http://thediplomat.com/2011/11/the-australian-canary/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
243 
 
Goldsworthy, David, Australian External Policy and the End of Britain’s Empire, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 51, no. 1, 2005, pp. 17-29. 
 
Goldsworthy, David, Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of Britain’s Empire, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002. 
 
Green, Michael J., and Szechenyi, Nicholas, Power and Order in Asia: A Survey of 
Regional Expectations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
Washington, 17 July 2014, <http://csis.org/publication/power-and-order-asia>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Green, Michael J., et. al., Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025, Capabilities, Presence and 
Partnerships: An Independent Review of US Defence Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, January 2016, <http://csis.org/files/
publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf>, accessed 5 
April 2016. 
 
Green, Michael J., et. al., The ANZUS Alliance in An Ascending Asia, Centre of Gravity 
Series, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre ANU and the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, July 2015, <http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/publications/anzus-
alliance-ascending-asia>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Gregory, Bruce, Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 616, March 2008, 274-290. 
 
Guan, Kwa Chong, “CSCAP: From Epistemic to Learning Community” in Ball, 
Desmond, and Guan, Kwa Chong (eds), Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-
Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2010. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
244 
 
Guth, David W., Black, White, and Shades of Gray: The Sixty-Year Debate Over 
Propaganda versus Public Diplomacy, Journal of Promotion Management, vol. 13, 
2008, pp. 309-325. 
 
Gyngell, Allan, and Wesley, Michael, Making Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Haas, Peter M., Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, International Organisation, vol. 46, no. 1, winter 1992, pp. 1-35. 
 
Halvorson, Dan, Reputation and Responsibility in Australia's 2003 Intervention in 
the Solomon Islands, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 4, 2013, 
pp. 439-455. 
 
Han, Eulalia, and Rane, Halim, Making Australian Foreign Policy On Israel-Palestine: 
Media Coverage, Public Opinion And Interest Groups, Carlton: Melbourne University 
Press, 2013. 
 
Hardy, John, Ending Ambivalence: Australian Perspectives on Stability in Asia, 18th 
Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Adelaide, 5-8 July 
2010. 
 
Hardy, John, Statements of Intent: The Politicisation of Australia’s Strategic Edge in 
the era of Defence Self-Reliance, Australian Political Studies Association (APSA) 
Annual Conference, Melbourne, 30 September – 3 October 2013. 
 
Harper, Norman, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian American 
Relations Between 1900 and 1975, St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland 
Press, 1987. 
 
Harper, Norman, Australian Policy Towards Japan, Australian Outlook, vol. 1, no. 4, 
1947, pp. 14-24. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
245 
 
 
Hartcher, Peter, Any China Conversation Better Than None At All, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 14 August 2012, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
opinion/any-china-conversation-better-than-none-at-all-20120813-244vd.html>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Hartcher, Peter, Are We Looking Less Like Americans?, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 
March 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/comment/are-we-looking-less-like-
americans-20140317-34xwx.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Hartcher, Peter, Big Kim a Sturdy Bridge to the US, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 July 
2004. 
 
Hartcher, Peter, Curtin Call and Excellent Debut, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 June 
2008, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/peter-hartcher/curtin-call-an-excellent-
debut/2008/06/26/1214472672972.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Hartcher, Peter, Dunny Escape to Done Deal, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 November 
2004, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/11/18/1100748140918.html>, 
accessed 5 April 2016.  
 
Hartcher, Peter, Forum Plays A Vital Role in Healthy US-Australia Links, Australian 
Financial Review, 10 August 2001. 
 
Hartcher, Peter, Frosty Relations Threaten to Sour Alliance, Sydney Morning Herald, 
11 June 2004, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/06/10/1086749840015
.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Hartcher, Peter, Howard Sets the Trap for a Younger Player, Sydney Morning Herald, 
18 June 2004, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/06/17/1087245040341
.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
246 
 
Hartcher, Peter, In With the New, And No Hard Feelings, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 
January 2008, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/in-with-the-new-and-no-
hard-feelings/2008/01/25/1201157663391.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Hartcher, Peter, Push for Broader Deal with US, Australian Financial Review, 29 
January 2002. 
 
Hartcher, Peter, Think About Life Without the US: Armitage, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 11 June 2004, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/06/10/108674984
2549.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Hawksley, Charles, Australia’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands: Change and 
Continuity: Change and Continuity in Middle Power Foreign Policy, Global Change, 
Peace & Security, vol. 21, no. 1, 2009, pp. 115-130. 
 
Heinrichs, Raoul, China’s Defence White Paper is Historic for Australia, And Not in a 
Good Way, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, <http://www
.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/06/03/Chinas-defence-white-paper-is-historic-for-
Australia-and-not-in-a-good-way.aspx>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Hemming, Judy, and McKinley, Michael, Major Wars and Regional Responses in 
Australia and New Zealand: International Relations as Apologetics and Exegesis (and 
Inadequate), paper presented to the Panel WC76 Memorialisation, Public Grieving 
and War in the Configuring of Political Community: Regional and Local Perspectives, 
56th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, 
18 February 2015. 
 
Henderson, Gerard, Correspondence: Robert Macklin and The Sydney Institute, The 
Sydney Institute Quarterly, issue 31, September 2007. 
 
Henry, Iain, Bipartisanship on the US-Australia Alliance Inhibits Serious Debate 
About the Benefits and Risks, Canberra Times, 31 May 2015, <http://www.canberra
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
247 
 
times.com.au/comment/bipartisanship-on-the-usaustralia-alliance-inhibits-serious-
debate-about-the-benefits-and-risks-20150529-ghcw84.html>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
Herman, Edward S., The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda, 
Boston: South End Press, 1982. 
 
Hernandez, Katherine Marie G., Bridging Officials and the Peoples of ASEAN: The 
Role of the ASEAN People’s Assembly, a paper prepared for the Anniversary 
Conference of the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, 22 October 2010. Note permission to cite received from author. 
 
Holdich, Roger, Johnson, Vivianne, and Andre, Pamela (eds), Documents on 
Australian Foreign Policy: The ANZUS Treaty 1951, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, 2001. 
 
Homans, Charles, Track II Diplomacy: A Short History, Foreign Policy, July/August 
2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/track-ii-diplomacy-a-short-history/>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Hudson, Phillip, Latham A Threat To Security, The Age, 18 September 2005, 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/latham-a-threat-to-security/2005/09/
17/1126750170163.html, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Hyde, Jim, Australia: The Asia Connection, Malmsbury, Victoria: Kibble Books, 1978. 
Middle Power Foreign Policy, Global Change, Peace & Security, vol. 21, no. 1, 2009, 
pp. 115-130. 
 
Ikenberry, John, and Kupchan, Charles A., Socialisation and Hegemonic Power, 
International Organisation, vol. 44, no. 3, summer 1990, pp. 283-315. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
248 
 
Ingram, James, A Time for Change - The Alliance and Australian Foreign Policy, 
address to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 9 June 2011, <http://
www.internationalaffairs.org.au/media_library/a-time-for-change-the-us-alliance-
and-australian-foreign-policy-by-james-ingram-ao-faiia/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, What is Multi-Track Diplomacy?, 
<http://www.imtd.org/index.php/about/84-about/131-what-is-multi-track-
diplomacy>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Jackman, Simon, et. al., The Asian Research Network: Survey on America’s Role in 
the Asia-Pacific, United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, June 
2016, <http://ussc.edu.au/publications/The-Asian-Research-Network-Survey-on-
Americas-role-in-the-Asia-Pacific>, accessed 8 June 2016. 
 
Jackson, Richard, Murphey, Eamon, and Poynting, Scott (eds), Contemporary State 
Terrorism: Theory and Practice, London: Routledge, 2010. 
 
Jennings, Peter, Defence White Paper: Battlefront Pitched Beyond “Sea Air Gap”, 
The Australian, 27 February 2016, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/def
ence-white-paper-battlefront-pitched-beyond-sea-air-gap/news-story/f518f3a25fa9
d0d06a798f58e48b4624>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Jennings, Peter, The 2016 Defence White Paper: Good Posture, The Strategist, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 25 February 2016, <http://www.aspi
strategist.org.au/the-2016-defence-white-paper-good-posture/>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
Job, Brian L., “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asian 
Security Order” in Ball, Desmond, and Guan, Kwa Chong, (eds), Assessing Track 2 
Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra and S. Rajaratnam School 
of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2010. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
249 
 
 
Johnson, Chalmers, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004. 
 
Jones, David Martin, and Smith, Michael L.R., Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN 
and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order, International Security, vol. 32, no. 1, 
summer 2007, pp. 148-184. 
 
Jones, Peter, Filling a Critical Gap, or Just Wasting Time? Track Two Diplomacy and 
Regional Security in the Middle East, Disarmament Forum: Arms Control in the 
Middle East, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), no. 2, 
2008. 
 
Julia Gillard Gives Labor a New Start, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 June 2010, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/editorial/julia-gillard-gives-labor-a-new-
start-20100624-z3jh.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Kasper, Wolfgang, Blandy, Richard, Freebairn, John, Hocking, Douglas, and O’Neil, 
Robert, Australia at the Crossroads: Our Choices to the Year 2000, Sydney: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1980. 
 
Katz, Elihu, and Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in 
the Flow of Mass Communications, New York: The Free Press, 1955. 
 
Kaye, Dalia Dassa, Rethinking Track Two Diplomacy: The Middle East and South Asia, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, no. 
3, June 2005. 
 
Kelly, Paul, China Divides Labor Across its Generations, The Australian, 11 August 
2012, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/china-divides-labor-
across-its-generations/story-e6frg74x-1226447870597>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
250 
 
Kelly, Paul, If Push Comes To Shove, The Australian, 10 July 2004. 
 
Kelly, Paul, The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia, Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2009.  
 
Kelly, Paul, The Rudd Alliance, The Australian, 28 June 2008. 
 
Kelly, Paul, US Bull Wants to Help in the China Shop, The Australian, 8 June 2011. 
 
Kelly, Paul, US, Labor Tense But Talking, The Australian, 16 June 2004. 
 
Kennan, George, Review of Current Trends, US Foreign Policy, Policy Planning Staff, 
PPS No. 23, 28 February 1948. 
 
Kenny, Mark, Gillard Lacks “Passion for Foreign Affairs” that Rudd had, Australian, 6 
October 2010, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/politics-news/gill
ard-lacks-passion-for-foreign-affairs-that-rudd-had/story-fn59nqld-122593458153
4>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Kerin, John, and Earl, Greg, Gillard Sticks to Her Guns on Foreign Affairs, Australian 
Financial Review, 26 June 2010, <http://www.afr.com/news/politics/gillard-sticks-
to-her-guns-on-foreign-affairs-20100625-iva7m>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Kettle, St John, Australia’s Arms Exports: Keeping them out of Repressive Hands, 
Peace Research Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1989. 
 
Khoo, Nicholas, Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay, 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 4, 2004, 35-46. 
 
Kingston, Margo, Loyalty Remembers Yesterday’s Man, The Age, 3 January 1992. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
251 
 
Kolko, Gabriel, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern 
Historical Experience, New York: Pantheon Books. 
 
Kolko, Gabriel, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945 – 
1980, New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. 
 
Kraft, Herman Joseph S., “The Autonomy Dilemma of Track 2 Diplomacy in 
Southeast Asia” in Ball, Desmond, and Guan, Kwa Chong (eds), Assessing Track 2 
Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, the Australian National University, Canberra and S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2010. 
 
Kraft, Herman Joseph S., The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in 
Southeast Asia, Security Dialogue, vol. 31, no. 3, 2000, pp. 343-356. 
 
Kraft, Herman Joseph S., Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights in Southeast 
Asia: the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor, Global Networks, vol. 2, no. 1, 2002, 
pp. 49-63. 
 
Kramer, Ronald C., and Michalowski, Raymond J., War, Aggression and State Crime: 
A Criminological Analysis of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, The British Journal 
of Criminology, vol. 45, no. 4, July 2005, pp. 446-469. 
 
Krebs, Gerhard, World War Zero? Reassessing the Global Impact of the Russo-
Japanese War 1904-05, The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 10, issue 21, no. 2, 2012, 
<http://apjjf.org/2012/10/21/Gerhard-Krebs/3755/article.html>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
Kuzmarov, Jeremy, Bomb After Bomb: US Air Power and Crimes of War From World 
War II to the Present, The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 10, issue 47, no. 3, 19 November 
2012, <http://apjjf.org/2012/10/47/Jeremy-Kuzmarov/3855/article.html>, accessed 
5 April 2016. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
252 
 
 
Lague, David, Australia Charts New Course in Asia-Pacific, Australian Financial 
Review, 31 December 1991. 
 
Lake, Marilyn, and Reynolds, Henry (eds), The Militarisation of Australian History, 
Sydney: UNSW Press, 2010. 
 
Lake, Marilyn, and Reynolds, Henry, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's 
Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008. 
 
Langmore, John, Logan, Calum, and Firth, Stewart, The 2009 Australian Defence 
White Paper: Analysis and Alternatives, Austral Policy Forum 10-01A, Nautilus 
Institute for Security and Sustainability, 15 September 2010, <http://nautilus.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/12/langmore-logan-firth.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Lasslett, Kristian, State Crime by Proxy: Australia and the Bougainville Conflict, 
British Journal of Criminology, vol. 52, no. 4, 2012, pp. 705-723. 
 
Lasswell, Harold D., Propaganda Technique in the World War, London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co. LTD, 1927. 
 
Latham, Mark, Labor and the World, address to the Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, Sydney, 7 April 2004. Reproduced at Australianpolitics.com, <http://aust
ralianpolitics.com/2004/04/07/labor-and-the-world-latham-foreign-policy-
speech.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Latham, Mark, The Latham Diaries, Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 
2005. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
253 
 
Latham “Undermining” US alliance, ABC News, 13 April 2004, <http://www.abc.net
.au/news/2004-04-13/latham-undermining-us-alliance/169506>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
Lazarsfeld, Paul, Berelson, Bernard, and Gaudet, Hazel, The People’s Choice: How 
the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1944. 
 
Lee, Yi-Jin, Singapore’s Defence Policy: Essential or Excessive, Master’s Thesis, US 
Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 2010. 
 
Leys, Simon, The Intimate Orwell, The New York Review of Books, 26 May 2011, 
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/may/26/intimate-orwell/>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Lippmann, Walter, Public Opinion, New York: The Free Press, 1922. 
 
Lippmann, Walter, The Phantom Public, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925. 
 
Lockhart, Greg, “We’re So Alone” Two Versions of the Void in Australian Military 
History, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 33, no. 120, 2002, pp. 389-397. 
 
Lockhart, Greg, “Absenting Asia” in Walker, David, and Sobocinska, Agnieszka (eds), 
Australia’s Asia, From Yellow Peril to Asian Century, Perth: University of Western 
Australia Publishing, 2012. 
 
Lockhart, Greg, Mugged at Oxford: Or, “Little Point in Defending the Periphery”!, 
Australian Historical Studies, vol. 35, no. 123, 2004, pp. 149-151. 
 
Lockhart, Greg, Race Fear, Dangerous Denial: Japan and the Great Deception in 
Australian History, Griffith Review Edition 32: Wicked Problems, Exquisite Dilemmas, 
2011, pp. 58-96. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
254 
 
 
Lockhart, Greg, The Minefield: An Australian Tragedy in Vietnam, Crows Nest, 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2007. 
 
Loewenstein, Antony, Rudd Helps The Middle East Story Remain One Sided, Crikey, 
4 December 2009, <http://www.crikey.com.au/2009/12/04/rudd-helps-the-middle-
east-story-remain-one-sided/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Loewnstein, Antony, Wikileaks Challenges Journalism-Politics Partnership, The 
Drum, ABC, 10 December 2010, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-12-10/wiki
leaks_challenges_jounalism-politics_partnership/42042>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Logan, Justin, China, America and the Pivot to Asia, CATO Institute, Policy Analysis 
No. 717, 8 January 2013, <http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/china-
america-pivot-asia>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Loosley, Stephen, Support Grows for Free Trade, Sunday Telegraph, 19 August 2001. 
 
Loosley, Stephen, The Ties That Bind, The Australian, 17 May 2013, <http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/business/the-deal-magazine/the-ties-that-bind/story-e6frga
bx-1226643018865>, accessed 5 April 2015. 
 
Lyon, Rod, Alliance Unleashed: Australia And The US In A New Strategic Age, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Canberra, June 2005, <https://www.
aspi.org.au/publications/alliance-unleashed-australia-and-the-us-in-a-new-strat
egic-age>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Lyon, Rod, and Tow, William T., The Future of the Australia-US Security Relationship, 
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 1 December 
2003. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
255 
 
MacDonald, David, and O'Connor, Brendon, Australia and New Zealand - America’s 
Antipodean Anglosphere Allies?, Australian Political Studies Association (APSA), 20 
August 2010, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664698>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Mackie, Jamie, and MacIntyre, Andrew, “Politics” in Hill, Hal (ed), Indonesia’s New 
Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1994. 
 
Manne, Robert, Little America: How John Howard Has Changed Australia, The 
Monthly, March 2006. 
 
Manne, Robert, Threats to University Independence: The Case of the Humanities, 
The Journal for the Public University, vol. 4, 2007, pp. 15-20. 
 
Mapendere, Jeffrey, Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of 
Tracks, Culture of Peace Online Journal, vol. 2, no. 1, 2005, pp. 66-81. 
 
Martin Griffiths and Michael Wesley, Taking Asia Seriously, Australian Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 45, no. 1, 2010, pp. 13-28. 
 
Martin, Douglas, Anne Wexler, An Influential Political Operative and Lobbyist, Is 
Dead At 79, New York Times, 8 August 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/
09/us/politics/09wexler.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
McCausland, Jeffrey D., Stuart, Douglas T., Tow, William T., and Wesley, Michael 
(eds), The Other Special Relationship: The United States and Australia at the Start of 
the 21st Century, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2007. 
 
McCormack, Gavan, Cold War Hot War: An Australian Perspective of the Korean 
War, Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1983. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
256 
 
McCormack, Gavan, Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink of 
Nuclear Catastrophe, Sydney: Random House Australia, 2004. 
 
McCoy, Alfred W., A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to 
the War on Terror, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006. 
 
McCraw, David, Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture: the Cases of Australia 
and New Zealand, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 2, 2011, 
pp. 167-184. 
 
McDonald, Hamish, The Wired Seas of Asia: China, Japan, the US and Australia, The 
Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 13, issue 15, no. 2, 20 April 2015, <http://apjjf.org/2015/
13/15/Hamish-McDonald/4309.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
McDonald, Hamish, True Friends Must Tell The Truth, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 
March 2010, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/true-friends-must-tell-the-
truth-20100319-qm1p.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
McDonald, Hamish, World’s A Stage for Softly, Softly Diplomats, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 23 July 2011, <http://www.smh.com.au/zoom/archive/d2510238>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
McDougall, Derek, Australia and the British Military Withdrawal From East of the 
Suez, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 51, no. 2, 1997, pp. 183-194. 
 
McFarlane, Bruce, “Australian Post-War Economic Policy” in Curthoys, Ann, and 
Merritt, John (eds), Australia’s First Cold War 1945-1953, Vol 1, Society, 
Communism and Culture, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1984. 
 
McLean, David, Anzus Origins: A Reassessment, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 24, 
no. 94, 1990, pp. 64-82. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
257 
 
McLean, David, Australia in the Cold War: A Historiographical Review, The 
International History Review, vol. 23, no. 2, 2001, pp. 299-321. 
 
McLean, David, From British Colony to American Satellite? Australia and the USA 
during the Cold War, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 52, no. 1, 2006, 
pp. 64-79. 
 
McLean, Ian W., Why Australia Prospered: The Shifting Sources of Economic Growth, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. 
 
Meakin, D. S., Australian Attitudes to Indian Independence, The Australian 
Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 1, March 1968, pp. 83-89. 
 
Meaney, Neville, “E.L Pearce and the Problem of Japan” in Bridge, Carl, and Attard, 
Bernard (eds), Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from 
Federation to the Second World War, Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 
2000. 
 
Mearsheimer, John, and Walt, Stephen, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007. 
 
Medcalf, Rory, Don’t ‘Contain’ China, but Australia Must Push for Rules-Based 
Security Order, Australian Financial Review, 11 September 2015, <http://www.afr
.com/opinion/dont-contain-china-but-australia-must-push-for-rulesbased-security-
order-20150910-gjjp0v>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Michaelsen, Christopher, The Triviality of Terrorism, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 66, no. 4. 2012, pp. 431-449. 
 
Military, Air and Civil Aid from Australia for Indo-China, The Canberra Times, 12 
March 1953, p. 1. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
258 
 
Millett, Michael, Keating Gets the Kudos but Hawke Gets the Emotion, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 3 January 1992. 
 
Mills, Stephen, US Sends Hugs and Kisses Then We’re On Our Own, Australian 
Financial Review, 3 January 1992. 
 
Milne, Glenn, Rudd’s Relevance Deprivation Syndrome, The Drum, ABC, 29 
September 2010, <http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/35454.html>, accessed 5 
April 2016. 
 
Munster, George J., and Walsh, Richard, Secrets of State: A Detailed Assessment of 
the Book They Banned, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1982. 
 
Murfett, Malcolm, “The Singapore Strategy” in Bridge, Carl, and Attard, Bernard 
(eds), Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation to 
the Second World War, Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000. 
 
Murphy, Katharine, Latham Cops Flak Over US Stand, Australian Financial Review, 
13 April 2004. 
 
Newton, Douglas, Hell-Bent: Australia’s Leap into the Great War, Melbourne: Scribe 
Publications, 2014. 
 
Nicholson, Brendan, Secret “War” With China Uncovered, The Australian, 2 June 
2012, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/secret-war-with-
china-uncovered/story-fn59nm2j-1226381002984>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Notter, James, and Diamond, Louise, Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: 
Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice, Occasional Paper No. 7, Washington: Institute for 
Multi-Track Diplomacy, October 1996, <http://www.imtd.org/index.php/publication
s/papers-and-articles/81-publications/144-occasional-paper-building-peace-and-
transforming-conflict-multi-track-diplomacy-in-practice>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
259 
 
 
Nye, Joseph S., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, vol. 616, March 2008, pp. 94-109. 
 
Nye, Joseph S., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004. 
 
O’Brien, Patricia, Remaking Australia's Colonial Culture?: White Australia and its 
Papuan Frontier 1901–1940, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 40, no. 1, 2009, pp. 
96-112. 
 
O’Connor, Brendan, and Vucetic, Srdjan, Another Mars-Venus Divide? Why Australia 
Said “Yes” and Canada Said “Non” to Involvement in the 2003 Iraq War, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 64, no. 5, November 2010, pp. 526-548. 
 
O’Lincoln, Tom, Australia’s Pacific War: Challenging a National Myth, Australia: 
Interventions Publishers, 2011. 
 
O’Lincoln, Tom, The Neighbour From Hell: Two Centuries of Australian Imperialism, 
Melbourne: Interventions, 2014. 
 
O’Neill, Andrew, “Regional, Alliance and Global Priorities of the Rudd-Gillard 
Government” in Cotton, James, and Ravenhill, John (eds), Middle Power Dreaming: 
Australia and the World Affairs 2006-2010, South Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 2011. 
 
O’Neill, Andrew, Australia’s Asia White Paper Review and the Dilemmas of 
Engagement, Security Challenges, vol. 8, no. 1, 2012, pp. 13-18. 
 
Oakes, Laurie, Julia Gillard Finds a Spine, Turns Defeat Into A Breathtaking Win, 
Herald Sun, 3 March 2012, http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/opinion/julia-
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
260 
 
gillard-finds-a-spine-turns-defeat-into-a-breathtaking-win/story-fn56baaq-12262
87818689, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Oakman, Daniel, Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan, Canberra: Pandanus 
Books, 2004. 
 
Oakman, Daniel, The Politics of Foreign Aid: Counter-Subversion and the Colombo 
Plan, 1950–1970, Pacifica Review, vol. 13, no. 3, 2001, pp. 255-272. 
 
Pacific Alliance Loses a Powerful Friend, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 August 2009. 
 
Palazzo, Albert, The Making of Strategy and the Junior Coalition Partner: Australia 
and the 2003 Iraq War, Infinity Journal, vol. 2, no. 4, 2012, pp. 26-30. 
 
Pan, Chengxin, The “Indo-Pacific” and Geopolitical Anxieties About China’s Rise in 
the Asian Regional Order, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 4, 
2014, pp. 453-469. 
 
Panitch, Leo, and Gindin, Sam, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political 
Economy of American Empire, London: Verso, 2012. 
 
Park, Jae Jeok, The US-led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Hedge Against Potential 
Threats or an Undesirable Multilateral Security Order, The Pacific Review, vol. 24, 
no. 2, 2011, pp. 137-158. 
 
Park, Jae Jeok, and Yoo, Hyun Chung, The Resilience of the US Australia Alliance: 
Does a (Potential) China Threat Provide a Rationale for the Alliance?, The Korean 
Journal of Defence Analysis, vol. 27, no. 4, December 2015, pp. 417-434. 
 
Patience, Allan, The Two Streams of Australia’s Middle Power Imaginings and their 
Sources, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 60, no. 3, 2014, pp. 449-465. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
261 
 
Paul, Erik, Australia and Southeast Asia: Regionalisation, Democracy and Conflict, 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 29, no. 3, 1999, pp. 285-308. 
 
Paul, Erik, Little America: Australia, the 51st State, London: Pluto Press, 2006. 
 
Paul, Erik, Neoliberal Australia and US Imperialism in East Asia, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Peck, James, Ideal Illusions: How the US Government Co-opted Human Rights, New 
York: Metropolitan Books, 2010. 
 
Peck, James, Washington’s China: The National Security World, the Cold War, and 
the Origins of Globalism, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006. 
 
Pemberton, Gregory, All the Way: Australia’s Road to Vietnam, Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1987. 
 
Peng, Chin, Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History, Singapore, Media Master, 2003. 
 
Peterson, M. J., Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management 
of Whaling, International Organisation, vol. 46, no. 1, 1992, pp. 147-186. 
 
Phillips, Dennis, Ambivalent Allies: Myth and Reality in the Australian-American 
Relationship, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1988. 
 
Philpott, Simon, Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the Australian National 
Imagination, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 3, 2001, pp. 371-
388. 
 
Pietsch, Sam, Australia’s Military Intervention in East Timor, 1999, PhD Thesis, The 
Australian National University, Canberra, February 2009. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
262 
 
Pilger, John, A Secret County, Great Britain: Vintage, 1989. 
 
PM Accuses Latham of “Indifference” to US Alliance, ABC News, 11 June 2004, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2004-06-11/pm-accuses-latham-of-indifference-to-
us-alliance/1991070>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Politics, Social Networks, and the History of Mass Communications Research: 
Rereading Personal Influence, special edition of the Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 608, November 2006. 
 
Powell, Robin, Pressures Are Mounting to Curb Cigarette Advertising Down Under, 
Advertising Age, 12 September 1983. 
 
President’s Departure Sets Legacy Deadline, Australian Financial Review, 2 January 
2007. 
 
Public Support for Iraq War Hits Low, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 April 2006, 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/National/Public-support-for-Iraq-war-hits-low/
2006/04/21/1145344267763.html, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Ramsey, Alan, The Sermon Bush Wants to Hear, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 
2004, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/06/11/1086749896060.html>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Ranald, Patricia, “The Australia-US Free Trade Agreement: Reinforcing Re-
peripherisation” in Bowes, Paul, Broomhill, Ray, Gutierrez-Haces, Teresa, and 
McBride, Stephen (eds), International Trade and Neoliberal Globalism: Towards Re-
peripherisation in Australia, Canada and Mexico?, London: Routledge, 2008. 
 
Ranald, Patricia, The Australia-US Free Trade Agreement: A Contest of Interests, 
Journal of Australian Political Economy, no. 57, June 2006, pp. 30-56. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
263 
 
Renouf, Alan, The Frightened Country, South Melbourne: MacMillan, 1979. 
 
Reynolds, David, A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International 
Order Since the Second World War, International Affairs, vol. 62, no. 1, 1985-1986, 
pp. 1-20. 
 
Reynolds, Henry, Forgotten War, Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2013. 
 
Reynolds, Wayne, Loyal to the End: The Fourth British Empire, Australia and the 
Bomb, 1943–57, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 33, no. 119, 2002, pp. 38-54. 
 
Riordan, Shaun, Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm?, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, Discussion Papers in 
Diplomacy, no. 95, November 2004, <http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/
20041100_cli_paper_dip_issue95.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Robinson, William I., Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention, and 
Hegemony, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
 
Roggeveen, Sam, America Has No Better Friend Than [Insert Country Here], The 
Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 12 January 2011, <http://www
.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/01/12/America-has-no-better-friend-than-insert-
country.aspx>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Roggeveen, Sam, Tony Abbott and the US Alliance, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute 
for International Policy, 21 August 2013, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/
2013/08/21/Tony-Abbott-and-the-US-alliance.aspx>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Rosewarne, Stuart, “Ruling the Region” in Verity Burgmann and Jenny Lee (eds), A 
Most Suitable Acquisition: A People’s History of Australia since 1788, Melbourne: 
McPhee Gribble Publishers, 1988. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
264 
 
Rosewarne, Stuart, Australia’s Changing Role in the South Pacific: Global 
Restructuring and the Assertion of Metropolitan State Authority, Journal of 
Australian Political Economy, no. 40, December 1997, pp. 80-116. 
 
Ross, Robert S., The US Pivot to Asia and Implications for Australia, Centre of Gravity 
Series, ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, March 2013, <http://ips.cap.anu
.edu.au/publications/us-pivot-asia-and-implications-australia>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
Rudd, Kevin, Kevin Rudd’s Address, The Australian, 24 August 2007, <http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/climate/kevin-rudds-address/story-e6frg6xf-
1111114253042>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Rudd, Kevin, speech to the Australian American Leadership Dialogue, Melbourne, 15 
August 2009. 
 
Said, Edward, Orientalism, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978. 
 
Scahill, Jeremy, Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield, New York: Nation Books, 
2013. 
 
Scanlan, Phillip, A Trade Pact to Prise US Door Open, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 
March 2004, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/03/01/1078117362609.ht
ml>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Scanlan, Phillip, Australia and the United States, Towards a Deeper Relationship, 
speech to the Australian Institute of International Affairs (WA Branch), 26 July 2005. 
 
Scanlan, Phillip, Australia Must Learn How to Benefit from the US Alliance, The Age, 
30 January 2007. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
265 
 
Scanlan, Phillip, Australian American Leadership Dialogue, New Observer, 2 May 
2004. 
 
Scanlan, Phillip, interview with Jane Singleton, City Extra, ABC, 18 June 1984. 
 
Scanlan, Phillip, Leader Dialogue Still Strong, Australian Financial Review, 5 February 
2015. 
 
Scanlan, Phillip, Leaders Dialogue Proudly Bipartisan, Australian Financial Review, 
21 February 2007. 
 
Scanlan, Phillip, More Than Just Brothers In Arms, Australian Financial Review, 10 
October 2001. 
 
Scanlan, Phillip, New World Disorder, Australian Financial Review, 3 July 2003. 
 
Scanlan, Phillip, Rights Threatened, The Australian, 14 May 1984.  
 
Scanlan, Phillip, submission to the Secretary, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade References Committee, 3 January 2004. 
Scanlan, Phillip, Tobacco and a Bill of Rights, Australian Financial Review, 6 May 
1985. 
 
Scappatura, Vince, L’Australie, Pièce Central Du << Pivot >> Amèricain, Le Monde 
Diplomatique, Poudrières Asiatiques, 139, Fèvrier – Mars, 2015, pp. 60-63, <https://
www.monde-diplomatique.fr/mav/139/SCAPPATURA/52574>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
Scappatura, Vince, The Role of the AALD in Preserving the Australia-US Alliance, 
Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 49, no. 4, 2014, pp. 596-610. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
266 
 
Scappatura, Vince, The US “Pivot” to Asia, the China Spectre and the Australian-
American Alliance, The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 12, issue 36, no. 3, 9 September 
2014, <http://apjjf.org/2014/12/36/Vince-Scappatura/4178/article.html>, accessed 
5 April 2016. 
 
Schreer, Benjamin, Business as Usual? The 2013 Defence White Paper and the US 
Alliance, Security Challenges, vol. 9, no. 2, 2013, pp. 35-42. 
 
Schreer, Benjamin, Moving Beyond Ambitions? Indonesia's Military Modernisation, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Canberra, November 2013, <https://
www.aspi.org.au/publications/moving-beyond-ambitions-indonesias-military-
modernisation>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Scott-Smith, Giles, Mapping the Undefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of 
Exchange Programs within International Relations Theory, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 616, March 2008, pp. 173-196. 
 
Scott-Smith, Giles, Networks of Empire: The US State Department’s Foreign Leader 
Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950-70, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 
2008. 
 
Scott-Smith, Giles, Searching for the Successor Generation: Public Diplomacy, the 
US Embassy’s International Visitor Program and the Labour Party in the 1980s, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 8, 2006, pp. 214-237. 
 
Selden, Mark, and So, Alvin Y. (eds), War & State Terrorism: The United States, 
Japan, & the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century, Oxford: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2004. 
 
Selden, Mark, East Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political 
Economy and Geopolitics, 16th to 21st Centuries, The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 7, 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
267 
 
issue 9, no. 4, 25 February 2009, <http://apjjf.org/-Mark-Selden/3061/article.html>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Seldon, Mark, Economic Nationalism and Regionalism in Contemporary East Asia, 
The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 10, issue 43, no. 2, 29 October 2012, <http://apjjf.org/
2012/10/43/Mark-Selden/3848/article.html>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Sexton, Michael, War for the Asking: Australia’s Vietnam Secret, Ringwood, Victoria: 
Penguin Books, 1981. 
 
Shearer, Andrew, Unchartered Waters: The US Alliance and Australia’s New Era of 
Strategic Uncertainty, Lowy Institute Perspectives, Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, Sydney, August 2011, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/unchart
ed-waters-us-alliance-and-australias-new-era-strategic-uncertainty>, accessed 5 
April 2016. 
 
Sheridan, Greg, Bob Carr Right Choice for Foreign Job, The Australian, 3 March 
2012. 
 
Sheridan, Greg, Continuity in Foreign Affairs but Questions Remain, The Australian, 
1 July 2010. 
 
Sheridan, Greg, Distorted Vision of Future US-China Relations, The Australian, 11 
September 2010, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/distorted-vision-of-
future-us-china-relations/story-e6frg6zo-1225917582189>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Sheridan, Greg, Financial Shadow on Alliances, The Australian, 25 September 2008. 
 
Sheridan, Greg, Leader to Stay True on Foreign Affairs, The Australian, 25 June 2010. 
 
Sheridan, Greg, Obama Opts for a Friend of Australia in Key Policy Role, The 
Australian, 19 January 2009. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
268 
 
 
Sheridan, Greg, Power Talking, The Australian, 23 July 2003. 
 
Sheridan, Greg, The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance 
Under Bush and Howard, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006. 
 
Signitzer, Benno H., and Coombs, Timothy, Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: 
Conceptual Convergences, Public Relations Review, vol. 18, no. 2, 1992, pp. 137-
147. 
 
Simon, Sheldon W., Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the 
Asia-Pacific: the CSCAP Experience, The Pacific Review, vol. 15, no. 2, 2002, pp. 167-
200. 
 
Simpson, Christopher, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and 
Psychological Warfare 1945-1960, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Siracusa, Joseph M., The ANZUS Treaty Revisited, Security Challenges, vol. 1, no. 1, 
2005, pp. 89-104. 
 
Sissons, D.C.S., The Pacific Pact, Australian Outlook, vol. 6, no. 1, 1952, pp. 20-26. 
 
Smith, Gary, and Kettle, St John (eds), Threats Without Enemies: Rethinking 
Australia’s Security, Sydney: Pluto Press, 1992. 
 
Snow, Nancy, International Exchanges and the US Image, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 616, no. 1, 2008, pp. 198-222. 
 
Snow, Nancy, Propaganda, Inc. Selling America’s Culture to the World (3rd Edition), 
New York: Seven Stories Press, 2010. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
269 
 
Snyder, Glenn H., The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics, World Politics, vol. 36, 
no. 4, 1984, pp. 461-495. 
 
Stanley, Peter, “Dramatic Myth and Dull Truth: Invasion by Japan in 1942” in 
Stockings, Craig (ed), Zombie Myths of Australian Military History, Sydney: UNSW 
Press, 2010. 
 
Stephens, Tony, Blessings from the King George Show, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 
January 1992. 
 
Stewart, Cameron, Spy Chiefs Cross Swords Over China as Kevin Rudd Backs 
Defence Hawks, The Australian, 11 April 2009, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/
news/spy-chiefs-cross-swords-over-china/story-e6frg6n6-1225697020657>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Silove, Nina, The Pivot before the Pivot: US Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance 
in Asia, International Security, vol. 40, no. 4, Spring 2016, pp. 45-88. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., Globalization and its Discontents, New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2003. 
 
Stone, Diane L., The ASEAN-ISIS Network: Interpretative Communities, Informal 
Diplomacy and Discourses of Region, Minerva, vol. 49, no. 2, 2011, pp. 241-262. 
 
Sullivan, David, “Sipping a Thin Gruel: Academic and Policy Closure in Australia’s 
Defence and Security Discourse” in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds), 
Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking 
After the Cold War, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996. 
 
Tan, See Seng, Non-official Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: “Civil Society” or “Civil 
Service”?, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 27, no. 3, 2005, pp. 370-387. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
270 
 
Tanter, Richard, “Just in Case”: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defence of 
Australia, Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies, vol. XXVI, no. 1, April 
2011, pp. 113-136. 
 
Tanter, Richard, After Obama – The New Joint Facilities, Nautilus Institute for 
Security and Sustainability, 18 April 2012, <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/12/After-Obama-Back-to-the-Bases-footnoted-version-18-April-1500.pdf>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Tanter, Richard, Possibilities and Effects of a Nuclear Attack on Pine Gap, Australian 
Defence Facilities Pine Gap, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 30 
October 2013, <http://nautilus.org/briefing-books/australian-defence-facilities/
possibilities-and-effects-of-a-nuclear-missile-attack-on-pine-gap/>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
Tanter, Richard, The $40 Billion Submarine Pathway to Australian Strategic 
Confusion, NAPSNet Policy Forum, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 
20 April 2015, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/the-40-billion-
submarine-pathway-to-australian-strategic-confusion/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Tanter, Richard, The “Joint Facilities” Revisited – Desmond Ball, Democratic Debate 
on Security, and the Human Interest, Nautilus Institute for Security and 
Sustainability, Special Report, 11 December 2012, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/
napsnet-special-reports/the-joint-facilities-revisited-desmond-ball-democratic-
debate-on-security-and-the-human-interest/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Tanter, Richard, The US Military Presence in Australia: Asymmetrical Alliance 
Cooperation and its Alternatives, The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 11, issue 45, no. 1, 11 
November 2013, <http://apjjf.org/2013/11/45/Richard-Tanter/4025/article.html>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Tanter, Richard, Trends in Asia, Alternatives, vol. 10, 1984, pp. 161-169. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
271 
 
 
Taylor, Brendan, The Defence White Paper 2013 and Australia’s Strategic 
Environment, Security Challenges, vol. 9, no. 2, 2013, pp. 15-22. 
 
Taylor, Brendan, Unbreakable Alliance? ANZUS in the Asian Century, Asian Politics 
and Policy, vol. 8, no. 1, 2016, pp. 75-85. 
 
Taylor, Ian, APEC, Globalisation, and 9/11, Critical Asian Studies, vol. 36, no. 3, 2004, 
pp. 463-478. 
 
Thawley, Michael, More Power to Australia, address to the Sir Robert Menzies 
Lecture Trust, Melbourne, Parliament House, 4 November 2005. 
 
The Authors and Editors, “Introduction - Breaching Institutionalised Habits of Mind” 
in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds), Discourses of Danger & Dread 
Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War, Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 1996. 
 
The United States Studies Centre (USSC), Australian Attitudes Towards the United 
States: Foreign Policy, Security, Economics and Trade, presentation by Professor 
Murray Goot, 3 October 2007, <http://ussc.edu.au/ussc/assets/media/docs/pub
lications/0708_nationalopinionsurvey_part1.pdf>, accessed 1 April 2016. 
 
Thomas, Jim, Cooper, Zack, and Rehman, Iskander, Gateway to the Indo-Pacific: 
Australian Defence Strategy and the Future of the Australia-US Alliance, Centre for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, November 2013, <http://csbaonline.org/pub
lications/2013/11/gateway-to-the-indo-pacific-australian-defense-strategy-and-the-
future-of-the-australia-u-s-alliance-2/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Thompson, Alistair, Lake, Marilyn, and Cottle, Drew, “Australians at War” in 
Burgmann, Verity, and  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
272 
 
Lee, Jenny (eds), A Most Suitable Acquisition: A People’s History of Australia since 
1788, Melbourne: McPhee Gribble Publishers, 1988. 
 
Thompson, Mark, How Much Is Too Little? Learning to Live With a Smaller Force, 
The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 15 August 2012, <http://
www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-much-is-too-little-learning-to-live-with-a-smaller-
force/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Thompson, Mark, The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2012-2013, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Canberra, May 2012, <https://www.aspi
.org.au/publications/the-cost-of-defence-aspi-defence-budget-brief-2012-2013>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Thompson, Mark, with Claxton, Karl and Muir, Tom, The Cost of Defence: ASPI 
Defence Budget Brief 2014-2015, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 
Canberra, May 2014, <https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-cost-of-defence-
aspi-defence-budget-brief-2014-2015>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Thompson, Roger C., Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist Era 
1820-1920, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980. 
 
Thornton, Songok Han and Thornton, William H., Development Without Freedom: 
The Politics of Asian Globalization, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2008. 
 
Tilly, Charles, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1992, Cambridge: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1992. 
 
Toohey, Brian and Pinwill, William, Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret 
Intelligence Service, Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia, 1989, p. 179. 
 
Toohey, Brian, and Wilkinson, Marian, The Book of Leaks: Exposes in Defence of the 
Public’s Right to Know, North Ryde: Angus and Robertson, 1987. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
273 
 
 
Toohey, Brian, The Dialogue Box, Australian Financial Review, 24 April 2008. 
 
Tow, William, “Alliances and Alignments in the Twenty-First Century” in Taylor, 
Brendan, (ed), Australia as an Asia Pacific Regional Power: Friendship in Flux?, 
London: Routledge, 2007. 
 
Turse, Nick, and Engelhardt, Tom, Terminator Planet: The First History of Drone 
Warfare 2001-2050, Dispatch Books, 25 May 2012. 
 
Turse, Nick, Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam, New 
York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Co, 2013. 
 
Ungerer, Carl, Spit and Polish for Middle Power, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 March 
2008, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/03/27/1206207302302.html>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Ungerer, Carl, The ”Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 53, no. 4, 2007, pp. 538-551. 
 
US Department of State, International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), US Bureau 
of Educational and Cultural Affairs, <http://eca.state.gov/ivlp>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
US Department of State, US Relations with Australia, Fact Sheet, Bureau of East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, 25 February 2016, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/
2698.htm>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
US Embassy Canberra, “A Left-Winger Now a Pragmatist”, cable #1074, 10 June 
2009, reproduced at The Age, <http://images.theage.com.au/file/2010/12/15/
2096934/Cables.htm?rand=1292396653979>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
274 
 
US Embassy Canberra, “Gillard the Pro-American”, cable #58001, 13 June 2008, 
reproduced at The Age, http://images.theage.com.au/file/2010/12/15/2096934/
Cables.htm?rand=1292396653979>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
US Embassy Canberra, “Pro-Israel”, cable #1074, 10 June 2009, reproduced at The 
Age, <http://images.theage.com.au/file/2010/12/15/2096934/Cables.htm?rand=12
92396653979>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Vine, David, Base Nation: How US Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the 
World, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2015. 
 
Vucetic, Srdjan, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialised Identity in 
International Relations, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. 
 
Wainwright, Elsina, Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon 
Islands, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Canberra, 10 June 2003, 
<https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/our-failing-neighbour-australia-and-the-
future-of-solomon-islands>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Walker, David, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939, St Lucia, 
Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1999. 
 
Walker, Tony, Cheney, Rudd to Discuss Alliance, Australian Financial Review, 19 
February 2007. 
 
Walker, Tony, The Extraordinary Reach of Albert Dadon, Australian Financial 
Review, 10 April 2010. 
 
Wallis, Joanne, The South Pacific: “Arc of Instability” or “Arc of Opportunity?”, 
Global Change Peace & Security: Formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global 
Change, vol. 27, no. 1, 2015, pp. 39-53. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
275 
 
Walt, Stephen M., Why Alliances Endure or Collapse, Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy, vol. 39, no. 1, 1997, pp. 156-179. 
 
Waters, Christopher, ‘Against the Tide’: Australian Government Attitudes to 
Decolonisation in the South Pacific, 1962-1972, The Journal of Pacific History, vol. 
48, no. 2, 2013, pp. 194-208. 
 
Waters, Christopher, A Failure of Imagination: R.G. Casey and Australian Plans for 
Counter-Subversion in Asia, 1954-1956, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
vol. 45, no. 3, 1999, pp. 347-361. 
 
Waters, Christopher, After Decolonisation: Australia and the Emergence of the Non-
aligned Movement in Asia, 1954-55, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 12, no. 2, 2001, 
pp. 153-174. 
 
Weiss, Linda, Thurbon, Elizabeth, and Matthews, John, How to Kill a Country: 
Australia’s Devastating Trade Deal with the United States, Crows Nest, Australia: 
Allen & Unwin, 2004. 
 
Wesley, Michael, The Rich Tradition of Australian Realism, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, vol. 55, no. 3, 2009, pp. 324-334. 
 
Wesley, Michael, There Goes the Neighbourhood: Australia and the Rise of Asia, 
Sydney: New South, 2011, pp. 143-144. 
 
White, Hugh, “Four Decades of the Defence of Australia: Reflections on Australian 
Defence Policy Over the Past 40 Years” in Huisken, Ron, and Thatcher, Meredith 
(eds), History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence 
Policy, Canberra: Australian National University E Press, 2007. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
276 
 
White, Hugh, Beyond the Defence of Australia: Finding a New Balance in Australian 
Strategic Policy, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2006, <http://www.
lowyinstitute.org/publications/beyond-defence-australia>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
White, Hugh, DWP 2016 and Self-Reliance, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute (ASPI), 8 March 2016, <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/dwp-2016-and-
self-reliance/>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
White, Hugh, Power Shift: Australia’s Future Between Washington and Beijing, 
Quarterly Essay, vol. 39, 2010. 
 
White, Hugh, Strategic Overreach, American Review, 17 August 2014. 
 
White, Hugh, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 
 
Wilder, Tracy H., and Packard, Robert F., Australia in Mid-Passage: A Study of Her 
Role in the Indian Ocean-Southeast Asia Area, Foreign Service Institute, US 
Department of State, 11 April 1966, p. 17, <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/up
loads/2012/09/711-Tracy-H.-Wilder-and-Robert-F.-Packard.pdf>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
Wolpe, Bruce C., A Message to Clinton, Stick Around, Mate, Australian Financial 
Review, 7 September 1995. 
 
Wood, James, “Australian Aims During the Occupation of Japan 1945-1952: From 
Occupier to Protector” in Matos, Christine De, and Gerster, Robin (eds), Occupying 
the “Other”: Australia and Military Occupations From Japan to Iraq, Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, 2009. 
 
Woolcott, Richard, The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to 
the Bali Bombings, Sydney: Harper Collins, 2003. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
277 
 
 
Wroe, David, Former PM John Howard Defends Top Bureaucrat Michael Thawley 
Over China Remarks, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 July 2015, <http://www.smh.com
.au/federal-politics/political-news/former-pm-john-howard-defends-top-bureau
crat-michael-thawley-over-china-remarks-20150702-gi3puy.html>, accessed 5 April 
2016. 
 
Zinn, Howard, The Power and the Glory, Boston Review, 1 June 2005, <http://www.
bostonreview.net/zinn-power-glory>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Zunes, Stephen, The Israel Lobby Revisited, Common Dreams, 23 December 2007, 
<http://www.commondreams.org/views/2007/12/23/israel-lobby-revisited>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Zunes, Stephen, The Israel Lobby: How Powerful Is It Really?, Mother Jones, 18 May 
2006, <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/05/israel-lobby-how-powerful-
it-really>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
 
Interviews and Correspondence 
 
Anonymous, Australian corporate executive, interview with author. 
 
Anonymous, Australian Liberal Party MP, interview with author. 
 
Anonymous, former Australian diplomat, interview with author. 
 
Anonymous, former ALP MP, interview with author. 
 
Bolkus, Nick, interview with author, 6 September 2011. 
 
Denton, John W. H., interview with author, 15 February 2012. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
278 
 
Dibb, Paul, interview with author, 13 September 2011. 
 
Downer, Alexander, interview with author, 14 September 2011. 
 
Dunn, Alan, interview with author, 23 November 2011. 
 
Evans, Gareth, interview with author, 10 April 2012. 
 
Flitton, Daniel, correspondence with author, 14 August 2011. 
 
Greiner, Nick, interview with author, 6 July 2011. 
 
Haigh, Bruce, interview with author, 22 November 2011. 
 
Harley, Tom, interview with author, 2 November 2011. 
 
Harris, Stuart, interview with author, 15 November 2011. 
 
Hartcher, Peter, interview with author, 29 October 2011. 
 
Hawke, Allan, interview with author, 29 December 2011. 
 
Henderson, Gerard, interview with author, 7 March 2012. 
 
Howes, Paul, interview with author, 5 August 2011. 
 
Hughes, Anthony, interview with author, 21 December 2011. 
 
Kelly, Paul, interview with author, 20 January 2012. 
 
Kemp, David, interview with author, 31 August 2011. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
279 
 
Latham, Mark, interview with author, 22 November 2011. 
 
Lawrence, Carmen, interview with author, 14 November 2011. 
 
Lipski, Sam, interview with author, 25 October 2011. 
 
Loosley, Stephen, interview with author, 11 January 2012. 
 
MacIntyre, Andrew, interview with author, 28 June 2011. 
 
McDonald, Hamish, interview with author, 15 November 2011. 
 
Milne, Glenn, interview with author, 9 November 2011. 
 
O’Dwyer, Kelly, interview with author, 21 October 2011. 
 
Reynolds, Anna, correspondence with author, 25 July 2011. 
 
Rhiannon, Lee, interview with author, 31 August 2011. 
 
Robb, Andrew, interview with author, 15 July 2011. 
 
Russell, Don, interview with author, 21 December 2012. 
 
Sembler, Mel, interview with author, 21 March 2012. 
 
Smith, Warwick, interview with author, 8 December 2011. 
 
Toohey, Brian, interview with author, 28 November 2011. 
 
Turnbull, Malcolm, interview with author, 20 April 2012. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
280 
 
White, Hugh, interview with author, 2 September 2011. 
 
Woodroofe, Thom, interview with author, 21 July 2011. 
 
Woolcott, Richard, interview with author, 22 March 2012. 
 
  
281 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: AALD Participants List, 1993-2011 (Unofficial)* 
 
Column1 Participant Country 
1 Admiral Chris Barrie Australia 
2 Alan Dunn United States 
3 Albert Dadon Australia 
4 Alcee Hastings United States 
5 Alexander Downer Australia 
6 Allan Fels Australia 
7 Allan Hawke Australia 
8 Amanda Johnston-Pel Australia 
9 Andrew Liveris Australia 
10 Andrew MacIntyre Australia 
11 Andrew Peacock Australia 
12 Andrew Robb  Australia 
13 Anne Keating Australia 
14 Anne Wexler United States 
15 Anne-Marie Slaughter United States 
16 Anthony Hughes Australia 
17 Arthur Sinodinos Australia 
18 Barack Obama United States 
19 Barrie Cassidy Australia 
20 Barry Jackson  United States 
21 Benjamin Gray Australia 
22 Bill Shorten Australia 
23 Bob Carr  Australia 
24 Bob Hawke Australia 
25 Bob Savage Australia 
26 Brendan Nelson Australia 
27 Brent Scowcroft United States 
APPENDIX A 
282 
 
28 Bruce Reed United States 
29 Bruce Stokes United States 
30 Bruce Wolpe Australia 
31 Bud Cramer United States 
32 Calvin Dooley United States 
33 Cameron Clyne Australia 
34 Carolyn Hewson Australia 
35 Charles Cook United States 
36 Chip Goodyear United States 
37 Chris Blake Australia 
38 Chris Bowen Australia 
39 Christine Nixon Australia 
40 Chuck Hagel United States 
41 Condoleezza Rice United States 
42 Cory Booker United States 
43 Cynthia Schneider United States 
44 Daniel Flitton Australia 
45 David Bartlett Australia 
46 David Carey United States 
47 David Epstein Australia 
48 David Hale United States 
49 David Kemp Australia 
50 David Kennedy United States 
51 David MacGibbon Australia 
52 Dennis Richardson Australia 
53 Dick Cheney United States 
54 Don Russell Australia 
55 Don Voelte Australia 
56 Doug Paal United States 
57 Douglas Bereuter United States 
58 E. J. Dionne Jr United States 
59 Eliot Cohen United States 
60 Emery Severin Australia 
APPENDIX A 
283 
 
61 Evan Feigenbaum United States 
62 Frank Lavin United States 
63 Gareth Evans Australia 
64 Genta H. Holmes United States 
65 Geoff Dixon Australia 
66 Geoff Walsh Australia 
67 George Brandis Australia 
68 George Schultz United States 
69 Geraldine Doogue Australia 
70 Glenn Milne Australia 
71 Grant Aldonas United States 
72 Greg Bujac United States 
73 Greg Earl Australia 
74 Greg Hywood Australia 
75 Greg Sheridan Australia 
76 Henry Waxman United States 
77 Hillary Clinton United States 
78 Hugh Morgan Australia 
79 Hugh White Australia 
80 Irene Moss Australia 
81 Jack Watson United States 
82 
James L. 
Connaughton 
United States 
83 James Packer Australia 
84 James Wolfensohn Australia 
85 Jamie Briggs Australia 
86 Jane Harman United States 
87 Janet Albrechtsen Australia 
88 Janet Holmes a Court Australia 
89 Jason Clare Australia 
90 Jay Johnson Australia 
91 Jeanne Pratt Australia 
92 Jeff Bader United States 
APPENDIX A 
284 
 
93 Jeff Bleich United States 
94 Jeff Kennett Australia 
95 Jennifer Hewett Australia 
96 Jill Hickson Australia 
97 Jill Schuker United States 
98 Jim Bacon Australia 
99 Jim Kelly United States 
100 Jim Kolbe United States 
101 Jim Steinberg United States 
102 Joe Duffey United States 
103 Joel Fitzgibbon Australia 
104 John Baker Australia 
105 John Brogden Australia 
106 John Brumby Australia 
107 John Denton Australia 
108 John Gay Australia 
109 John Hess  United States 
110 John Hewson Australia 
111 John Howard Australia 
112 John McCain United States 
113 John McCarthy Australia 
114 John Moore Australia 
115 John Murphy Australia 
116 John Negroponte United States 
117 John Olson Australia 
118 John Shalikashvili United States 
119 Joshua Frydenberg Australia 
120 Julia Gillard Australia 
121 Julie Bishop Australia 
122 Julie Inman Grant Australia 
123 Julie Singer Scanlan United States 
124 Karl Rove United States 
125 Kelly O'Dwyer Australia 
APPENDIX A 
285 
 
126 Ken Dam United States 
127 Kevan Gosper Australia 
128 Kevin Nealer United States 
129 Kevin Rudd Australia 
130 Kim Beazley Australia 
131 Kristina Keneally Australia 
132 Kurt Campbell United States 
133 Lael Brainard United States 
134 Lamar Alexander United States 
135 Larry Irving United States 
136 Larry Lindsay United States 
137 Larry Smarr United States 
138 Laurie Brereton Australia 
139 Laurie Oakes Australia 
140 Lyric Hughes Hale United States 
141 Mal Brough Australia 
142 Malcolm Turnbull Australia 
143 Margaret Jackson Australia 
144 Mark Arbib Australia 
145 Mark Birrell Australia 
146 Mark Bishop Australia 
147 Mark Vaile Australia 
148 Martha Raddatz United States 
149 Martin Adams Australia 
150 Martin Ferguson Australia 
151 Martyn Evans Australia 
152 Maxine McKew Australia 
153 Mehrdad Baghai Australia 
154 Mel Sembler United States 
155 Michael Cook Australia 
156 Michael Gawenda Australia 
157 Michael Green United States 
158 Michael Kroger Australia 
APPENDIX A 
286 
 
159 Michael L’Estrange Australia 
160 Michael Porter United States 
161 Michael Powell United States 
162 Michael Wesley Australia 
163 Michele Flournoy United States 
164 Mike Rann Australia 
165 Mitch Fifield Australia 
166 Nick Bolkus Australia 
167 Nick Greiner Australia 
168 Nick Warner United States 
169 Norman J. Ornstein United States 
170 Pat Turner Australia 
171 Paul Dibb Australia 
172 Paul Howes Australia 
173 Paul Kelly Australia 
174 Paul Wolfowitz United States 
175 Paula Dobriansky United States 
176 Paula Stern United States 
177 Pete Wilson United States 
178 Peter Beinart United States 
179 Peter Cook Australia 
180 Peter Cosgrove Australia 
181 Peter Costello Australia 
182 Peter Cowhey United States 
183 Peter Doherty Australia 
184 Peter Dutton Australia 
185 Peter Garrett Australia 
186 Peter Hartcher Australia 
187 Peter Reith Australia 
188 Peter Watson United States 
189 Peter Yates Australia 
190 Phil Lader United States 
191 Phillip Scanlan Australia 
APPENDIX A 
287 
 
192 Porter Goss United States 
193 Ralph Ives United States 
194 
Raymond Walter 
Apple Jr 
United States 
195 Richard Alston Australia 
196 Richard Armitage United States 
197 Richard Court Australia 
198 Richard Marles Australia 
199 Richard Pratt Australia 
200 Richard Woolcott Australia 
201 Robert Doyle Australia 
202 Robert Hormats United States 
203 Robert McCallum Jnr United States 
204 Robert McClelland Australia 
205 Robert Thompson United States 
206 Robert Walker United States 
207 Robert Zoellick United States 
208 Ron Wilson Australia 
209 Ross Garnaut Australia 
210 Rush Holt United States 
211 Sally Loane Australia 
212 Sam Lipski Australia 
213 Sandra Kristoff United States 
214 Sandra Yates Australia 
215 Simon Crean Australia 
216 Stanley Roth United States 
217 Stephen Conroy Australia 
218 Stephen Loosley Australia 
219 Stephen Smith Australia 
220 Steve Bracks Australia 
221 Steve Clemons United States 
222 Steve Deady Australia 
223 Steve Howard Australia 
APPENDIX A 
288 
 
224 Steve Martin Australia 
225 Steven R. Okun United States 
226 Stuart Harris Australia 
227 Susan Rice United States 
228 Terry Campbell United States 
229 Therese Rein Australia 
230 Thom Woodroofe Australia 
231 Thomas E. Mann United States 
232 Thomas Friedman United States 
233 Thomas Mann United States 
234 Tim Fischer Australia 
235 Tom Harley Australia 
236 Tom Schieffer United States 
237 Tom Schneider United States 
238 Tony Abbott Australia 
239 Tony Parkinson Australia 
240 Tony Walker Australia 
241 Vernon Walters United States 
242 Warren Christopher United States 
243 Warren Scott Australia 
244 Warren Snowdon Australia 
245 Warwick McKibbon Australia 
246 Warwick Smith Australia 
247 Wayne Osborn Australia 
248 Wayne Swan Australia 
249 Wendy Sherman United States 
250 William Burns United States 
251 William Cohen United States 
252 William Perry United States 
253 Winston Lord United States 
 
*Source: Author research based on news articles, websites and interviews. 
 
  
289 
 
Appendix B: Inaugural AALD, Washington, 1993 (Various Photos) 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
290 
 
 
 
 291 
 
Appendix C: George H. W. Bush and Bob Hawke, with Mel Sembler, White 
House, 27 June 1989 
 
 
